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Access to medicines, and the unavoidable conflict that arises between Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPRs) and Human Rights remains a major concern for both developing and developed countries. 
The extent and resultant impacts of pandemics such as the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), 
malaria, tuberculosis and the increasing burden of ‘diseases of western lifestyle’,1 such as cancer, 
could be argued in itself as justification for some degree of limitation of IPRs.  
Notably, in 2012 between 32.2 and 38.8 million of people in the world lived affected by HIV,2 
whereas in sub-Saharan Africa alone was found 70% of new infections.3 Even though more people 
than ever are currently under life-saving antiretroviral therapy (ARV),4 in sub-Saharan Africa 
almost three-quarters of HIV positive people have not suppressed the viral load due to gaps in 
treatments resulting from shortages.5 Women are the most affected by this pandemic, with the 
chance of being HIV positive estimated to be double that of men.6 Moreover, it should be taken 
into account that although first-line treatments are available in the market at a price that is greatly 
reduced than before, the second-line treatments are still unaffordable for the majority of people 
leaving with HIV.7 In particular, the World Health Organization (WHO) Report of 2013 shows 
                                                             
1 Lifestyle diseases or diseases of civilization are diseases more common in industrialised countries where people live 
usually longer. They can include Alzheimer, arthritis, atherosclerosis, asthma, cancer, chronic liver disease or cirrhosis, 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, Type 2 diabetes, heart disease, metabolic syndrome, chronic renal failure, 
osteoporosis, stroke, depression and obesity. 
2 See Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), GLOBAL REPORT – UNAIDS Report on the Global 
AIDS epidemic 2013, (2013) 8, available at:  
http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/media_asset/UNAIDS_Global_Report_2013_en_1.pdf, accessed on 24 
September 2014. 
3 See Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) (note above), 12. 
4 See WHO, Global Update on HIV Treatment 2013: Results, Impact and Opportunities, in partnership with UNICEF 
and UNAIDS (2013), 13 available at: 
http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/sub_landing/files/20130630_treatment_report_en_3.pdf, accessed on 
September 2014. In particular, the report explains that “the number of people accessing antiretroviral therapy (ART) 
globally continues to climb rapidly, and the target of reaching 15 million people with this life-saving treatment is 
within grasp”. 
5 See Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) (note above), 50. 
6 See Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) (note above), 17. 
7 S. F. Musungu, Access to Art and Other Essential Medicines in Sub-Saharan Africa: Intellectual Property and 
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that the median cost of second-line regimens per person per year was US$ 453 in low-income 
countries, US$ 451 in lower-middle-income countries and US$ 442 in upper-middle-income 
countries.8 Therefore, the price of second-line treatments remains exorbitant for the majority of 
people living with HIV.9 In addition, third-line regimes are tremendously costly, since they can be 
“18 times more than the lowest price for first-line regimens”.10 Even though the WHO Report also 
indicates a decrease in the cost of second-line treatments between 2010 and 2012, 11  these 
improvements, although encouraging, are not sufficient to address the issue and a reduction in the 
cost of second- and third-line regimes should be considered as a priority. 
South Africa is the country with the highest number of people in the world living with HIV.12 
Moreover, HIV and tuberculosis in South Africa are particularly linked with more than the 50% 
of the new tuberculosis cases associated to HIV.13 In particular, tuberculosis is the principal cause 
of death amongst people affected by HIV.14 As shown, the problem is not limited to HIV/AIDS 
alone. Other diseases such as tuberculosis, malaria and an increasing growth of non-communicable 
diseases continue to pose great threats to lives in South Africa.15 A recent report distributed by the 
journal Lancet Oncology foresees that cancer will grow in South Africa by 78% by 2030.16 From 
a worldwide viewpoint, the World Health Organization's International Agency for Cancer 
Research (IARC) predicts that the global cancer rate will grow by 75% by the year 2030. Those 
expansions will negatively affect the healthcare systems in developing countries since care of 
cancer is costlier than care for infectious diseases.17 
                                                             
Relevant Legislations, Report Commissioned by The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Regional 
Service Centre for Eastern and Southern Africa, (September 2007), iii).  
8 See WHO, Global Update on HIV Treatment 2013: Results, Impact and Opportunities, (note 4 above), 100. 
9 See WHO, Global Update on HIV Treatment 2013: Results, Impact and Opportunities, (note 4 above), 100. 
10 See WHO, Global Update on HIV Treatment 2013: Results, Impact and Opportunities, (note 4 above), 100. 
11 See WHO, Global Update on HIV Treatment 2013: Results, Impact and Opportunities, (note 4 above), 100. 
12 See C. Park, A. Prabhala & J. Berger, Using Law to Accelerate Treatment Access in South Africa: an analysis of 
patent, competition and medicines law, in United Nations Development Programme (2013) New York, 9. The full 
document is available here: http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/hiv-aids/using-law-to-
accelerate-treatment-access-in-south-africa.html, accessed on 29 September 2014. 
13 See Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) (note 2 above) 67. 
14 See Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) (note 2 above) 67. 
15 See C. Park, A. Prabhala & J. Berger (note above) 9.  
16  See F. Bray, A. Jemal, N. Grey, J. Ferlay, D. Forman, “Global cancer transitions according to the Human 
Development Index (2008–2030): a population-based study” (2012) The Lancet Oncology Vol. 13, No. 8, 790–801.  
17 See J. Ferlay, H. R.Shin, F. Bray, D.  Forman, C. Mathers, D. M. Parkin, “Estimates of worldwide burden of cancer 
in 2008: GLOBOCAN 2008” in Int J Cancer. (2010) 127: 2893–2917. 
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Besides this, a sharp disparity in access to medicines is noticeable between developed and 
developing countries. In fact, even though developing countries represent almost the 80% of the 
world’s population, their drug consumption is the 20% of the global pharmaceutical use.18 This 
imbalance is thought to be due to the scarcity of resources, excessive medicine prices, lack of skills, 
spread corruption combined with the strong international patent regime imposed by the Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS Agreement).19  
The human right to health, which includes access to medicine, is legally proclaimed in 
International Human Rights Treaties as well as in the majority of national Constitutions,20 such as 
the South African Constitution of 1996. However, an effective realisation of access to medicine 
can be strongly restricted by the current legal framework, which protects the production and 
distribution of medicines with the grant of IPRs. The fundamental right to health and access to 
affordable medicine, although highly proclaimed and defended by International laws, is in practice 
not being adequately addressed by some emerging economies. In particular, according to Médecins 
Sans Frontières (MSF), the difficulty of accessing essential medicines in developing countries 
results from (i) the poor quality of the medicines; (ii) the lack of their availability; (iii) their 
excessive cost; (iv) the extent of the implementation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
Agreements.21  
All WTO Members implemented the TRIPS Agreement, South Africa included, which are obliged 
to comply with its provisions. The TRIPS Agreement aims at protecting and enforcing IPRs 
throughout the world by establishing uniform rules for patents, trade secrets, trademarks, 
geographical indications, copyrights and designs globally. A major concern regarding the TRIPS 
                                                             
18 See R., Amollo, “Revisiting the TRIPS regime: Rwanda-Canadian ARV drug deal "tests" the WTO General Council 
decision” (2009) African Journal of International and Comparative Law, 2.  
19 See R., Amollo (note 18 above) 2. 
20 The right to health has been proclaimed in international and regional human rights treaties as well as national 
constitutions all over the world. Examples of international human rights treaties include: the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, 1948; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966; the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1979; the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989; 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2006. Examples of regional human rights treaties are:  the 
European Social Charter, 1961; the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981; the Additional Protocol 
to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1988. 
21 See Pécoul B., Chirac P., Trouiller P., Pinel J. and Médecins Sans Frontières, Access to essential drugs in poor 
countries: a lost battle?, (1999), available here: http://www.msfaccess.org/content/access-essential-drugs-poor-
countries-lost-battle,  accessed on 1 October 2014. 
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Agreement is ensuring that patent protection for pharmaceutical products does not prevent people 
in developing countries from accessing medicines. In fact, the Paris Convention for the Protection 
of Industrial Property of 1883 (Paris Convention) was, prior to the TRIPS Agreement, the only 
international act for patent protection. This treaty left member countries free to choose their own 
requirements for patenting an invention, allowing some countries, like India22 and Brazil, to not 
grant patent protection for medicines on public health grounds. However, the TRIPS Agreement 
drastically changed the international patent system, by requiring all WTO members to enforce 
effective patent protection for all pharmaceutical products. By providing guidance and binding 
policy directions on IPRs, the TRIPS Agreement also explicitly set a number of flexibilities, to 
allow its members to create their own patent systems. The TRIPS flexibilities aim at permitting 
“developing and least-developed countries to use TRIPS-compatible norms in a manner that 
enables them to pursue their own public policies, either in specific fields like access to 
pharmaceutical products or protection of their biodiversity, or more generally, in establishing 
macroeconomic, institutional conditions that support economic development”.23 In this respect, 
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) explicitly recommended that 
member countries take full advantage of these flexibilities to ensure access to medicines especially 
for serious diseases such as HIV.24 To the same purpose, the WTO Ministerial Conference issued 
in November 2001 a Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (the so-called Doha 
Declaration, hereafter the “Doha Declaration”) in order to emphasise the problems of developing 
countries in implementing the TRIPS Agreement and in particular their difficulty in getting access 
to essential drugs and vaccines.25 This was particularly critical in view of the provision set by art. 
                                                             
22 From 1948 the Indian government set up two committees, known as the Tek Chand Committee and the Ayyangar 
Committee aimed at giving recommendations for a patent law reform. Particularly, the latter concluded that patent 
protection should not be granted in critical areas such as food and medicines since the prohibitive prices resulting from 
the patent would hinder the access to resources and pharmaceuticals for the Indian citizens in clear violation of Article 
21 of the Indian Constitution (N. Rajagolala Ayyangar, Report on the Revision of the Patents Law (1959), para 101).  
23  See World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Advice on Flexibilities under the TRIPS Agreement. 
Available online at: http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/legislative_assistance/advice_trips.html, accessed on 
October 2014.  
24 See International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) “EU, US Battle Over Illegal GM Corn 
Finds Truce” Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol. 9, No. 13 (20 April 2005), in which it is reported that: “The 
UN Commission on Human Rights has called on its 53 members to consider taking full advantage of the flexibilities 
included in the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in order to fight 
diseases such as HIV/AIDS”. Available online at: http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/eu-us-battle-over-
illegal-gm-corn-finds-truce, accessed in August 2014.  
25  See Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 20 November 2001, Doha WTO Ministerial 
Declaration 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, available here: 
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31 (f) of the TRIPS Agreement, according to which compulsory licences should be authorised 
“predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorising such use”. The 
Doha Declaration, indeed, expressed the concern that countries lacking manufacturing capacity in 
the pharmaceutical sector would not be able to make effective use of the compulsory licensing 
provision set by the TRIPS Agreement. Notably, Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration instructed 
the TRIPS Council “to find an expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General 
Council before the end of 2002”. 
The Doha Declaration was followed by the WTO Decision of 2003, which provides for a waiver 
of some of the provisions of art. 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.26 The waiver allows WTO Members 
to grant compulsory licences in order to export pharmaceutical products to countries with 
insufficient or no manufacturing capacities as well as to allow WTO Members which are part of 
certain regional trade agreements, to further export products that have been manufactured or 
imported under a compulsory licence to other members of the regional groups.   
Although the problem of access to medicines in developing countries set out in the Paragraph 6 of 
the Doha Declaration was thought to have been addressed by the WTO Decision of 2003, followed 
by a similar Decision in 2005,27 there remain some further obstacles that prevent access to essential 
medicines in the developing world. The proclaimed legitimacy of compulsory licences, in fact, did 
not prevent some developed countries from threating the developing countries with unilateral 
retaliations. For instance, when the US Government supported several pharmaceutical companies 
in action against the South African Government and its reform aimed at improving the use of 
                                                             
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm, accessed on 15 September 2014. 
26  See Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public health, 1 
September 2003, Decision of the WTO General Council of 30 August 2003, WT/L/45, available here: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm, accessed on 15 September 2014. 
27 See Amendment of the Trips Agreement, December 2005, WTO General Council Decision Wt/L/641, available 
here: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm, accessed on 15 September 2014. 
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TRIPS flexibilities.28 In fact, to this day, South Africa has never issued a compulsory licence for 
a drug.29 
As above mentioned, South Africa has the largest total number of people living with HIV in the 
world.30  Yet, the South African’s patent legislation is still lacking the necessary flexibilities 
proclaimed in the two WTO Decisions31. Furthermore, the South African Patents Act, as currently 
framed, does not entirely facilitate access to affordable medicine, in part because it greatly expands 
patentability beyond the minimum required by the TRIPS Agreement.  
In particular, the South African patent system does not undertake a substantive examination of the 
applications submitted by the requester. Therefore, patent applications can potentially be granted 
without ensuring that the criteria of patentability have been satisfied.  
Moreover, the South Africa Patents Act expressly recognises the patenting of new uses of already-
known substances, which goes beyond the patentability requirements set by the TRIPS 
Agreement. 32  This additionally brings into the system the so-called problem of “patent 
evergreening”, that allows pharmaceutical companies to maintain their control over a drug with 
the issue of a new patent for the small change they have made to the expired patent, which is an 
obvious obstacle to the manufacturing of the generic drug equivalent.  
Furthermore, the definition of novelty is broadly interpreted in South Africa, for instance the 
“selections patent” is recognised and applied in the country.33 Even though, a selections patent, 
                                                             
28 See Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act No. 90 of 1997, South African Government Gazette 
No. 18.505 of December 12, 1997 (amending the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act No. 101 of 1965, as 
amended by Acts Nos. 65/1974, 17/1979, 20/1981 and 94/1991). Also, see Pistorius T., “The impact of Intellectual 
Property Law and policy on sustainable development” (2007) South African Yearbook of International Law, 13.  
29  See Medecins Sans Frontieres, South Africa: Stop blindly handing out patents! (2013) available online at: 
https://www.msf.org.za/msf-publications/south-africa-stop-blindly-handing-out-patents, accessed on 22 October 
2014.  
30 See UNAIDS, World AIDS Day Report (2012) available online at: 
http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/documents/epidemiology/2012/gr2012/JC2434_WorldAIDSda
y_results_en.pdf, accessed on 24 October 2014. 
31 See K. Tamar, “South Africa ‘seeks balance’ between intellectual property, public health” in Business Day (6 
November 2013). Available online at: http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/health/2013/11/06/south-africa-seeks-
balance-between-intellectual-property-public-health, accessed on 22 September 2014. 
32 See Section 25(9) of the South African Patents Act No.57 of 1978 (hereafter, “South African Patents Act”). 
33 See B-M Group Ltd. v. Beecham Group Ltd., 1980 BP 343 according to which “selection patents” is valid when 
“the selected members” have some substantial, special, peculiar advantage over the other, unselected members. 
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which is a second patent granted for a selection of compounds from a broad range of compounds 
described in a prior patent, is acceptable in principle, it must strictly satisfy the requirements of 
novelty and non-obviousness. In fact, generic companies would not have access to generic 
equivalents after the patent had expired, if a new patent has been granted by selecting one or more 
elements already disclosed in a prior patent.  
An examination system inclusive of both pre- and post-grant opposition systems, is internationally 
recognised and implemented even by a number of developing countries.34 However, the South 
Africa Patents Act does not provide for a substantive examination system. In fact, a patent 
application shall be granted if the application complies with the required formalities.35 In other 
words, a patent registrar may proceed with the grant of the patent simply when the appropriate 
application form has been correctly filled, However there exists no formalised system for 
objections relating to content prior to the grant.  
In order to overcome these gaps and to create a coherent legal framework on IP law, in September 
2013 the Minister of Trade and Industry of South Africa, Dr Rob Davies, published the draft 
National Policy on Intellectual Property (IP) Policy.36  The Draft National Policy on Intellectual 
Property (IP) of South Africa (2013), (the “Draft National Policy”), as further explained in the 
body of this work, positively centred its attention on the right of having access to medicine as 
proclaimed in Section 27 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; it also included 
some of the public health flexibilities available in the TRIPS Agreement.37 However, certain 
important mechanisms permitted by the TRIPS Agreement, which could facilitate access to 
medicines and vaccines, have been omitted and will therefore be considered by this study. As a 
result, this work will critically examine the upcoming South African National IP Policy with regard 
to patents only, in relation to the current South African patent law. In particular, it will investigate 
                                                             
34 India is the main example of practical use of the substantive examination system.  
35 See Section 34 of the South African Patents Act, which empowers the registrar of applications to grant the patent if 
it complies with the requirements of the Act. 
36 See Department of Trade and Industry, Draft National Policy on Intellectual Property (IP) of South Africa (2013), 
(September 2013), Policy Framework, available online at: http://ip-unit.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/DRAFT-IP-
POLICY.pdf, accessed in August 2014, (hereafter “Draft National Policy”). 
37 Remarkably, the policy makers expressed particular attention for the Doha Declaration and its recommendations.  
In particular, the Draft National Policy states that South Africa should create a substantive search and examination 
systems; the South African Patents Act should be amended in order to implement a pre- and post-grant opposition 
system; compulsory licensing should be used in South Africa as per the international treaties; Parallel importation 
should be facilitated also by means of regional arrangements.  
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whether the Draft National Policy, in its present published incarnation, adequately facilitates the 
human right to health, specifically access to medicine and, if not, what should be amended or 
integrated in order to create a new patent system which would reach the final goal of improving 
access to medicine without hindering innovation and development in South Africa.  
Notably, in assessing the potential impact of the forthcoming patent legislative reform upon access 
to medicines and the IPRs in South Africa, the study undertakes a critical and comparative analysis 
of the current legal patent system of comparable middle-income countries, such as India, Brazil 
and Argentina.  Particularly, the goal is to investigate how the latter are addressing the problem of 
accessing essential medicines within their territories and what results are achieved in implementing 







THE INTERFACE BETWEEN THE HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH AND THE 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 
 
1. SCOPE AND OVERVIEW 
The scope of this second Chapter is to analyse the national and international acknowledgment of 
the human right to health as expressed in international treaties and conventions, and as set forth by 
the South African Constitution of 1996. Section 27 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa enshrines the human right principle of having access to health care, which found its judicial 
recognition in the renowned case Minister of Health & Others v. Treatment Action Campaign & 
Others.38 The Chapter will show how the South African State has a positive obligation to take 
active measures in order to frame a legal regime, which would fully realise the human right to 
health. In addition to this, the study will deeply examine the international standards of patentability 
and the flexibilities available in the TRIPS Agreement; which have been explicitly enclosed in 
order to temper the monopoly given by the patent in cases where fundamental public interests are 
involved. The goal of this Chapter is to explore the interface between human right to health, in 
particular access to medicines, and IP.  
2. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH  
The right to health has firstly found its international recognition in the Constitution of WHO39, 
according to which the scope of the WHO is “the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible 
                                                             
38 See, Minister of Health & Others v. Treatment Action Campaign & Others, Case CCT 8/02, 5 July 2002, 10 BCLR 
1033 CC. 
39 The WHO Constitution was signed by 61 States, on 22 July 1946, during the International Health Conference in 
New York. The Constitution is available online at: htt1://www.who.int/governance/eb/who_constitution_en.pdf, 
accessed in November 2014. 
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level of health” (Article 1) that “is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without 
distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition” (preamble). 
The right to health was subsequently defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR)40 as “the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being” of the 
person and his family, “including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social 
services” (Article 25).41 Defining an adequate standard of living is problematic due to multiple 
economic and social differences between countries. However, Article 12 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)42 attempts to give an internationally 
recognised definition of the right to adequate health by stating that “the States Parties […] 
recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health”. To further clarify this statement, a Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (the ESCR Committee) 43  was created to ensure the correct interpretation and 
implementation of the right to adequate health by the signing States, enforced through the issuance 
of legally binding comments relating to the rights contained in the ICESCR. Notably, General 
Comment No. 1444 gives a complete interpretation of the right to health clarifying that it “is a 
fundamental human right indispensable for the exercise of other human rights” (paragraph 1). 
However, it should not be confused with the right to be healthy, by stating “good health cannot be 
ensured by a State, nor can States provide protection against every possible cause of human ill 
                                                             
40 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 
December 1948 in Paris. The UDHR represents the first and major expression of fundamental human rights that are 
available for all human beings and should be internationally protected. The Declaration resulted from the tragedy of 
the Second World War. The full text is available online at: http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/, accessed in 
November 2014. 
41 The Declaration of Alma-Ata on Primary Health Care, adopted in 1978 at the WHO/UNICEF Conference held in 
the Soviet Union, is another example of extended interpretation of the right to health, which further expands the 
meaning of the same in order to include “complete physical, mental and social well-being, and not merely the absence 
of disease or infirmity” (para I). Although the Alma-Ata Declaration is not binding, it is a clear expression of the 
international growing awareness as regards the realization of the right to health. The full text is available online at: 
http://www.who.int/publications/almaata_declaration_en.pdf?ua=1, accessed in November 2014. 
42 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) is a legally-binding international 
treaty that was adopted and opened for signature on 16 December 1966 and entered into force 3 January 1976. The 
full text is available online at: http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cescr.aspx, accessed in November 
2014. 
43 The Committee was established under the United Nations Economic and Social Council Resolution 1985/17 of 28 
May 1985. 
44 General Comment No. 14, E/C.12/2000/4 (2000) available online at: 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2f2000%2f4&Lang
=en, accessed in November 2014. 
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health” (paragraph 9), and must be read as “as a right to the enjoyment of a variety of facilities, 
goods, services and conditions necessary for the realization of the highest attainable standard of 
health” (paragraph 9). Furthermore, the right to health needs to be extensively comprehended so 
as to include “the underlying determinants of health, such as food and nutrition, housing, access 
to safe and potable water and adequate sanitation, safe and healthy working conditions, and a 
healthy environment” (paragraph 4).  
General Comment No. 14 clarifies that the right to health contains four essential elements: 
“availability”, “accessibility”, “acceptability”, and “quality” (paragraph 12). This means 
“functioning public health and health-care facilities” as well as goods, services and programmes 
need to be provided by the State Party in sufficient quantity, and they should be also accessible to 
everyone. In addition, “all health facilities, goods and services must be respectful of medical 
ethics” culturally, scientifically and medically appropriate and “of good quality”.  
Of note, according to the General Comment No. 14 the right to health requires the State Parties to 
comply with three types of obligations, namely to “respect”, “protect” and “fulfill” such a right 
(paragraph 33). The Committee imposes negative and positive obligations to the States. In 
particular, the States must “refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the 
right to health” and they should “take measures that prevent third parties from interfering” with 
it. Furthermore, the State Parties have the obligation “to facilitate, provide and promote” the right 
to health which includes the necessity to implement “appropriate legislative, administrative, 
budgetary, judicial, promotional and other measures towards the full realization of the right to 
health” (paragraph 33).  
Thus, General Comment No. 14 imposes on the State Parties “core obligations” as to the least 
fundamental level of protection of the right to health that should be fulfilled in order to guarantee 
access to essential medicines. The obligations must be performed in conformity with the principle 
of “progressive realization”, which “means that States parties have a specific and continuing 
obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the full realization” of the 




In October 1994, South Africa signed the ICESCR and in January 18, 2015 it ratified the Covenant, 
which will enter into force on 12 April 2015. Consequently, the ICESCR is legally binding within 
the country. Thus, the fundamental right to health, and consequently the right to access to essential 
medicines, is an internationally recognised human right and therefore legally enforceable in South 
Africa. Furthermore, human rights, as generally considered by the international customary law and 
the international law of treaties, possess as common ground the human dignity, which creates a 
universal duty of respect and safeguard whether or not customs or consents exist.45 As a result, the 
recognition of human rights not only arises from international agreed instruments (such as the 
UDHR or the ICESCR), but also “from the inherent dignity of the human person”46.  
Notably, the right to health is proclaimed and protected in South Africa under the Constitution of 
1996.47 In fact, Section 7 commands the State to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in 
the Bill of Rights”, which expressly guarantees in Section 27 the right to have access to medicine 
and health care services. Moreover, this obligation is specifically extended by Section 39.2 to 
“every court, tribunal or forum” of South Africa. Resultantly, the State and its organs has a 
positive obligation of effectively implementing actions that enable the realisation of the rights set 
forth in the Bill of Rights. Particularly, Section 27 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa establishes that “everyone has the right to have access to health care services” and that 
“the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures […] to achieve the progressive 
realisation of the right”.  
The constitutional significance of the right to access to medicines, sets forth by Section 27, has 
been expressed by the Constitutional Court of South Africa in the case Minister of Health & Others 
v. Treatment Action Campaign & Others.48 The applicants Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) 
and Others complained that the denial by the South African government to adopt the Nevirapine 
treatment programme was unreasonable and against the human rights guaranteed by the South 
                                                             
45 On this point, see Vawda Y. A. & Baker, B. K, Achieving social justice in the Human Rights/Intellectual Property 
debate: Realising the goal of access to medicines, in African Human Rights Law Journal, 13 AHRLJ 55-81, 2013. 
46 See Chirwa, D., The right to health in international law: Its implications for the obligations of state and non-state 
actors in ensuring access to essential medicine, in South African Journal on Human Rights 541, 2003.  
47 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 is 
available online at: http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/theconstitution/thetext.htm, accessed in November 
2014. 
48 Constitutional Court of South Africa, Minister of Health & Others v. Treatment Action Campaign & Others, (note 
above). Available online at: http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2002/15.html, accessed in December 2014. 
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African Constitution. The Constitutional Court expressed its favour for the applicants and held that 
Section 27 explicitly imposes to the State an obligation of implement, “within its available 
resources”, the realisation of the right to access to health; thus, ordered to the South African 
government to adequately make Nevirapine available to the public and “implement […] a 
comprehensive and coordinated programme to realise progressively the rights of pregnant women 
and their newborn children to have access to health services to combat mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV”.49  
This decision highlights the significance of the principle of accessing medicine enshrined by the 
“right to have access to health care services” as expressed in Section 27. Moreover, the judgment 
demonstrates TAC’s success on reaching the goal of improving access to anti-retroviral therapy 
(ARVs), using the human right principles embodied in the South African Constitution. This court 
victory is crucial not only for South Africa but more widely in terms of the international 
understanding of the interaction between patents and access to medicines. In fact, it emphasizes 
the distinction between the inalienable human rights of people affected by HIV/AIDS to access 
ARVs and “the temporary property right associated with intellectual property”.50 In addition, the 
Constitutional Court has affirmed the pre-eminence of the South African Constitution and the Bill 
of Rights upon the State which, as previously stated in the judgment Government of the Republic 
of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others51, has an obligation to enact such rights: “[…] 
these are rights, and the Constitution obliges the State to give effect to them. This is an obligation 
that Courts can, and in appropriate circumstances, must enforce”.52 Moreover, the Constitutional 
Court clarifies that the “Constitution obliges the state to act positively to ameliorate” the situation 
of “desperation of hundreds of thousands of people”, who live “in deplorable conditions 
throughout the country. […] The obligation is to provide access to housing, health-care, sufficient 
food and water, and social security to those unable to support themselves and their dependants”.53  
                                                             
49 Ibid 135.2(a).  
50 See D. Matthews, Intellectual Property, Human Rights and Development, The Role of NGOs and Social Movements, 
Edward Elgar, UK (2011) 103.  
51  See Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others (CCT11/00) 2000 ZACC 19; 
2001 (1) SA 46; 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (4 October 2000). The decision is available online at: 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2000/19.html, accessed in December 2014. 
52 Ibid 94.   
53 In Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others (note above) 93.   
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Resultantly, it appears clear from the above examination that South Africa has an international and 
national obligation to give effect to the right to health and, in particular, the right to access to life-
saving medicines. As it will be clarified in the following paragraph, this goal can be reached by 
South Africa through the enactment of internationally recognised IP rights’ restrictions, such as 
the flexibilities already available in the international context and, more specifically, in the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
 
3. THE INTERNATIONAL PATENTS REGIME UNDER THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 
3.1.Origins 
A patent grants a monopoly for a limited time, generally 20 years, over the use, commercialization 
and exploitation of an invention, giving the owner the right to unilaterally set a price for his 
discovery.54  The patent gives to the patent holder a ius prohibendi right which is the exclusive 
power to prevent anyone from using, producing and commercialising the patented invention.  
The justifications for patents conveyed over the nineteenth century are different. The patent can 
be seen as the reward for the inventor as to the useful services that they have provided to the society, 
as well as a reward for not keeping the invention secret. In fact, without the due recompense 
represented by the monopoly there is a likely risk of “immediate imitation of novel technological 
ideas”, which could refrain the inventor from disclosing the secret of their discovery for the benefit 
of future generations.55 Another important point of consideration is that the patent owner may 
recover the expenses disbursed in the research and development (R&D) of the invention, only 
through the earnings arising from the monopoly owned in the market.56 
It should be noted that the protection granted by the patent is limited to the nation where the 
application has been filed; this has led States, over the years, to sign international and regional 
                                                             
54 See T. Aplin & J. Davis, Intellectual Property Law, Oxford University Press, 1st ed., New York (2011) 446 - 453. 
55 See F. Machlup & E. Penrose, “The patent controversy in the nineteenth century” (1950) 10 Journal of Economic 
History, 1, 9-26.  
56 See Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Developmental Policy, 
(2002) London, 14- 15. The full report is available online at: 
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/ciprfullfinal.pdf, accessed in December 2014. 
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agreements in order to establish global consistent standards of patent protection. Thus, the origin 
of the TRIPS Agreement can be found in such a rationale: “laying down minimum standards with 
respect to substantive patent law”.57 
The TRIPS Agreement is the final act of 28 previous international agreements resulting from the 
so-called Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations that took place from 1986 to 1994. 
After the Second World War, the increasing amount of international trade led developed countries 
to call for a more adequate level of IP protection, beyond that which had been provided by the 
Paris Convention of 1883 for the Protection of Industrial Property (the “Paris Convention”) and 
the Berne Convention of 1886 for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (the “Berne 
Convention”). In fact, neither the Paris Convention nor the Berne Convention imposed new 
substantive laws on Member States, but they allowed instead States to set, in their domestic 
systems, IP protection that could differ in the scope and duration. For instance, patent protection 
for pharmaceutical products was denied by some developing countries with the aim to limit the 
rise of price in medicines.  
As previously stated, the TRIPS Agreement introduces new minimum standards of harmonised IP 
protection for all WTO Members. Simultaneously, by creating the WTO organisation it binds all 
signatory parties to become members of the WTO. Moreover, members are free to establish more 
extensive IP protection, provided that the minimum standards set by the TRIPS Agreement are 
guaranteed; but, most importantly, they may implement its obligations choosing the method that 
they consider to be more appropriate for their legal system.  
Three principal aspects can be recognised in the TRIPS Agreement: Standards, Enforcement and 
Dispute settlement. Accordingly, the treaty requires Member States to comply with the substantial 
obligation of setting minimum standards of protection for IPRs, which also includes compliance 
with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) conventions:  the Paris Convention and 
the Berne Conventions.58 Regarding the enforcement of IPRs, the TRIPS Agreement sets a number 
of provisions aimed at introducing in domestic laws IP enforcement procedures and remedies. 
                                                             
57 See T. Aplin & J. Davis (note above) 461.  
58 The WIPO is an agency of United Nations, established in 1967 and based in Geneva. Its main scope is to administer 
the Paris and Berne Conventions and to regulate different aspects of International IP law.   
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Finally, the treaty established the WTO dispute settlement system, which resolves disputes 
between WTO Members related to the compliance with the TRIPS provisions.59 
The implementation of the TRIPS Agreement, far from being unanimously appreciated, has 
brought divisions and controversial arguments as to the beneficial effects of a worldwide, 
harmonised framework of IPRs. In particular, the strict level of standardisation and pressures from 
both the WTO and the developed countries has created difficulties for developing countries in 
meeting and implementing such standards of IP protection. Notably, some critics highlighted the 
fact that the TRIPS Agreement has benefited mainly the economy of United States, which is the 
“the world’s biggest net intellectual property exporter”.  Yet, “the rest of the developed countries 
and all developing countries were in the position of being importers with nothing really to gain by 
agreeing to terms of trade for intellectual property that would offer so much protection to the 
comparative advantage the US enjoyed in intellectual property-related goods. […] The intellectual 
property regime we have today largely represents the failure of democratic processes both 
nationally and internationally”.60  
3.2. Standards of protection: Patentability criteria 
The concept of an invention is not explicitly defined in the TRIPS Agreement.  The reason is found 
in the necessity of allowing a flexible interpretation that may be adjusted over the time with the 
continuous developing of progress and technology.  
Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement states that an invention, in order to be patentable, must be 
“new, involve an inventive step” and must be “capable of industrial application”.  
The term “new” is intentionally not defined in the TRIPS Agreement. This is in line with the 
provision sets forth by Article 1.1 according to which “members shall be free to determine the 
appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal 
system and practice”. In light of this, the TRIPS Agreement does not specify what WTO members 
should consider as new. However, an invention is generally described as new when it has not been 
                                                             
59 See T. Aplin & J. Davis (note above) 16 -17. 
60 P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who owns the knowledge economy, London (2002) New Press, 
10 – 13.  
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anticipated, which means that it does not form part of the prior available art. In this context, the 
“prior art”, or also referred to as the “state of art”, is broadly defined in most domestic patent 
systems as to include “everything made available to the public by means of a written or oral 
description, by use, or in any other way, before the date of filing of the […] patent application”,61 
as well as “all matter (whether a product, a process, information about either, or anything else) 
which has at any time before the priority date of that invention been made available to the public 
[…] by written or oral description, by use or in any other way”, whether inside the country of 
filing or elsewhere.62 
The novelty requirement satisfies a double scope: on one hand, it makes sure that a patent has not 
been given for something that is already in use, since it would potentially hinder people’s right to 
work (the “right to work” rationale); on the other hand, it ensures that a patent is issued solely for 
an invention connected to non-disclosed information (the “information disclosure” rationale).63  
It is worth noting that according to the “relative” novelty approach, as in the case of India and the 
United States, the use of the invention is anticipated only when it has occurred within a particular 
territory.64 On the contrary, the concept of prior art can be explicitly not territorially restricted and 
in such a case the prior use, or the prior publication, anywhere in the world would anticipate the 
invention (the “absolute” novelty approach). In this regard, the South African Patents Act adheres 
to the approach of absolute novelty; thus, any kind of prior disclosure, anywhere in the world, 
whether by use or publication, would anticipate an invention and therefore nullify a claim of 
novelty.  
The second requirement set by the TRIPS Agreement (in some systems also described as the “non-
obviousness” requirement) requires, for an invention to be patentable, the involvement of an 
inventive step. An invention can be patented only if, having regard to the prior art, the invention 
                                                             
61 Article 54.2 of the European Convention on the Grant of European Patents, (5 October 1973), Munich. The full text 
is available online at: http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/epc.html, accessed in December 2014. 
62See Section 2(2) of the UK Patents Act of 1977 (as amended). The full text of the UK Patents Act is available online 
at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-patents-act-1977, accessed in December 2014. 
63 See T. Aplin & J. Davis (note above) 528. 
64  Although it should be noted that the prior disclosure related to documents is generally territorially unlimited. For 
instance, a document published in Brazil will amount to a disclosure in the prior art and consequently it will anticipate 
the invention in India and the US. By contrast, the use of an invention in Italy will not anticipate the patent in India or 
in the US.  
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is non-obvious to a person skilled in the art. Thus, this second criteria is “qualitative in nature”, 
contrarily to the quantitative requirement of novelty. 65  Particularly, it prevents patents being 
granted for merely obvious extensions or simply modifications of the prior art, but instead they are 
granted in consideration of the exceptional merit involved in the discovery.66  
The crucial aspect of an inquiry of non-obviousness is the role played by the person skilled in the 
art. In other words, the invention has to be assessed through the eyes of a hypothetical skilled man 
who “is deemed to have looked at and read publicly available documents and to know of public 
uses in the prior art”.67 Patents must be granted exclusively for new inventions, which entail 
nothing that is technically or practically obvious and therefore does not deserve to be monopolised.  
In assessing whether the alleged invention involves an inventive step, one must consider all 
circumstances relevant to the case. In this way, the US jurisprudence has developed a well 
articulated procedural strategy in the attempt to recognise the person skilled in the art: “factors 
that may be considered in determining level of ordinary skill in the art include: (1) the educational 
level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those 
problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the technology; and 
(6) educational level of active workers in the field”.68 Thus, the central question that should be 
asked is whether the “invention would or would not have been obvious, as a whole, when it was 
made, to a person of "ordinary skill in the art" - not to the judge, or to a layman, or to those skilled 
in remote arts, or to geniuses in the art at hand”.69   
A different method has been chosen by the European Patent Office (EPO), which, in assessing 
inventiveness, has developed the so-called “problem-solution” approach, according to which there 
are fundamental steps that need to be considered in order to decide whether or not an invention is 
patentable. These steps involve determining: 1) the “closest prior art” to the invention; 2) the 
objective technical problem to be solved, which requires the comparison between the closest prior 
                                                             
65 See Mölnlycke AB and Another v Procter & Gamble Limited and Others (No.5) 1994, RPC 49 (CA) 112. 
66 See A. Griffiths, Windsurfing and the inventive step, (1999) IPQ 160, 163-164.  
67 In Pfizer Ltd’s Patent, 2001 FSR 16, 201. 
68 In Orthopedic Equipment Co., Inc. v. All Orthopedic Appliances, Inc., Appeal Nos. 83-513, 83-525 Slip op. 13, Fed. 
Cir. May 16, 1983, 217 USPQ 1281 - 1285. 
69 In Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal 218 USPQ 865, 1983, 868-869; see also in Bausch & Lomb 
v. Barnes-Hind Hydrocurve, 230 USPQ 416, 1986, 420. 
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art and the technical results achieved by the claimed invention; 3) whether the solution to the 
technical problem is obvious to the eyes of the skilled man starting from the closest prior art.70 
Regarding the inventive step requirement in the context of pharmaceuticals, some national courts 
have adopted a skeptical position, which highlights their awareness of public health needs. Indeed, 
the adoption of a strict standard of inventiveness would contribute to preventing undue 
proliferation of obvious patents, such as in cases of evergreening of pharmaceutical patents. For 
example, in the Patents Court of England and Wales, Mr Justice Birss took the view that the 
invention of a medicinal formulation for treating psoriasis, by means of the use of two already-
known substances already used to treat psoriasis, with the sole addition of a particular solvent was 
invalid for lack of inventive step.71 The decision shows that incremental inventions should be 
considered as an optimization of the use of known medicines rather than new pharmaceutical 
inventions.72 
Of special note in this context, is the landmark judgment of the India's Supreme Court on public 
health and patent for pharmaceutical products, Novartis v. Union of India & Others.73 
The Court dismissed the appeal of Novartis against the Indian Patent Office’s decision, which 
refused to grant the patent for a therapeutic drug for the treatment of Chronic Myeloid Leukemia. 
The judgment considered that the patent application did not satisfy the requirement of novelty and 
inventiveness required by the Indian Patents Act. The claimed invention was deemed as a mere 
modification of a known drug, namely the raw form of imatinib contained in the previous 
Zimmermann patent:  with the court holding that it was “completely unable to see how Imatinib 
Mesylate can be said to be a new product [...] Imatinib Mesylate is all there in the Zimmerman 
                                                             
70 P., Cole, “Inventive step-meaning of the EPO Problem and Solution Approach, and Implications for the United 
Kingdom-Part I” (1998) European Intellectual Property Review 267, 215-216. 
71 In Teva UK Limited & Teva Pharmaceuticals Limited v Leo Pharma A/S & Leo Laboratories Limited, 2014, EWHC 
3096. See also J. Albutt, Not a roaring success for Leo in the Patents Court, in Dehns, Patent and Trade Mark 
Attorneys, in: 
http://www.dehns.com/site/information/industry_news_and_articles/not_a_roaring_success_for_leo_in_the_patents
_court.html, access in December 2014. 
72 Similarly, in Hospira UK Ltd v Genentech Inc, 2004, EWHC 1094, the Court, considering a case of inventive step 
in the context of pharmaceutical, stated that the incremental invention in terms of dosage regime was obvious and 
therefore lacking inventiveness.  
73 In Novartis v. Union of India & Others, 2013, Civil Appeal No. 2706-2716. The decision will be analysed in details 
in Chapter IV.  
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patent. It is a known substance from the Zimmermann patent”.74 
Finally, Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement requires, for an invention to be patentable, the third 
requirement of the “industrial application”. This requirement makes sure that only inventions with 
a practical and concrete application may be protected with the monopoly of the patent, barring all 
abstract creations that do not provide utility to society.  In this way, the United States adopts a 
broader definition of the concept of utility stating that an invention is patentable when  “useful”75. 
In the field of pharmaceutical drugs an extensive interpretation of the “industrial application” 
condition might lead to the risk of granting patent protection for the unknown function of 
substances. For instance, in Chiron Corporation v Murex Diagnostics Ltd. the Court of Appeal of 
England and Wales recognised the patent invalid for lack of industrial application because the 
polypeptides of the Hepatitis C Virus claimed in the patent were “useless for any known 
purpose”.76 
3.3.  The flexibilities 
The discussion about the growth of the price of medicines and its resulting impact on access to 
medicine in developing and least-developed countries has drastically intensified in the last twenty 
years after the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement.   
In 1998 the WHO published a report that expressed its concern as to the implications that the WTO 
agreement would have in the health sector, especially on access to pharmaceutical drugs.77  In this 
context, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) of developing countries played a significant role 
in highlighting potential negative consequences that a stricter application of the international IP 
regime could have in relation to public health. This led WTO Members to focus their attention on 
the flexibilities established in the TRIPS Agreement. In particular, the Doha Declaration 
emphasized the need for developing and least-developed (LDC) countries to take full advantage 
                                                             
74 Ibid 131. 
75 See Section 101 of the U.S. Patent Law, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (Consolidated Patent Laws as of September 2007). 
The full text is available online at: http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=177344, access in December 2014. 
76 In Chiron Corporation v Murex Diagnostics Ltd, 1996, RPC 535, 607.  
77 G. Velásquez & P. Boulet, Globalization and Access to Drugs. Implications of the WTO/TRIPS Agreement (1999) 
World Health Organization, Geneva. 
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of the flexibilities available under the TRIPS Agreement so as to guarantee access to medicine. 
Notably, paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration affirms that the TRIPS Agreement “can and should 
be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public 
health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all”.78     
The objectives and principles, which reinforce the right of WTO Members to address concerns 
related to public health through the flexibilities, are set out by Article 7 and 8 of the TRIPS 
Agreement. Article 7 states that “the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights” 
should be achieved “in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare”, balancing rights and 
obligations; Article 8 permits WTO Members to “adopt measures necessary to protect public 
health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-
economic and technological development”. In addition, it should be noted that Article 65.4 and 
Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement set transitional periods appropriate to developing and LDC 
countries in order to grant patent protection for drugs. While the deadline to provide 
pharmaceutical patent protection for developing countries expired on 1 January 2005, the deadline 
for LDCs was recently extended to 1 July 2021.79  
Notably, in order to ensure access to medicine all WTO Members can benefit from the 
advantageous TRIPS flexibilities, as described below.  
3.3.1. Exclusion from patentability 
Article 27.2 and 27.3 of TRIPS Agreement establish that WTO Members may specifically set some 
exclusions from patentability, namely those “inventions, the prevention within their territory of 
the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including 
to protect human, animal or plant life or health […]” as well as “diagnostic, therapeutic and 
                                                             
78  See Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 20 November 2001, Doha WTO Ministerial 
Declaration 2001, (note above). 
79 In June 2013 WTO Members decided to further extend the deadline for LDCs to protect IP under the TRIPS 
agreement. LDCs were initially given time until 1 January 2005 to implement the TRIPS’s provisions, however, the 
deadline was successively extended until 1 January 2016.  See also WTO, The least developed get eight years more 
leeway on protecting intellectual property, 2013, in 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/trip_11jun13_e.htm, accessed in December 2014. 
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surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals […]”. 
The rationale behind this exclusion has its origin in the principle that the fundamental right to life 
should be given the utmost prominence. In this regards, patents should not hinder countries from 
fully safeguarding ordre public, morality and human, animal, or plant life together with the 
necessity not to constrain medics from accomplishing their diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical 
responsibility.80  
As a result, WTO Members have significant flexibility in setting a ban for patentability criteria as 
regards inventions that could be seen as a threat for the ordre public, morality and human life. 
Thus, given the exceptional impact that pharmaceutical patents have on access to medicines and 
consequently on human life, it could be argued that countries could, and should, improve access 
to medicine by means of a more appropriate use of the TRIPS flexibilities. This view was taken 
by India while amending the Patents Act of 1971 (the “Indian Patents Act”).81 Consequently, 
according to the Indian Patents Act, only in the field of pharmaceutical inventions, (i) naturally 
occurring substances, (ii) new forms of already known substances, not resulting in the 
enhancement of the know efficacy of that substance, (iii) new uses of known substances, (iv) mere 
admixtures, and (v) methods of treatment, are all excluded from patentability.82 
 
3.3.2.  Limited exceptions  
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement provides for “limited exceptions to the exclusive rights 
conferred by a patent”, allowing additional public health related flexibilities, which formally 
diminish the strong rights awarded by patents. However, the limited exceptions to patents rights, 
which include research and experimentation, prior use, early working and the export of medicines 
to non-producing countries, are provided only if they “do not unreasonably conflict with a normal 
                                                             
80 See E. Asif, “Exclusion of Diagnostic, Therapeutic and Surgical Methods from Patentability” (2013) Journal of 
Intellectual Property Rights, Vol 18, 242 – 250. 
81  C. Park, A. Prabhala & J. Berger, (note above) 40. The full document is available online at: 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/hiv-aids/using-law-to-accelerate-treatment-access-in-
south-africa.html, accessed in December 2014. 
82 See Section 3(c), 3(d) and 3(e) of the Indian Patents Act, 1970 (as amended up to Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005). 
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exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent 
owner”. 
Notably, those mentioned exceptions were already in use in national laws prior to the 
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. For this reason, during negotiations both developing 
and developed countries agreed for the insertion of a general provision that could comprise such 
concessions in a sole principle.83  
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement has been at the centre of an international discussion regarding 
the appropriate meaning of the word “limited”. In particular, there have been views put forward 
suggesting an extended interpretation of Article 30, so as to allow countries with producing 
capacities to export drugs to non-producing countries, without the use of compulsory licensing. 
The argument has been clarified by the EC-Canada WTO Dispute Settlement Panel,84 which 
explained that limited exceptions must satisfy three cumulative conditions in order to be justified: 
(i) the exception must be “limited”; (ii) it “must not unreasonably conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the patent”; (iii) finally, it must “not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interest of third parties”.85 
The WTO Panel, highlighting the limited nature of these exceptions, strictly interpreted the 
provision of Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement. Particularly, the Panel stressed that the word 
“exception” already suggests a limited allowance and the term “limited” further restricts such a 
concession. Then, it emphasizes the significant similarity between Article 30 and Article 13 of the 
TRIPS Agreement (“Limitation and exceptions”) and that the latter finds its origin in the wording 
of Article 9.2 of the Berne Convention, which provides an exception to copyright for fair use. 
                                                             
83 See UN Conference on Trade & Development-International Centre for Trade & Sustainable Development, The 
TRIPS Agreement and Developing Countries (2005) 95 UNCTAD Geneva. 
84 The complaint from the EC was against Canada and two specific aspects of its legislation, namely the “stockpiling 
exception” and the “regulatory review”. Whereas the former provision allowed third parties to manufacture a patented 
pharmaceutical product, without the patent owner permission, within six months of the expiration of the patent validity 
so as to supply the product onto the market as soon as the patent had expired; the latter exception allowed unauthorized 
third parties “to make, contract, use or sell the patented invention solely for uses reasonably related to the development 
and submission of information required under any law of Canada, a province or a country other than Canada that 
regulates the manufacture, construction, use or sale of any product” (Canada Patent Act, Section 55.2(1)). 
85 See WTO Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (Canada – Patent Protection), 
WT/DS114/R, adopted 17 March 2000, para. 7.20. See also F. Ortino, E. Petersmann, “The WTO Dispute Settlement 
System, 1995-2003” (2004) Kluwer Law International, 424 – 432.  
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Finally, the Panel took the view that the “stockpiling exception” carried out by Canada (through 
which Canada authorized third parties to manufacture and store patented drugs, without the 
authorisation of the patent-holder, with the aim of putting the drug into the market upon expiration 
of the patent) was not a “limited exception” within the meaning of Article 30 of the TRIPS 
Agreement. The decision of the Panel brought doubts regarding the excessively restrictive 
interpretation of Article 30 and as to the implications that the decision would have regarding 
compulsory licensing. In particular, the concerns relate to whether a compulsory licence for 
manufacturing and supplying a generic medicine to another WTO Member is justifiable under 
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement, without conflicting “with a normal exploitation of the 
patent”. 86  However, the Doha Declaration (issued soon after the WTO Panel decision), 
highlighting the important role of compulsory licensing in expanding access to medicines, played 
a central role in surpassing the concerns and criticisms resulting from the Panel decision.  
Another aspect of Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement that should be considered as a significant 
mechanism to improve access to medicine, is the “early working” exception, also called 
“regulatory exception” or “Bolar” provision. It was introduced by the United States with the aim 
of testing inventions regarding pharmaceutical products, before the expiration of patents, in order 
to study and then commercialize the generic versions of the same drugs immediately after the 
patents expire. Such a type of exception to the patent’s rights before the expiration of the right has 
found great support from the developing world. It is generally used in order to permit generic 
producers to use the patented medicine with the aim of obtaining marketing approval by drug 
regulatory authority, regardless to the patentee authorisation. This method lets the generic 
manufactures to enter into the market right after the expiration of the patent.  
The “regulatory exception” was also discussed by the EC-Canada WTO Dispute Settlement Panel, 
which ruled that the use by Canada of this exception was “limited” and therefore it complies with 
the provision of Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement. In fact, the patented drugs were produced, 
without authorisation, only with the aim to obtain regulatory approval and they were restricted 
solely to a small number of items.  
                                                             
86 See D. Matthews (note above) 21-22. 
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3.3.3.  Compulsory licensing 
The compulsory licence, also called the “non-voluntary licence”, is the permission given to third 
parties by governments, only when certain legal conditions are met, to exploit patented inventions 
without the authorization of the patent owner. It is a policy mechanism available in international 
law so as to limit some of the implications arising from a monopoly, especially concerning 
pharmaceutical patents and their possible impact on public health accessibility. Therefore, the 
rationale for a compulsory licence comes from the importance of the public interest to have access 
to an essential invention usurping the private and exclusive right of the patent holder to its 
economic reward.87  
The granting of a compulsory licence is not unlimited but the request and the use of the licence is 
subject to restrictions of time and to an economical compensation to the title-owner. The grounds 
for granting a compulsory licence may vary considerably and they are subject to specific 
requirements set by national laws as to the issuance and the use of the licence.88 
The mechanism of compulsory licensing was first adopted by the Paris Convention and 
subsequently confirmed under the TRIPS Agreement provisions. According to Article 5A of the 
Paris Convention Member States were able to issue non-voluntary licences, under certain 
conditions, for preventing abuse of the exclusive rights granted to the title-holder. The granting of 
compulsory licences became globally recognised and it slowly started to be used in multiple and 
varied circumstances, i.e. anti-competitive activities, public interest and government use. 
Interestingly, some members decided to provide compulsory licences for goods of specific 
importance for the public, such as food and medicines.89   
The policy tool of compulsory licensing is provided under Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, 
which, contrary to the Paris Convention, does not mention expressly the term “compulsory 
licence”, rather stating “Other Use Without the Authorization of the Right Holder”. With the 
                                                             
87 J. Reichman, “Comment: Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions: Evaluating the Options”, 
(2009) 37(2) Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 247. 
88 See C. Correa, Intellectual Property Rights and the use of compulsory licences: options for developing countries, 
in Trade-Related Agenda, Development and equity (T.R.A.D.E.), South Centre (1999) 8-10. The full text of the 
working paper is available here: http://www.iatp.org/files/Intellectual_Property_Rights_and_the_Use_of_Co.pdf, 
accessed in January 2015. 
89 See C. Correa (note above) 4. 
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expression “other use”, Article 31 aims to extend the scope and freedom of the WTO members to 
grant compulsory licences, avoiding restricting them only to certain specific situations. The TRIPS 
Agreement, however, establishes a detailed list of substantive and procedural conditions that are 
the minimum standard that the WTO members are bound to put in practice in their national 
legislations. Article 31, while stating that the applications for compulsory licensing need to be 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis, affirms that applicants must firstly engage in private 
negotiations with the patent holder in order to obtain a voluntary licence. This condition may be 
waived in case of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, such as social 
and public health threats like epidemics, wars, famines etc., and public non-commercial use, for 
instance when a governmental institution seeks to achieve the goals of a national health policy by 
using the patented medicines.90 The TRIPS Agreement especially refers to another two grounds 
upon which compulsory licences may be granted: anti-competitive practices and dependent patents. 
While the former enables competent authorities to issue compulsory licences in order to “correct 
anti-competitive practices” which include disproportionate pricing and other violation of patent 
rights;91 the latter ground refers to cases where a compulsory licence is authorised “to permit the 
exploitation of a patent (‘the second patent’) which cannot be exploited without infringing another 
patent (‘the first patent’)”, provided that the second patent involves an “important technical 
advance of considerable economic significance”.92 
Furthermore, the use “of the subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the patent 
holder […] shall be non-exclusive” (Article 31 (d)), “non-assignable […]” (Article 31 (e)) and 
importantly “shall be authorised predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the 
Member authorising such use” (Article 31 (f)).  
Regarding the condition set by Article 31 (f), a group of developing countries of WTO members 
expressed its concerns and requested a clarification from the TRIPS Council regarding the relation 
between IPRs and access to medicines, in particular as to the inability of countries lacking 
manufacturing capacity to utilise compulsory licensing under Article 31 of the TRIPS 
                                                             
90 See C. Correa, “Patent Rights” (2008) 235 in C. Correa & A. Yusuf Intellectual Property and International Trade: 
The TRIPS Agreement, Kluwer Law International, 2ed. 
91 Article 31 (k) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
92 Article 31 (l) of the TRIPS Agreement.  
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Agreement.93   
The consequent Declaration which was adopted in November 2001 in Doha, Qatar, clarified that 
“the TRIPS Agreement should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of the WTO 
Members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines” 
(Paragraph 4).94 The Declaration aimed at finding a balance between IPRs and human rights, 
particularly by inviting the WTO members to adopt the necessary measures to protect public health.  
Most importantly, Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration requested that the TRIPS Council find an 
expeditious solution to the problem regarding WTO members without manufacturing capacity and 
to report it to the General Council before 2002. The 30th of August 2003 WTO Decision95 set out 
a temporary waiver of Article 31(f) in order to allow countries lacking manufacturing 
pharmaceutical capacities to import pharmaceutical products from other WTO exporting members. 
This waiver was made permanent only on 6 December 2005, when WTO members agreed to 
permanently amend Article 31 (f) of the TRIPS Agreement.96  
One of the direct effects of the Doha Declaration was the increase in use of the compulsory 
licensing mechanisms, by developing countries, mainly for the benefit of their domestic market. 
Such a tendency revealed the growing intention of developing countries to make available in their 
national legislation the flexibilities provided in the TRIPS Agreement.97 Despite the admirable 
trend, only one compulsory licence has been issued using Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, 
when Canada notified the TRIPS Council of the granting of a compulsory licence allowing the 
                                                             
93  The paper was submitted to the TRIPS Council by the Africa Group, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand 
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94  See Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 20 November 2001, Doha WTO Ministerial 
Declaration 2001, (note above). 
95 See Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public health, Decision 
of the WTO General Council of 30 August 2003, (note above). 
96 See WTO General Council, Amendment of The Trips Agreement, December 2005 (note above). 
97 The Ministers of Health of the Member States of the African Union declared in the Gaborone Declaration, October 
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generic pharmaceutical company, Apotex, to manufacture and export seven million antiretroviral 
drugs of TriAvir to Rwanda.98 Regrettably, the whole process of using the compulsory licensing 
through Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration was found “laborious and convoluted”, as declared 
by the vice president of Apotex’s regulatory and medical affairs, Bruce Clark, “it is almost a waste 
for us to go through the process”, revealing that Apotex will not use the programme again except 
if less complex mechanisms were to be implemented.99 
The scarce use of this international policy tool, in addition to the complexity of the mechanism, 
possibly found another cause in the increasing negotiations of bilateral free trade agreements 
(FTAs), used particularly between the United States, to some extent Europe, and developing 
countries. In particular, some of these FTAs require a TRIPS-plus protection for pharmaceutical 
products, which in some instances exceeds the threshold of protection required within the USA 
itself.100 Notably, the flexibilities available in the TRIPS Agreement have been limited in certain 
cases by bilateral FTAs, which unavoidably restrict the conditions for using compulsory licensing, 
for instance the US-Singapore FTA expressly imposes restrictions to Singapore to grant 
compulsory licences.101  As a result, efforts carried out by developing countries for implementing 
the TRIPS flexibilities are often discouraged by developed countries, which drive the former to 
shape their patent laws in the image of developed countries’ domestic patent systems.102 In the 
described context, the facilitation of access to medicines and public health protection is not 
adequately addressed; therefore, “countries that are still in the process of negotiation of FTAs 
                                                             
98 See Medical News Today, GSK Gives Consent to Canadian Drug Company to Manufacture Generic Antiretroviral 
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should carefully consider the public health implications of such agreements”.103  
3.3.4.  Voluntary licensing 
With a voluntary licence a title holder directly gives permission to a third party to produce, market 
and distribute the patented invention (generally the generic version) in exchange for the 
corresponding royalties agreed between the parties. Article 28.2 of the TRIPS Agreement 
recognises the right of the patent owner “to assign, or transfer by succession, the patent and to 
conclude licensing contracts”. Despite this, pharmaceutical companies do not often spontaneously 
grant voluntary licences, but instead they frequently do so following public pressure and 
governmental treats of granting compulsory licences. An example of this can be found in the South 
African competition law case, Hazel Tau and Others v GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer 
Ingelheim 104 , where competition law was used to challenge multinational pharmaceutical 
companies for charging excessive prices for their ARV medicines, in violation of Section 8(a) of 
the Competition Act which bans “a dominant firm to […] charge an excessive price to the 
detriment of consumers”.105 The solution was found through a settlement agreement in which the 
pharmaceutical companies decided to grant a royalty-free voluntary licence.106 
The use of voluntary licences may have a specific utility in facilitating domestic generic companies 
to improve their own R&D as well as their manufacturing abilities, enabling generic competitors 
to potentially find more economical methods of manufacture.107 However, voluntary licences may 
also bear the negative implication of delaying generic companies from entering into the market if 
an appropriate technology transfer is not achieved.108  
Interestingly, the use of voluntary licences is becoming more frequent through the innovative tool 
of patent pools, which were initially promoted by UNITAID, a new mechanism of fund raising for 
                                                             
103 C. Correa, (note above) 165. 
104 See Hazel Tau & Others v GlaxoSmithKline & Boehringer Ingelheim (Competition Commission) Case No. 2002 
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105  See Section 8 of the Competition Act of the Republic of South Africa. Available online here: 
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public health initiatives related to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB) and malaria.109 UNITAID in July 
2008 approved the creation of the Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) with the mission of providing 
more affordable ARV medicines in developing and least-developed countries. The MPP is 
exclusively based on voluntary licences granted by patent owners to generic pharmaceutical 
companies, which may resultantly manufacture the generic versions of the patented drug for the 
benefit of developing and least-developed countries.110  
While stimulating generic competition and consequently reducing the prices of essential drugs, the 
MPP contributes to reducing the cost of negotiations. Subsequently, generic competitors with the 
MPP will not need to sign separate licence agreements with different patent owners, but they will 
be able to enter in a sole sublicensing agreement, in fact, “in the absence of a patent pool, a 
company might need to obtain licence from at least three different patent holders to be able to 
develop, produce, export and sell an ARV […]”.111  
3.3.5.  Parallel Importation 
The TRIPS Agreement explicitly recognises the principle of international exhaustion of rights 
expressed in the mechanism of parallel importation (Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement), on the 
consideration that the patent owner has been already rewarded in the country where the good has 
been initially sold. 
In the pharmaceutical sector parallel importation occurs where patented drugs produced in one 
market are exported to another market without the authorization of the patent holder. The doctrine 
of international exhaustion is justified on the grounds that the IP right become exhausted when the 
product protected by a patent (or a trademark or a copyright) is first sold in the market with the 
consent of the right owner, who, from the moment of the first sale in one market, loses the 
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monopoly of importation and sale in further markets.112 This practice has the main benefit of 
reducing prices by increasing competition in the domestic pharmaceutical market.113 From a public 
health perspective, this means that pharmaceuticals can become legally available in one country 
directly through foreign suppliers.  
Parallel importation is an automatic mechanism, which does not require the explicit authorisation 
of the patent holder for its implementation, given that the right owner has been already rewarded 
with the first sale of their invention. However, WTO Members need to translate this flexibility into 
their national regimes, and in particular, should implement explicit laws to allow parallel imports 
in their territory.114   
The doctrine of international exhaustion is also referred to in the United States as the “first-sale 
doctrine”. Despite this, United States rejected “the first-sale doctrine” in the pharmaceutical field, 
although favourably accepted it in relation to trade marks and copyrights. This refusal was formally 
expressed by the US delegation at the Council for TRIPS in June 2001, in which US admitted that 
“[…] permitting such imports discourages patent owners from pricing their product differently in 
different markets based upon the level of economic development because of the likelihood that, for 
example, product sold for low prices in a poor country will be bought up by middle men and sent 
to the wealthiest country markets and sold at higher prices […]”.  
In light of this, the US pharmaceutical industry, supported by the US government, pressured South 
Africa to amend Section 15C of the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act of 1997, 
according to which, the Minister can “prescribe conditions for the supply of more affordable 
medicines”, which also includes the conditions for parallel importing in South Africa.115 
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Yet, the application of the doctrine of international exhaustion of rights in the public health field, 
when exporting and importing countries equally implement adequate regulations to prevent an 
abuse of this right, is of vital importance for patients and for facilitating access to essential 
medicines.  Furthermore, the legitimacy of this policy tool is not only recognised by Article 6 of 
the TRIPS Agreement, but it has been explicitly highlighted in the Doha Declaration. 116 
Additionally, in a globalised world where barriers of communication and local markets are 
progressively diminishing, imposing strict trade restrictions will not help competitiveness and the 
general public to benefit of more affordable medicines.117  
4. CONCLUSION 
The international and national legal framework as represented by the TRIPS Agreement of 1994, 
the Doha Declaration of 2001 and the Constitution of South Africa of 1996, while promoting 
development and progress, requires WTO members to protect and safeguard the human right to 
health, which includes the right to access to life-saving medicines. However, the debate as to 
whether IPRs should have priority over the right to health or vice-versa is far from over and there 
is not a simple solution to such a dispute. On one hand, IPRs and more specifically patents, 
contribute to the progress of society by rewarding the title-holder with a monopoly on the invention, 
in addition, patents allow pharmaceutical industries to adequately invest on R&D so as to discover 
new medicines; on the other hand, pandemics and health emergencies, such as the HIV/AIDS crisis 
affecting South Africa, ask for some degree of limitation of the monopoly owned by 
pharmaceutical companies in order to increase the competition from generic companies to provide 
cheaper medicine. As a result, a solution must be reached that balances those opposing but 
interfaced rights. This could be obtained by taking full advantage of the flexibilities granted by the 
TRIPS Agreement.    
  
                                                             
The authors explained: “Fearing a domino effect in the developing world, the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, backed 
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challenges and made the pharmaceutical applicants drop their claim and paid for the legal expenses.  
116  See Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 20 November 2001, Doha WTO Ministerial 
Declaration 2001, (note above), para 5(d). 






THE SOUTH AFRICAN PATENT REGIME AND ITS INTERFACE WITH THE TRIPS 
AGREEMENT 
 
1. SCOPE AND OVERVIEW 
This Chapter will examine the current legal situation in South Africa, according to the South 
African Patents Act, especially with regard to the patentability criteria, which, although differing 
slightly from what it is stated by the TRIPS Agreement, greatly expand the scope of patentability. 
It will continue with an analysis of the procedures of substantial examination and opposition, 
whose absence greatly increases the chance of unduly obtaining and keeping a patent. The study 
then will focus on the other alternatives available, which are relevant to the public health system, 
such as compulsory licensing, parallel importation and limited exceptions, including “early 
working”, or the “Bolar” exception, which are likely to increase and facilitate access to medicine, 
and whether or not they are offered in South Africa.  
The Chapter, highlighting the potential significance of the use of the TRIPS flexibilities in the 
context of access to medicines, will consider whether a legislative patents reform in South Africa 
would be necessary so as to address public health related issues.  
2. PATENTABILITY CRITERIA IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN PATENTS ACT 57 OF 1978 
The South African patents regime has been regulated since 1916118 and is currently governed by 
the South African Patents Act of 1978119, which governs the registration and the granting of 
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patents for inventions. According to Sect. 45(1) of the South African Patents Act, patent grants a 
monopoly over the invention giving to the patentee “the right to exclude other persons from 
making, using, exercising, disposing or offering to dispose of, or importing the invention, so that 
he or she shall have and enjoy the whole profit and advantage accruing by reason of the 
invention”. Section 25(1) of the South African Patents Act clarifies the basic requirements of 
patentability stating that “a patent may […] be granted for any new invention which involves an 
inventive step and which is capable of being used or applied in trade or industry or agriculture”. 
The provision is in line with the obligation under Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement, which 
without imposing to the Member States specific definitions of the patentability criteria, simply 
provides that patents should be “new, involve an inventive step” and “capable of industrial 
application”. Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement purposely leaves WTO Members free to 
determine stricter patentability requirements having regard to their policy priorities. Resultantly, 
provided that the minimum standard of novelty, inventiveness and industrial application are 
respected, Member Parties may set higher criteria for granting patent protection to their inventions.  
The relevant aspects of patentability will be discussed in turn.  
2.1. Novelty  
The novelty criterion is aimed at ensuring that only inventions, which do not form part of the state 
of the art, before the priority date, are entitled to benefit from patent protection. In fact, the 
monopoly granted by a patent can only be justified if the invention is not in the public domain, 
meaning that it has not been previously disclosed. There are two definitions of novelty, “relative 
novelty”, which considers an invention to be new only in relation to the state of the art in the 
country in which the patent protection is requested; and “absolute novelty”, which takes into 
account all prior disclosures globally.  
Under the South African law, “an invention shall be deemed to be new if it does not form part of 
the state of the art immediately before the priority date of that invention” (Section 25(5)). The 
following Section 25(6), further explains the meaning of “state of art” affirming that it “shall 
comprise all matter (whether a product, a process, information about either, or anything else) 
which has been made available to the public (whether in the Republic or elsewhere) by written or 
oral description, by use or in any other way”. This provision makes clear that South Africa adheres 
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to an absolute definition of novelty. Thus, also a matter disclosed outside the country will nullify 
the novelty of the invention.   
Yet, the South African jurisprudence has often broadly interpreted the novelty principle, holding 
that little differences between the prior art and the claimed invention are able to satisfy the novelty 
requirement. In the case Schlumberger Logelco Inc. v. Coflexip SA, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
stated that an invention is not anticipated “if the description in the prior document differs, even in 
a small respect”120. Thus, according to South African courts even a small difference between what 
exists in the prior art and what is claimed in the patent application, can be considered new and 
therefore meritorious of patent protection.  
In addition, Section 25(9) of the South African Patents Act expressly recognises the patenting of 
new uses of already-known substances, which is an exception that goes beyond the patentability 
requirements set by the TRIPS Agreement.  According to this provision: “In the case of an 
invention consisting of a substance or composition for use in a method of treatment of the human 
or animal body by surgery or therapy or of diagnosis practised on the human or animal body, the 
fact that the substance or composition forms part of the state of the art immediately before the 
priority date of the invention shall not prevent a patent being granted for the invention if the use 
of the substance or composition in any such method does not form part of the state of the art at 
that date”.121 
Indeed, Section 25(9) manifestly brings into the South African system the so-called problem of 
“patent evergreening”, that “is a patenting strategy consisting of acquiring patents on minor, often 
trivial, modifications of existing pharmaceutical products or processes in order to indirectly 
extend the period of patent protection over previously patented compounds”.122 Consequently, the 
“evergreening” phenomenon allows pharmaceutical companies to maintain their control over a 
drug through issuance of a new patent for the small change they have made to the expired patent, 
which is an obvious obstacle to the manufacturing of the generic drug equivalents, and ultimately 
                                                             
120 See Schlumberger Logelco Inc. v. Coflexip SA, 2003 (1) SA 16 (SCA).  
121 See Section 25(9) of the South African Patents Act. 
122 C. Correa, “Pharmaceutical inventions: when is the granting of a patent justified?”, in Int. J. Intellectual Property 
Management, Vol. 1, Nos. 1/2 (2006) 20.  
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to access to medicine.123 In this way, a medicine already used for the treatment of a particular 
disease can be claimed as new, and therefore obtain patent protection, for the new use of the same 
invention. For example, as pointed out in the United Nations’ report of 2013, which investigated 
the condition of accessing essential medicines in South Africa, the ARV zidovudine (AZT), was 
developed in the 1960s as a cancer treatment. Subsequently, it was found that AZT could be used 
in the treatment of HIV. The existence of Section 25(9) of the South African Patents Act allowed 
the pharmaceutical company Burroughs Wellcome, now GlaxoSmithKline, to obtain patent 
protection for AZT as a “method of treating” HIV and AIDS. In light of the above, a stricter 
interpretation of the novelty principle would have nullified the novelty and impeded the grant of 
the patent.124 
Despite the wording of South African Patents Act, the TRIPS Agreement contains no provision 
requiring an interpretation of the novelty criteria in the manner adopted by Section 25(9). In light 
of this consideration, the South African legislative authority could amend or delete the provision 
set by Section 25(9) so as to exclude a patent evergreening phenomenon consisting of granting a 
new patent for new uses of already-know substances.  
Another aspect that should be taken into consideration when assessing the issue of access to 
medicine in South Africa, is the recognition and application in the country of the so-called 
mechanism of “selection patent”125. Even though a selection patent, which is a second patent 
granted for a selection of compounds from a broad range of compounds described in a prior patent, 
is acceptable in principle, it must strictly satisfy the requirements of novelty and non-
obviousness.126 In practice, generic companies would not be able to produce generic equivalents 
after the initial patent had expired, where the monopoly of 20 years is extended beyond its natural 
                                                             
123 Interestingly, although the TRIPS Agreement does not impose WTO States to grant patents on new uses of already 
known substance, United States signed three bilateral FTAs with Morocco, Australia, and Bahrain, that extend the 
patentability to new uses of a known product (AFTA, art. 17.9.1; MFTA, art. 15.9.2; BFTA, art 14.8.2).  
124 C. Park, A. Prabhala & J. Berger (note above) 29.  
125 See C. Correa, (note above) 12, in which the author clarifies that “a ‘selection patent’ is a patent under which a 
single element or a small segment within a large known group is ‘selected’ and independently claimed based on a 
particular feature not mentioned in the large group”. 
126 See B-M Group Ltd. v. Beecham Group Ltd. (note above) according to which “selection patents” is valid when 
“the selected members” have some substantial, special, peculiar advantage over the other, unselected members. 
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term, by granting a new patent upon the selection of one or more elements already disclosed in the 
original patent. 
Many legislations have a different approach regarding the acceptance of “selection patent”. In the 
UK, for instance, selection patents are subject to some restrictions: it is accepted only if it is based 
on some substantial advantage gained or disadvantage avoided.127 However, the selection is not 
valid, and therefore not patentable, when the quality of the selected group is not of special character, 
but it is common to the quality of the larger group for which the previous patent exists.  
The European Patent Office (EPO) approach is stricter than the one followed by the UK.128 
According to the EPO, when the subject matter of a new invention is the selected group of a larger 
class of compounds contained in a earlier patented invention, the selection is considered novel 
only if “(a) the selected sub-range is narrow compared to the known range; (b) the selected sub-
range is sufficiently far removed from any specific examples disclosed in the prior art and from 
the end-points of the known range; (c) the selected range is not an arbitrary specimen of the prior 
art, i.e. not a mere embodiment of the prior art, but another invention (purposive selection, new 
technical teaching)”.129 
Recently, the Argentinian Government in cooperation with the National Institute of Intellectual 
Property issued new guidelines regarding the patent applications, which specifically reject 
applications deemed as selection patents.130 
Thus, as pointed out by a relevant scholar, “selection patents should not be admitted if the selected 
components have already been disclosed and, hence, lack novelty”.131  
                                                             
127 See the UK Examination Guidelines for Patent Applications relating to Biotechnological Inventions in the UK 
Patent Office (May 2005), para 24 and Section 3 of the Manual of Patent Practice, para 3.27.  
128 See the Technical Board of Appeal’s decisions in T12/81 (BAYER/Diastereoisomers) OJ 8/1982, 296 and in T 
198/84 (Hoechst) OJ 1985, 209. 
129 EPO, Guidelines for Examination, Part G - Patentability, Chapter VI - Novelty, Sect. 8(ii).  
130 Joint Resolution No. 118/20012, 546/2012 and 107/2012 of May 2, 2012, of the Ministry of Industry, Ministry of 
Health and the National Industrial Property Institute, approving the Guidelines for the Examination of Patent 
Applications of Pharmaceutical and Chemical Inventions, Date of Entry into Force: 16 May 2012, available at http:// 
www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=13007, accessed in February 2015. 
131 See C. Correa, (note above) 12.  
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In light of the above, it can be stated that a narrower interpretation of novelty which will expedite 
access to medicine in South Africa, is not only possible, as demonstrated by the approach taken by 
the EPO and Argentina, and importantly, is in line with the TRIPS Agreement provisions.  
2.2.  Inventive Step  
If the requirement of novelty is satisfied, for an invention to be patentable it must also possess an 
inventive step, which corresponds to a technical advance as compared to the state of the art (also 
known as the prior art). Therefore, an invention shall involve an inventive step when it is not 
obvious to the person skilled in the art, having regard to any matter, which forms part of the state 
of the art.132 
 Finding a uniform definition of non-obviousness or inventiveness is a critical task. In this way, 
the TRIPS Agreement leaves to Member countries the freedom to determine the level of technical 
contribution that makes an invention sufficiently inventive and therefore patentable. Indeed, the 
TRIPS Agreement, without giving a predetermined definition of inventiveness, leaves patent 
offices and courts of WTO Members free to set more or less strict definitions of such a standard. 
Resultantly, in the context of public health and access to live-saving medicines in developing 
countries, it is recommendable to implement a narrower criterion of inventiveness, which would 
minimise the issuance of unwarranted patents for medicines and could contribute towards the 
stimulation of competition.133 However, the South African interpretation of this concept scarcely 
takes this into consideration as shown below.134  
Section 25(10) of the South African Patents Act states that “an invention shall be deemed to 
involve an inventive step if it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art, having regard to any 
matter which forms, immediately before the priority date of the invention, part of the state of the 
art”.  
                                                             
132 See Section 25(10) of the South African Patents Act.  
133 See C. Correa (note above) 5. 
134 See C. Correa, Pharmaceutical Innovation, Incremental Patenting and Compulsory Licensing, in Research Paper, 
South Center (September 2011) Geneva, 12. The full text of the research paper is available online at: 
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/en/d/Js21395en/, accessed in February 2015. 
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The South African courts, adopting the interpretation given by the English courts, distinguish three 
stages that need to be determined in order to assess the existence of the non-obviousness in an 
invention: “first, the definition of the problem to be solved or the difficulty to be overcome; 
secondly the choice of the general principle to be applied in solving the problem or overcoming 
the difficulty; and thirdly, the choice of the particular means to be used. Merit in any one of these 
stages, or in the whole combined, may support the invention”.135 Subsequently, in the case Ensign-
Bickford,136 the standard three-step test has been replaced by the four-step approach, introduced 
by the English case Molnlycke AB and Another v Proctor & Gamble Limited and Others. 
According to the latter case, the questions to be asked as to evaluate whether the inventiveness 
standard is satisfied are:  
“1. What is the inventive step said to be involved in the patent in suit? 
2. What was, at the priority date, the state of the art (as statutorily defined) relevant to that step? 
3. In what respect does the step go beyond, or differ from, that state of the art? 
4. Having regard to such development or difference, would the taking of the step be obvious to the 
skilled man?”. 137 
Thus, in order to ascertain the inventiveness of the claimed invention, the role of the “skilled man”, 
to whom the reached invention should be non-obvious, having regard to the state of art, is crucial. 
However, establishing the level of inventiveness at which the invention is deemed to be non-
obvious is a question of central importance. In fact, the number of patents issued, or re-issued, 
exponentially grows when the level of non-obviousness is too low, with evident implications to 
public health and access to medicines. In this respect, it has been highlighted that “setting a high 
inventive step will help prevent the strategic use of patents by multinational companies to block 
the generic industry”.138 Nevertheless, if the level of inventiveness is too high, the progress of 
                                                             
135 See Miller v Boxes and Shooks (Pty) Ltd 1945 AD 561. 
136 See Ensign-Bickford (South Africa)(Pty) Limited and Others v AECI Explosives and Chemicals Limited 1998 
BIP271 (SCA) 281. 
137 See Mölnlycke AB and Another v Procter & Gamble Limited and Others (note above) 115.  
138 C. Correa, (note above) 15-16.  
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society will inevitably be hindered since enterprises and investors will be less willing to invest in 
R&D.139 
As Pfizer & Ano v Cipla Medpro & Ors case shows, South African courts are applying a low level 
of non-obviousness.140 In this case, the court ruled that the formulation of besylate salt, which for 
an expert is obvious, was unexpected and constituted an advance on the prior art. The court 
consequently rejected the revocation of the patent because it accepted that it was sufficiently 
inventive.  
Interestingly, in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. the United States Supreme Court took an 
innovative and unusual approach to the inventive step standard of patentability. Indeed, the court 
introduced a stricter approach to the non-obviousness doctrine, by stating that “granting patent 
protection to advances that would occur in the ordinary course without real innovation retards 
progress, and may, in the case of patents combining previously known elements, deprive prior 
inventions of their value or utility”.141  
In light of the foregoing, it is possible to conclude that South African courts are in the position to 
adopt a stricter interpretation of the inventiveness standard, which would be consistent with the 
flexibilities allowed in the TRIPS Agreement and simultaneously would avoid an unjustified 
patent proliferation in the pharmaceutical sector.  
2.3.  Industrial application  
The requirement of industrial application is generically satisfied in South Africa. According to 
Section 25 (1) of the South African Patents Act an invention can be patented if it “is capable of 
being used or applied in trade or industry or agriculture”. In other words, patents can only be 
granted to inventions, which are useful and capable of being industrially reproduced. To better 
understand this concept, Justice David Kitchin of the UK High Court of Justice, in Eli Lilly and 
                                                             
139 E.W., Kitch, The nature and function of the patent system, 20 J.L & Econ.265, (1977). 
140 See Pfizer & Ano v Cipla Medpro & Ors 2005 BIP 1.  
141 See KSR Int’l v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) 15 (slip opinion). For a more accurate discussion, see also C. 
A. Cotropia, “Predictability and Nonobviousness in Patent Law After KSR”, in Michigan Telecommunications and 
Technology Law Review, (2014), Volume 20, Issue 2.  
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Company v. Human Genome Sciences Inc., clarified that “a patent is not a hunting licence to find 
a use for the claimed product. It is a reward for the successful conclusion of the search”.142 
 
3. EXAMINATION AND OPPOSITION PROCEDURES  
Even though the TRIPS Agreement does not put any obligation to Member States to provide a 
substantive examination system, the benefits of an examination system, which includes pre- and 
post-grant oppositions, are illustrated by the experience of several WTO countries, in particular by 
India, as will be explained in the next Chapter.  
Yet, the South African patent system does not undertake an early substantive examination of the 
applications submitted by the requester. Section 34 of the South African Patents Act states that the 
patent registrar “shall examine in the prescribed manner every application for a patent and every 
complete specification accompanying such application or lodged at the patent office in pursuance 
of such application and if it complies with the requirements of this Act, shall accept it”. In other 
words, a patent registrar may proceed with the grant of the patent only after having examined in 
the prescribed manner every application (emphasis added). However, currently the patent office 
would merely register the applications when the appropriate application forms have been correctly 
filled.143 Moreover, there exists no formalised system for objections relating to content and patent 
applications can potentially be granted without ensuring that the criteria of patentability have been 
satisfied. 
The Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) corresponds to the South African 
                                                             
142 See Eli Lilly and Company v. Human Genome Sciences Inc., [2008] EWHC 1903 (Pat), case number HC06C02687. 
Interestingly, on November 2, 2011, the United Kingdom Supreme Court reversed the decision that HGS’s patent was 
lacking of the requirement of industrial application. The Supreme Court held that Article 57 of the European Patent 
Convention (EPC) states that: “An invention shall be considered as susceptible of industrial application if it can be 
made or used in any kind of industry, including agriculture”; thus, it ruled that the use of the molecule for research as 
carried out by HGS was sufficient in itself as an industrial activity ([2011] UKSC 51, Para 155). 
143 A. Pouris & A. Pouris, “Patents and economic development in South Africa: Managing intellectual property rights” 
in S Afr J Sci (2011) 107(11/12), 5, available online at: http://www.sajs.co.za/sites/default/files/publications/pdf/355-
6888-1-PB.pdf, accessed in February 2015. In particular, the authors explain that the CIPC (CIPRO under the old 
name) “does not investigate the novelty or inventive merit of the invention – only the forms or documentation are 
verified and not the substance of the product or process”. 
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patent office, where all patent applications are filed, formally examined and finally registered. The 
patent registration procedure takes up to 6 months and a provisional protection is granted for 12 
months from the submission of the patent application. 
As mentioned, South Africa is a non-examining country; this means that when the application 
complied with all required formalities the patent is normally granted. Hence, CIPC does not carry 
out any substantial examination regarding whether the requirements of novelty, inventiveness and 
utility exist in the invention.144 
The negative consequences of a patent registration without an accurate examination in place are 
obvious. Firstly, a non-examining system brings an unwarranted patent proliferation since even 
weak inventions, by escaping a strict inspection, may eventually be registered. For instance, 
according to the World Intellectual Property Indicators Report of 2013, South Africa had one of 
the higher numbers of patents in force in 2012 by office within the “top 20 offices”, which are 
those offices that granted the largest number of patents in 2012. Moreover, the report shows that 
the 87.8% of patents in force in South Africa belongs to non-residents.145 Secondly, it inevitably 
dilutes the prior art, given that it allows the existence in the country of patents lacking novelty, 
inventiveness and utility. Furthermore, while the patent registration in both Europe and the United 
States limits the number of claims to be included in one patent application, in the South African 
patent system the applicant is not restricted by such a rule. In addition, the European Patent Office 
(EPO) and the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) establish a higher price for 
patents including more than a set number of claims.146 However, the registration fees in South 
Africa are lower than those in other countries, with the obvious consequence of attracting foreign 
applicants, especially from developed countries. The situation explained above produces an 
unequal situation in terms of patent protection, since, while it favours foreign investors in South 
                                                             
144 A. Pouris & A. Pouris, (note above) 5.  
145  See World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), World Intellectual Property Indicators (2013), 80. 
Available online at: http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/941/wipo_pub_941_2013.pdf, accessed in 
February 2015. 
146 For an example of the registration procedure before the EPO, see Guide for applicants, Part 2: PCT procedure 
before the EPO, Claim Fees available online at: http://www.epo.org/applying/international/guide-for-
applicants/html/e/ga_e_xi_3.html, accessed in February 2015. Similarly, the USPTO sets the filing fee in accordance 
with 35 U.S.C. 41 and the Fee Setting Authority set forth in section 10 of Public Law 112-29, Sept. 16, 2011. For an 
example of the filing fee see http://www.uspto.gov/about/offices /cfo/finance/fees.jsp, accessed in February 2015. 
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Africa, it prevents South African inventors from receiving patent protection abroad, considering 
the high cost for registering and maintaining patents abroad.147 Moreover, a registration restricted 
to a sole territory brings the risk of an international disclosure. Yet, in case of a “relative novelty” 
this may be insufficient for destroying the novelty of a foreign subsequent invention.148  
Another crucial aspect for consideration is patent databases. In the Resolution 61.21 of the 2008, 
the World Health Assembly urged the Member States to “facilitate widespread access to, and 
promote further development of, including, if necessary, compiling, maintaining and updating, 
user-friendly global databases which contain public information on the administrative status of 
health-related patents, including supporting the existing efforts for determining the patent status 
of health products, in order to strengthen national capacities for analysis of the information 
contained in those databases, and improve the quality of patents”.149 As a result of this, several 
national patent offices worldwide implemented, in the past years, electronically searchable 
databases.150 However, an open access on-line searchable database does not exist in South Africa. 
Thus, only a manual research can be physically carried out at the CIPC and, as it has been correctly 
highlighted, this “approach is not supportive of the requirements of the public interest to 
disseminate the know-how of patents widely”.151  
Thus far, examination systems that include both pre- and post-grant oppositions are internationally 
recognised, as it will be further shown in the following Chapter. However, as previously stated, 
the South African Patents Act does not provide for any opposition procedure, since Section 34 
solely empowers the registrar to grant the patent if the application complies with the formal 
                                                             
147 A. Pouris & A. Pouris, (note above) 6. 
148 As pointed out “[…] South African inventors are not able to protect their inventions abroad and they also run the 
danger of disclosing their inventions to foreigners by patenting only locally” in A. Pouris & A. Pouris, (note above) 
7. 
149 See World Health Assembly, Global strategy and plan of action on public health, innovation and intellectual 
property, WHA61.21 (24 May 2008) Annex 5, Section 36(c). Available online at: 
http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/A61/A61_R21-en.pdf, accessed in February 2015. 
150 See T. Amin, “Searching for Transparency: Improving Patent Information to Increase Access to Medicines”, in 
BRIDGES, (2010) V. 14 – No. 4. Available online at: http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/searching-for-
transparency-improving-patent-information-to-increase-access, accessed in February 2015. In this article the author 
clarifies that: “Examples include Argentina, Brazil, China, Colombia, Egypt, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines 
and Thailand. In the case of the Indian Patent Office, it was only after much public pressure that the database provided 
the full text of published and granted patents, as well as the status of applications”. 
151 A. Pouris & A. Pouris, (note above) 7. 
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requirements of the South African Patents Act.  
Despite this, it should be taken into account that a substantial examination system, as the one 
implemented in India (analysed in the next Chapter), is to be considered as one of the main tools, 
which may increase access to medicines.152 Only by recognising the right to oppose an application 
consisting of a weak innovation, low quality inventions would be prevented from being patented. 
Most foreign jurisdictions allow pre-grant and post-grant opposition mechanisms. While the latter 
generally enable a specific interested person to file an opposition within a certain time after the 
patent has been granted, the former normally permits anyone to file an opposition after the 
publication of the application and before the grant of the patent. 153  From a public health 
perspective, a policy tool such as the one just described, shall promote the public interest in having 
access to medicines, by constraining the patent ever-greening and reducing monopolies over no-
patentable inventions.      
4. THE USE OF FLEXIBILITIES:  
4.1.  Exclusion from patentability 
As cited in the second chapter of this study, the TRIPS Agreement set express exclusions to 
patentability that WTO members are allowed to implement in their laws. Namely, Article 27.2 and 
27.3 of the TRIPS Agreement establish that “members may exclude from patentability inventions, 
the prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect 
ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid 
serious prejudice to the environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the 
exploitation is prohibited by their law”; additionally, “members may also exclude from 
patentability:  
                                                             
152 See C. Park, A. Prabhala & J. Berger (note above) 54, where the author explains that: “The advantages of having 
an examination system, particularly along with a system of pre- and post-grant oppositions to patent applications and 
granted patents respectively, is borne out in the experience of a number of developing countries. For instance, the 
Indian Patents Act allows for oppositions by civil society groups. Taking advantage of provisions like section 3(d), 
networks of people living with HIV have filed oppositions on several key medicines. Indian generic companies have 
also filed oppositions.” 




 (a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals;  
 (b) plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially bio- logical processes 
for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes. 
[…]” 
Section 25(4) of the Patents Act specifically assimilated the above exclusions by stating that “A 
patent shall not be granted: 
(a) for an invention the publication or exploitation of which would be generally expected to 
encourage offensive or immoral behaviour; or  
(b) for any variety of animal or plant or any essentially biological processes for the production of 
animals and plants, not being a micro-biological process or the product of such process.” 
Additionally, Section 25(11), in line with the TRIPS Agreement, declares the incapability of “an 
invention of a method of treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy or diagnosis 
practiced on the human or animal body” to be “used or applied in trade or industry or 
agriculture”.  
Despite this, the Patents Act introduces in the South African law an exception to the exclusion set 
by Section 25(11). In fact, according to Section 25(12), “subsection (11) shall not prevent a 
product consisting of a substance or composition being deemed capable of being used or applied 
in trade or industry or agriculture merely because it is invented for use in any such method”. 
This provision produces an additional exception to the principle of non-patentability of methods 
of treatment of humans or animals which is not requested by the TRIPS Agreement, particularly 
with Article 27.3, and which expands the scope of industrial applicability beyond its required 
limit.154  
4.2.  Limited exceptions 
As already illustrated in the previous Chapter, the TRIPS Agreement, providing for “limited 
                                                             
154 C. Park, A. Prabhala & J. Berger (note above) 35 – 38.  
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exceptions to the exclusive rights” of the patentee, allows additional public health related 
flexibilities aimed at reducing the extent of rights awarded by patents.155  
In 2002, South Africa introduced, through an amendment of Section 69A(1) of the Patents Act, 
the exception which states: 
“It shall not be an act of infringement of a patent to make, use, exercise, offer to dispose of, dispose 
of or import the patented invention on a non-commercial scale and solely for the purposes 
reasonably related to the obtaining, development and submission of information required under 
any law that regulates the manufacture, production, distribution, use or sale of any product”.156 
In light of the foregoing, the use of an invention without the permission of the patent holder is not 
an act of infringement when it is done for acquiring information to submit for regulatory approval. 
In other words, pharmaceutical generic manufacturers can obtain registration of the generic 
equivalents of the relevant drug with the South African registration authorities, before the 
expiration of the patent.  
However, the South African Patents Act does not seem to extensively utilise the exceptions 
considered by Art. 30 of the TRIPS Agreement. In fact, this provision is purposely drafted in a 
broad manner with the aim of respecting “the legitimate interests of the patent owner”, but also 
taking into account “the legitimate interests of third parties”. Furthermore, the wording of Art. 30 
of the TRIPS Agreement gives to WTO members a considerable level of autonomy to provide for 
different types of exceptions to the patentee’ exclusive right.   
For instance, research and experimental exceptions can be fundamental policy tools to increase 
development and progress in the pharmaceutical field and to obtain more information about the 
uses and eventual side-effects that a certain drug can have.157 In this way, Section 60(5)(b) of the 
                                                             
155 See Art. 30 of the TRIPS Agreement. However, the limited exceptions to patents rights, which include research 
and experimentation, prior use, early working and a controversial export of medicines to non-producing countries, are 
provided only whether they “do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner”. 
156 The South African Patents Act was amended by the Patents Amendment Act No. 58 of 2002, and published in 
Government Gazette on 15 January 2003. 
157 World Health Organization, Intellectual property and access to medicines: papers and perspectives (2010) 16-17. 
The full paper is available online here: http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/en/d/Js17521en/, accessed in February 2015. 
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United Kingdom Patents Act of 1977 states that “an act which would constitute an infringement 
of a patent for an invention shall not do so if […] it is done for experimental purposes which are 
related to the subject matter of the patented invention”.158  
Therefore, an extensive interpretation, which would incorporate research, experimental and 
educational exceptions, would not be in conflict with the TRIPS Agreement.159 
4.3.  Compulsory licensing  
As previously discussed, Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement permits, through the policy 
mechanism of compulsory licensing, the use of patented inventions without the express 
authorisation of the patent holder. Notably, by issuing a compulsory licence, a country allows a 
third party to manufacture the patented drug, under certain conditions, during the validity of the 
patent right and without the patent owner’s consent.  
Compulsory licences contribute to promoting access to medicine, as firmly stated by the Doha 
Declaration, in order to respond to the “the gravity of public health problems afflicting many 
developing and least developed countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 
malaria and other epidemics”160, “each Member has the right to grant compulsory licences and 
the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted”.161  
Regrettably, South Africa has not so far taken full advantage of the mechanisms allowed by the 
TRIPS Agreement to reduce the patent holder’s rights in the name of the public interest.162 As 
Section 56 of the South African Patents Act shows, South Africa requires a long and expensive 
judicial mechanism for granting a compulsory licence. Currently, applications must be filed with 
                                                             
For more on the experimental use exception, see E. Richard Gold et al., The Research or Experimental Use Exception: 
A Comparative Analysis, Montreal: Centre for Intellectual Property Policy / Health Law Institute (2005) available on 
line: http://www.cipp.mcgill.ca/data/newsletters/00000050.pdf, accessed in February 2015. 
158 With this provision the UK Patents Act of 1977 recalls the wording of Article 27(b) of the Community Patent 
Convention established in 1975, which states “acts done for experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of 
the patented invention” do not constitute patent infringement.  
159 C. Park, A. Prabhala & J. Berger (note above) 56 - 57. 
160  See Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 20 November 2001, Doha WTO Ministerial 
Declaration 2001, (note above), para 1. 
161  See Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 20 November 2001, Doha WTO Ministerial 
Declaration 2001, (note above), para 5(b).  
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the commissioner of patents “in the prescribed manner” and the proceeding will be conducted 
according to “the law governing procedure in civil cases in the Transvaal Provincial Division of 
the High Court of South Africa”.163 Thus, the granting of a compulsory licence, following the 
structure of a full judicial proceeding, can take years to complete, with consequential delays in the 
issuance and implementation of compulsory licences, particularly in case of national 
emergencies.164 
Yet, the TRIPS Agreement does not require a complex procedure such as the one described above. 
On the contrary, Article 1 leaves member states “free to determine the appropriate method of 
implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice”. Thus, 
it is possible to implement a far simpler process, given that it is in compliance with the TRIPS 
Agreement’s provisions. Additionally, streamlined procedure may support and stimulate generic 
companies or NGOs to call for a larger use of compulsory licences, when needed, and resultantly 
increase competition in the pharmaceutical sector.  
In addition, Section 56 of the South African Patents Act limits to only four circumstances the 
grounds upon which compulsory licences may be granted and only “in case of abuse of patent 
rights”. 
In this way, Section 56 provides that patent rights “shall be deemed to be abused” when: 
a) “the patented invention is not” commercially “being worked in the Republic” or it is not 
being worked during an adequate extent of years, where according to the commissioner 
there is not a “satisfactory reason for the non-working”; 
b) the demand for the patented item is “not being met to an adequate extent and on 
reasonable terms”; 
c) the refusal coming from the patent holder to grant the licence “upon reasonable terms” 
causes prejudice to the “trade, industry or agriculture, the trade of persons, or the 
establishment of any new trade or industry […] and it is in the public interest that a licence 
or licences should be granted”; 
                                                             
163 See Section 19(1) of the South African Patents Act. 
164 C. Park, A. Prabhala & J. Berger (note above) 61- 62. 
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d) the demand for the patent item is met by importation and “the price charged is excessive 
compared to the price in the country” of origin.  
As stated, the Doha Declaration encourages members to take full advantage of the TRIPS 
flexibilities.165 Therefore, a more extensive choice of public health grounds could, and should, be 
implemented in South Africa. For instance, Section27, TAC and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) 
in their Joint Submission to the Department of Trade and Industry stressed the attention towards 
other grounds for compulsory licences that should include the following circumstances: “medicine 
prices prohibit access, supply is inadequate to need, there is a need for multiple suppliers to avoid 
shortages or stock-outs, the patent holder has refused to grant a voluntary licence on reasonable 
terms, the medicine is an “essential facility,” there is a need for a novel fixed dose combination 
medicine comprising ingredients patented by multiple right holders, and the medicine is not being 
adequately worked in South Africa”.166 
Regarding government-use licences, Section 4 of the South African Patents Act clarifies that a 
Minister of State, before using an invention for public purposes, must enter into agreement with 
the patentee as to the conditions upon which the invention can be used. In this way, Section 4 
imposes a further requirement on the process of granting a government-use licence, which is 
expressly waived by Article 31(b) of the TRIPS Agreement. This provision clearly states that no 
prior consultations with the patent holder need to be carried out “in case of a national emergency 
or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in case of public non commercial use”. Thus, South 
Africa, imposing an obligation of prior negotiations, does not maximize the flexibility granted by 
Article 31(b) of the TRIPS Agreement to all WTO members. 
                                                             
165  See Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 20 November 2001, Doha WTO Ministerial 
Declaration 2001, (note above), para 4, which states “[…] we reaffirm the right of WTO members to use, to the full, 
the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose”. 
166 See S27, TAC and MSF in the Joint Submission on the Draft National Intellectual Property Policy, 2013 (17 
October 2013) 44, footnote 93. The full text is available online at: http://www.fixthepatentlaws.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/S27-TAC-MSF-Submission_on_IP_Policy.pdf, accessed in August 2014. In addition, C. 
Park, A. Prabhala & J. Berger (note above) believe that additional grounds can be included in order to facilitate the 
issuance of compulsory licences. These situations “could be broadly based on public health grounds, allowing for 
any third party to apply for a compulsory licence in the public interest. Such a ground would effectively serve as a 
‘catch-all’ to allow compulsory licences to be granted in situations that may not necessarily fit neatly into one of the 
above-mentioned grounds”, 71.  
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Of interest, according to 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) of the United States Code,167 a title-holder can only 
recover monetary damages from the government for the unauthorized use or manufacture of the 
patented invention:  “whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United 
States is used or manufactured by or for the United States without licence of the owner thereof or 
lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the owner’s remedy shall be by action against the 
United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and 
entire compensation for such use and manufacture”. For this reason, the US government has 
largely used compulsory licences for governmental-use.168  
In light of these considerations, South Africa could amend Section 4 of its Patents Act to allow a 
greater use of this type of compulsory licensing. The use of this policy tool could be of special 
importance for a developing country like South Africa, which has less capacity of boosting the 
generic drug industry that is essential for promoting competition.169  
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, additionally, states that in case of national emergency or 
extreme urgency, Member States are allowed to grant compulsory licences. Moreover, paragraph 
5(c) of the Doha Declaration recognises that each WTO Member has “the right to determine what 
constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood 
that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other 
                                                             
167  See United States Code, 2006 Edition, Supplement 5, Title 28. Available online at: 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/USCODE-2011-title28/USCODE-2011-title28-partIV-chap91-sec1498/content-
detail.html, accessed in February 2015. 
168  In 2001, for instance, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) used 28 USC 1498 to treat 
pharmaceutical companies, in order to permit the importation of generic ciprofloxacin in the case of a possible terrorist 
attack of anthrax. Interestingly, this practice has been severely criticized by the European Union: “This practice is 
particularly frequent in the activities of the Department of Defense but is also extremely widespread in practically all 
government departments. For obvious reasons this practice is particularly detrimental for foreign right-holders 
because they will generally not be able to detect governmental use and are thus very likely to miss the opportunity to 
initiate an administrative claims process. Article 31 of the TRIPs Agreement introduces a requirement to inform 
promptly a right holder about government use of his patent, but no action has been taken by the US so far to bring 
their legislation into conformity with this provision.” (European Commission 1997) 
169 See Department of Trade and Industry, Draft National Policy (note 34 above) in which it has been recognised that: 
“A developing country like South Africa can access medicines at lower prices via a mechanism called "compulsory 
licensing". Compulsory licensing allows a country to licence the manufacture of patented medicines to a third 
manufacturer when there are good reasons to do so, e.g. when the Government considers the price of medicines to be 
astronomically high [Kunst, Rimmer, Commission]. Compulsory licensing may be of assistance as a bargaining tool 
in price negotiations with producers of patented medicines e.g. the US envisaged this possibility when negotiating the 
price of Cipro (a drug) following the anthrax attack after "9/11/2001" (9/11).” 
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epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency”.170 
Despite the express statements of the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration, the South 
African Patents Act does not provide for the issuance of compulsory licences in case of national 
emergency or extreme urgency. Dissimilar to South Africa, in India the procedure of granting 
compulsory licences is accelerated in such situations.171 Consequently, it would be permissible for 
South Africa to establish a compulsory licensing system, in which in situations of emergency and 
urgency, the government would provide, and also expedite, the granting of this public health policy 
practice.  
Notably, in 1998, when South Africa announced its motivation to start adopting compulsory 
licences and parallel importation for life-saving medicines, a group of pharmaceutical companies, 
supported by the US, filed a lawsuit against the South African government, arguing that their IPRs 
would have been undermined (“PMA v Government of RSA” case). However, the pharmaceutical 
companies decided to unconditionally withdraw the application against South Africa, due to a 
severe international condemnation of the case.172 Although South Africa agreed, in exchange for 
the pharmaceutical industry withdrawing, to use the compulsory licensing mechanism in a discreet 
and wise manner. However, South Africa has never issued a compulsory licence for drugs to this 
date.173 
As it has been highlighted, compulsory licensing is a well-recognised practice essential in 
“addressing the adverse effects of the patent grant on public welfare”, which “can reduce drug 
costs both through generic manufacture and by posing a credible threat in negotiations with drug 
manufacturers”.174 In light of this, and also considering the accessibility of TRIPS flexibilities, a 
                                                             
170  See Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 20 November 2001, Doha WTO Ministerial 
Declaration 2001, (note above). 
171 This aspect will be further discussed in the next Chapter.  
172  See High Court Of South Africa, Case 4183/9, the notice of motion is available online at: 
http://cptech.org/ip/health/sa/pharmasuit.html, accessed in February 2014. See also B. Deacon, “Global Social Policy 
and Governance” in SAGE Publications Ltd (2007) 56 and P. DeRoo, “Public Non-Commercial Use' Compulsory 
Licensing for Pharmaceutical Drugs in Government Health Care Programs” in Michigan Journal of International Law 
(2011) Volume 32, Issue 2, 354-357. 
173 See Medecins Sans Frontieres, (note above). 
174 L. Forman, “Trading health for profit: the impact of bilateral and regional free trade agreements on domestic 
intellectual property rules on pharmaceuticals” in Cohen J. C., Illingworth P., and Schüklenk U. (eds.) The power of 
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legislative amendment of Section 4 and Section 56 of the South African Patents Act is not only 
possible, in the country, but rather needed.  
 
4.4.  Voluntary licensing 
Voluntary licences play a significant role in incentivising improving access to medicine.175 In fact, 
by increasing competition in the pharmaceutical market, they make drugs more affordable. In 
relation to this, it has been explained that the presence in the market of more participants, such as 
generic competitors, would result in a significant price reduction.176 
South Africa succeeded in reducing the excessive prices of some of the principal life-saving 
medicines in the battle against the two colossal pharmaceutical companies, GlaxoSmithKline 
(GSK) and Boehringer Ingelheim (BI).177 The case started after a group of generic drug companies, 
supported by civil society groups, in particular TAC, claimed that the two companies were in 
breach of the competition law since the prohibitive price of their ARV medicine was detrimental 
for consumers. In particular, by charging such an excessive price they were “directly responsible 
for premature, predictable and avoidable deaths of people living with HIV/AIDS, including both 
children and adults”.178  Moreover, the applicants stressed on the fact that the extent of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic, which “is the leading cause of mortality in South Africa and is regarded as 
the greatest health threat […]”,179 made the high profit of these drug companies unjustifiable. Of 
special note is the great support, from national and international organizations, received by the 
                                                             
pills: Social, ethical and legal issues in drug development, marketing and pricing (2006) 191.  
175 With a voluntary licence a title holder directly gives permission to a third party to produce, market and distribute 
the patented invention (generally the generic version) in exchange for the corresponding royalties agreed between the 
parties. See also Chapter II, 3), c), iv) of this study. 
176 See BK Baker & E Obaka, The danger of in-kind drug donations to the Global Fund (2008) 372 (2). See also K. 
de Joncheere, A. H. Rietveld & C. Huttin, “Experiences with generics” in International Journal of Risk & Safety in 
Medicine 15 (2002) 101–109 101 IOS Press, where the authors explain that: “Generic competition is usually used in 
deregulated markets to encourage price competition. It is considered as one of the major forms of leverage which can 
be exercised in a relatively liberal environment to contain market prices on multiple source products”. 
177 See Hazel Tau & Others v GlaxoSmithKline & Boehringer Ingelheim (note above).  
178 See Complaint submitted to the Competition Commission of South Africa in the case Hazel Tau & Others v 
GlaxoSmithKline & Boehringer Ingelheim, (note 102 above) 17. Available online at: http://www.section27.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2010/10/TauvGSKevidenceAndLegalSubmissions.pdf, accessed in February 2015. 
179 Ibid 60.4. 
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applicants during the lawsuit. Particularly, the Cosumer Project on Tecnology (CPTech) gave 
reccomandations and advice to the complainants, expressed in the affidavit (“Expert Annexure 
JPL”) regarding R&D costs. The Director of CPTech, James Love, affirmed that “the high capital 
cost” of R&D spent by drug companies that produce ARVs was based “upon assumptions of very 
long lead times for development, something that does not reflect either recent industry experience, 
or historical data on AIDS drugs”.180 Additionally, he concluded: “there is also evidence that 
many commonly held views on the costs of new drug development are not supported by the 
empirical evidence concerning the costs of clinical trails”.181 
On the 16th of October, 2003, the Competition Commission announced that GSK and BI abused 
of their dominant position in the ARV market and therefore they contravened the Competition Act 
1998.182 A few months later, in December 2003, a settlement agreement was concluded with the 
two drug firms: GSK and BI agreed to provide a non-exclusive royalty-free voluntary licence, thus, 
allowing generic competitors to use and manufacture ARV drugs in South Africa.183 
4.5.  Parallel importation  
As stated in Chapter 2, the principle of international exhaustion of rights is recognised in Article 
6 of the TRIPS Agreement. This principle recognises the possibility of importing a product from 
another country, without the permission of the right-owner, provided that the product has been 
already sold, with the authorization of its title-holder, into the market of importation.  
South Africa inserted a provision regarding parallel importation only in 2002, with the amendment 
of the South African Patents Act of 1978.184 Section 45(2) reads:  
“The disposal of a patented article by or on behalf of a patentee or his licencee shall, subject to 
                                                             




u0bQ5kYSbWwnSQ&bvm=bv.85761416,d.d2s, accessed in February 2015. 
181 See J. P. Love (note above) para 46.  
182 See Competition Commission Press Release, (16 October 2004). Available online at: 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/cc10162003.html, accessed in February 2015. 
183 See T. Pistorius, (note above) 398.  
184 See Patents Amendment Act No. 58 of 2002. 
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other patent rights, give the purchaser the right to use, offer to dispose of and dispose of that 
article.” 
Before this, in 1997, South Africa introduced the Medicines and Related Substances Control 
Amendment Act No. 90 (Medicines Act), whose Section 15C, provided for the parallel importation 
of pharmaceuticals from other nations. Particularly, the Act was aimed at solving the health crisis, 
due to the intense spread of HIV/AIDS in the country, through a more efficient use of the TRIPS 
flexibilities, specifically via the policy tools of compulsory licensing and parallel importation. 
However, the United States attempted to force the South African government to remove the 
provision contained in Section 15C, enclosing, in 1999, the country to the list of “Special 301 
Section” of the amended Trade Act of 1974.185 
Section 15C of the Medicines Act, in particular, intends to ensure the supply of more affordable 
medicines, giving to the Minister the power to “prescribe the conditions for the supply of more 
affordable medicines in certain circumstances so as to protect the health of the public”. 
Specifically, the Minister may: (a) “[…] determine that the rights with regard to any medicine 
under a patent granted in the Republic shall not extend to acts in respect of such medicine which 
has been put onto the market by the owner of the medicine, or with his or her consent”; 
(b)“prescribe the conditions on which any medicine which is identical in composition, meets the 
same quality standard and is intended to have the same proprietary name as that of another 
medicine already registered in the Republic, but which is imported by a person other than the 
person who is the holder of the registration certificate of the medicine already registered and 
which originates from any site of manufacture of the original manufacturer as approved by the 
council in the prescribed manner, may be imported”; (c)“prescribe the registration procedure for, 
as well as the use of, the medicine referred to in paragraph (b)”.  
Despite the political pressures from both the United States and the pharmaceutical firms to amend 
                                                             
185 Section 301 was amended by Section 1303 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitive Act of 1998, see online at: 
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2004/2004_Special_301/Section_Index.html, accessed 
in February 2015.  
A “Special 301 Report” is annually drafted by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), which 
enumerates the countries that are not compliant with the standard of IPRs on the so-called list “Special 301 Section”, 
threating them with trade sanctions. Particularly, countries whose IP systems are deemed to be critical are divided into 
a "Priority Watch List" and a "Watch List", depending on the level of concern. 
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Section 15C,186 the South African government was able to resist those challenges, and, supported 
by the European Union, national and international NGOs and the WHO, 187  made the 
pharmaceutical applicants drop their claim and paid for the legal expenses.188   
It should also be noted that Regulation 7 of the General Regulations to the Medicines Act 2003, 
which gives effect to Section 15C of the Medicines Act, clarifies that “a medicine referred to 
section in 15C(b) of the Act may be sold if: […] the medicine is under patent in the Republic”. 
This Section should be read together with Regulation 7 of the General Regulations to the 
Medicines Act 2003, which gives effect to Section 15C. For instance, the person desiring to import 
a medicine should submit to the Minister of Health (i) a large number of documents and credentials, 
notwithstanding the lack of an administrative body, which would receive those papers;189 (ii) 
documentary evidence of the price at which the medicine will be sold in South Africa, although in 
some cases the price will be set only at a advanced phase of the process.190 Furthermore, the 
validity of the permit importation is limited to a period of two years,191 leading to a situation of 
uncertainty after the expiration of the validity. Additionally, the applicant, after having received 
the permit from the Minister of Health of parallel importing a medicine in South Africa, must apply 
for the registration of the medicine, even though the medicine will only be available for two 
years.192  
Despite Section 15C explicitly allows parallel importation in South Africa, no medicines have 
been imported in the country until now.193 The reason can possibly be found in the complexity of 
the system set forth by Regulation 7, which, to some extent, unduly aggravates the method of 
importation with excessive requirements, going beyond what is required by the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
                                                             
186 See para 3(c) of this Chapter, where the “PMA v Government of RSA” case is analysed. 
187 See R. L. Swarns, Drug Makers Drop South Africa Suit Over AIDS Medicine, The New York Times (2001), A1. 
188 See World Health Organization, Intellectual Property and access to medicines, (2010) 15-16. See also W. W. 
Fisher & C. P. Rigamonti (note above) 5 - 9.  
189 See Regulation 7(2) of the General Regulations to the Medicines Act 2003.  
190 See Regulation 7(2) e) of the General Regulations to the Medicines Act 2003. 
191 See Regulation 7(3) of the General Regulations to the Medicines Act 2003. 
192 See Regulation 7(5) of the General Regulations to the Medicines Act 2003. 
193 See S27, TAC and MSF in the Joint Submission on the Draft National Intellectual Property Policy, 2013 (note 




The central goal of this Chapter was the analysis of the South African patents law, mainly in regard 
to the use and implementation in the patents system of the TRIPS flexibilities. The analysis of this 
study took into consideration the South African Patents Act and also the Medicines Act of 1997 
(see year), comparing their provisions with the International rules set by the TRIPS Agreement. 
The work shows that South Africa, in different areas of patent law, applies a more extensive 
legislation, which although not breaching any International provisions, does not take advantage of 
the TRIPS flexibilities allowed in the international patents context. In conclusion, a legislative 
reform which imposes stricter patentability criteria; creates a procedure of substantial examination 
and opposition; and facilitate the application of other IPRs’ restrictions (such as compulsory 
licensing, parallel importation and limited exceptions, including “early working”, or the “Bolar” 
exception) is not only possible, but it is necessary in order to increase competition in relation to 







EXAMINING FOREIGN PATENT REGIMES 
1. SCOPE AND OVERVIEW 
The scope of the fourth chapter is to analyse the patent legal framework of three foreign 
jurisdictions: India, Brazil and Argentina. As it has been shown in the previous chapters, the TRIPS 
Agreement requires Member States to set a standard level of IP protection. However, it 
simultaneously provides them with the right to use flexibilities in order to address public health 
concerns.194   
In this regard, the present analysis will focus on the law and practice, including the patent offices 
practice, of these similar middle-income countries, which have public health-related issues that 
can be considered analogous with South Africa. In fact, India, Brazil and Argentina were selected, 
since together with South Africa, represent one-third of the HIV positive people affected in the 
world. Moreover, in the last decades they all have reinforced their political commitments in order 
to fight HIV/AIDS epidemics. 
The discussion, therefore, will explore different legal strategies and remedies relating to these 
issues, and in particular the TRIPS flexibilities, carried out by each of the above-said countries so 
as to address public health threats and increase access to medicines. Finally, this study will 
investigate the legal results achieved by India, Brazil and Argentina in implementing in their patent 
regimes the TRIPS flexibilities. 
2. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES IN THE INDIAN PATENT 
LAW 
                                                             
194 The TRIPS Agreements and its flexibilities are detailed explored in Chapter II of this study.  
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2.1.   Origin and development of the current patent framework  
In 1947, after the independence from the British, the Indian government created two committees 
to give recommendations for a patent legislative reform: the Tek Chand Committee (1948-1950) 
and the Ayyangar Commitee (1957-1959). The former placed emphasis upon the necessity to 
increase the use of compulsory licences to reduce potential abuses of IPRs from foreign companies, 
whose patents were often granted beyond the scope of patentability.195 The latter, also known as 
“Ayyangar Report”, focusing on public health issues and on the high mortality rate in the country, 
advised to deny patents in critical areas, particularly food and medicines.196 The committee, thus, 
concluded that the consequential increase in prices for the patented goods would have inhibited 
the majority of inhabitants from having access to resources, in express violation of Article 21 of 
the Indian Constitution (“Protection of life and personal liberty”).197 
In light of these recommendations, the Indian Patents Act of 1970 was drafted with the intention 
of excluding patent protection for food and medicines themselves and providing protection only 
for “claims for the methods or processes of manufacture”.198 A patents system as such, permitted 
Indian pharmaceutical companies, especially generic industries, to become specialists in reverse 
engineering and to grow exponentially.199 This makes India “possibly the only developing country 
in the world that has come this close to achieving so-called self- sufficiency in medicines”,200 
before the coming into force of the TRIPS Agreement.  
However, as previously discussed, the TRIPS Agreement required all WTO Members to provide 
patent protection to all fields of technology, including food, drugs and chemical products.201 This 
obligation forced India to adopt a succession of amendments to the Patents Act of 1970, which 
                                                             
195 See J. Mueller, “The Tiger Awakens: the tumultuous transformation of India’s Patent System and the rise of Indian 
pharmaceutical innovation” University of Pittsburgh Law Review (2007) 68 (3), 511.  
196 N. R. Ayyangar, Report on the Revision of the Patents Law (1959), para 101. 
197 See Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which states: “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty 
except according to procedure established by law”. The Constitution was adopted by the Constituent Assembly on 
26th November 1949 and came into force on 26th January 1950. In this regards, see S. Ragavan, “Of the Inequals of 
the Uruguay Round” (2006) Marquette Intellectual Property Review, 10(2), 285.  
198 See Section 5 of the Indian Patents Act of 1970.  
199 See D. Matthews (note above) 165.  
200 See S. F. Musungu & C. Oh, The Use of Flexibilities in TRIPS by Developing Countries: Can They Promote Access 
To Medicines? in World Health Organisation and South Center (April 2006), 16.  
201 See Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.  
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were implemented in three separate phases. The first amendment of the Indian Patents Act of 1970 
was enacted in 1999, with the introduction of a system for granting exclusive marketing rights and 
the setting of a mailbox for patent applications. In 2002, further amendments of the Indian Patents 
Act of 1970, relating to the rights of the patent holder, the issuance of compulsory licensing and 
the shift of burden of proof to the violating party, were passed by the Parliament. Finally, with the 
third amendments of 2005, India extended full patent protection to all patentable subject matters. 
In addition, it established a 20 years term of protection for all patents.202  
In its attempt to fully implement the TRIPS Agreement, India paid particular attention to using the 
TRIPS flexibilities in order to defend the human right to life, as proclaimed by Article 21 of the 
Indian Constitution. The provisions contained in the Indian Patents Act, which incorporated the 
flexibilities, are discussed in the following paragraphs.  
2.2.  Patentability criteria in the Indian Patents Act  
India, in line with the recommendations given by the the Tek Chand Committee (1948-1950) and 
the Ayyangar Commitee (1957-1959), set stricter criteria of patentability, aimed at limiting the 
practice of patent evergreening. Therefore, the Indian Patents Act is considered as having “the 
most rigorous patentability criteria in the world”.203   
As noted, the TRIPS Agreement leaves the Member States free to determine stricter standards of 
patentability, provided that the invention satisfies the three principles of novelty, inventive step 
and industrial applicability.204 This can be considered a flexibility in itself, which permitted India 
to prevent unwarranted patent monopolies, resulting from the implementation of extensive 
patentability conditions. In this way, Section 3 of the Indian Patents Act specifically excludes 
certain inventions from patent protection.205 In the public health context, the most significant 
exclusions are set by:  
                                                             
202 S. Chaudhuri, TRIPS and Changes in Pharmaceutical Patent Regime in India, Working Paper No 535 (2005), 
Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, 3 -4.  
203 See C. Park & A. Jayadev, Access to Medicines in India: A Review of Recent Concerns (2009) 13. Available for 
download at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1436732, accessed in March 2015.  
204 See Art. 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.  
205 See P. Pusceddu, “Access to medicines and TRIPS compliance in India and Brazil” in European Intellectual 
Property Review (2014), 9.  
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i. Section 3(c), mere discovery of natural substances such as “scientific principle or the 
formulation of or discovery of any living thing or non-living substance occurring in 
nature”; 
ii. Section 3(d), “new form of a known substance”, not resulting in the enhancement of its 
known efficacy, and “new use for a known substance”; 
iii. Section 3(e), “a substance obtained by a mere admixture resulting only in the aggregation 
of the properties of the components”; 
iv. Section 3(f), “mere arrangement or re-arrangement”; 
v. Section 3(i), methods of treating humans and/or animals. 
In addition, the “explanation” added to Section 3(d) makes clear that “salts, esters, ethers, 
polymorphs, metabolites, pure form, particle size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, 
combinations and other derivatives of know substances” should be treated as the same substance, 
“unless they differ significantly in properties with regard to efficacy”.  
Section 3(d), and in particular, the exclusion from patentability of a “new form of a known 
substance”, was, until recently, at the centre of attention of the Indian Courts in the Novartis case, 
whose final judgement was given by the Supreme Court in April 2013.206  The case, which will be 
further discussed in this Chapter, demonstrates the Court’s intent of maintaining and defending a 
strict approach regarding the application and interpretation of the patentability criteria. 207  In 
particular, the controversy turned around the meaning of “an enhancement of efficacy”, set by 
Section 3(d) to satisfy the requirement of inventive step. The Supreme Court clarified “that each 
of the different forms mentioned in the explanation have some properties inherent to that form, 
e.g., solubility to a salt and hygroscopicity to a polymorph. These forms, unless they differ 
significantly in property with regard to efficacy, are expressly excluded from the definition of 
‘invention’. Hence, the mere change of form with properties inherent to that form would not qualify 
as ‘enhancement of efficacy’ of a known substance. In other words, the explanation is meant to 
indicate what is not to be considered as therapeutic efficacy”.208 In taking this view, the Supreme 
                                                             
206 See Novartis AG v Union of India & Others, (note above).  
207 C. Park, A. Prabhala & J. Berger (note above) 42. 
208 See Novartis AG v Union of India & Others, cit., (note above) 181. 
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Court of India found that the Novartis’s patent claim for beta crystalline form of the mesylate salt 
of imatinib was unpatentable because it did “not qualify the test of Section 3(d) of the Act”.209  
2.3.  Examination and Opposition Procedures  
In India, the application for a patent must be initially made in the prescribed form and filed in the 
Patent Office on the basis of the first-to-apply system.210 Subsequently, the application will be 
examined in relation to its compliance with the requirements of the Indian Patents Act, in 
particular, the existence of any lawful ground of objection to the patent, and the existence of 
already published or claimed equal inventions by third parties.211  
One particular point of interest is the use by India of a system of pre-grant and post-grant 
opposition to patents. The right to oppose a patent, before and after its granting, is one of the most 
important tools for preventing weak inventions from receiving patent protection and concurrently 
reducing the patent evergreening. In this regard, Section 25 of the Indian Patents Act permits “any 
person” to initiate a pre-grant opposition proceeding against an application, before the grant of the 
patent. As a result, any public interest groups as well as generic drug industries are able to file a 
pre-grant opposition against pharmaceutical patent applications, which they believe do not deserve 
patent protection.  
The exhaustive list of grounds for filing an opposition are set out by Section 25(1) of the Indian 
Patents Act and occur when the invention: (i) was wrongfully obtained by the applicant; (ii) was 
published before the priority date; (iii) was already claimed in another application; (iv) did not 
fulfil the statutory standards; (v) was not sufficiently disclosed in the specification; and, (vi) was 
anticipated by traditional knowledge.212 
Interestingly, various civil society organisations and generic rival industries took the chance to use 
Section 25(1) of the Indian Patents Act to challenge the validity of drug patent applications,213 
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210 See Section 6 and 7.1. of the Indian Patents Act.  
211 See Section 12.1 of the Indian Patents Act.  
212 See Section 25(1) a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k of the Indian Patents Act.  
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aiming to safeguard and support an implementation of the law, which is in line with the promotion 
of access to medicines.214  In this regard, the Madras High Court in the case Indian Network for 
People living with HIV/AIDS v Union of India proclaimed the right to the opponent to be heard, 
before the grant of the patent: “A right is a legally protected interest. Therefore when law 
consciously confers a right on a person to object at a pre-grant stage that right must be protected 
in the way it has been granted, namely the right to object with a right of hearing”.215 
In addition to the right to oppose patent applications before their grant, the Indian Patents Act 
provides a post-grant opposition system. In this case, only the “person interested” is allowed to 
file the opposition, within one year from the grant of the patent.216 Section 2(1)(t) of the Indian 
Patents Act specifies that the “person interested” is “a person engaged in, or in promoting, 
research in the same field as that to which the invention relates”. 
In explaining the differences between the pre- and post-grant opposition procedure, the Supreme 
Court held that “the main difference between Section 25(1) and Section 25(2), as brought out by 
Patent (Amendment) Act, 2005, is that even after a patent is granted, a “post-grant opposition” 
can be filed under Section 25(2) for a period of one year. The reason is obvious. In relation to 
patents that are of recent origin, a higher scrutiny is necessary. This is the main rationale 
underlying Section 25(2) of the said 1970 Act”. 217 The Supreme Court, moreover, stressed the 
attention to the distinct role of the subjects entitled to file a pre- and a post-grant opposition: “there 
                                                             
Medicines, Access & Knowledge (I-MAK) filed an opposition in November 2012, followed by the Delhi Network of 
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215 See MANU/TN/1217/2008, para. 33.  
216 See Section 25(2) of the Indian Patents Act.  
217 See J. Mitra v. Asst. Controller of Patent and Design, Supreme Court of India Civil Appellate Jurisdiction arising 
arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.15727 of 2008, 22. Available online at: 
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is […] a radical shift due to the incorporation of Section 25(2) where an interested party is granted 
a right to challenge the patent after its grant. The ground of challenge under Section 25(1) is 
identical to Section 25(2) of the said 1970 Act. However, Section 25(1) is wider than Section 25(2) 
as the later is available only to a “person aggrieved”.”218 
The above decision expresses the judicial determination of protecting the public interest, when 
giving protection to an invention. Opposition systems are a significant tool to limit some of the 
adverse effects that IP rights can have on public health and access to medicines. Resultantly, patent 
examiners should be aware of the impact that their decisions may have on fundament human rights, 
such as the right to health. Moreover, they should attempt to reach the ultimate goal of serving the 
public interest, by granting patents that are rightly inventive.219 However, as pointed out “patent 
offices have become extremely pro-patent since the early 1980s ... the applicant […] has become 
a ‘client’, whose needs must be satisfied by quick, cheap procedures. The result is a total 
deterioration of examination procedures [...]”.220  
In addition, it should be considered that pre- and post-grant opposition procedures are cost 
efficient, since they avoid the legal and judicial costs of a full court proceeding. Furthermore, the 
opposition is an administrative process, therefore, the time to get to a decision is certainly shorter 
than in a judicial case.221 
2.4.  Limited exceptions 
The Patents Amendment Act of 2005 legally introduced the “early working”, or the “Bolar” 
exception into the Indian Patents Act of 1970. Under Section 107A(a), making and using patented 
inventions solely for developing information necessary to obtain marketing approval are “not to 
be considered as infringement”. Thus, generic manufacturers are allowed to produce, or even 
import, a patented drug in order to develop and submit information for regulatory approval and to 
introduce the generic drug immediately after the expiry of the patent right. In other words, this 
                                                             
218 See J. Mitra v. Asst. Controller of Patent and Design, (note above) 22.  
219 See C. Correa, (note above) 17. 
220 See D. Foray, “The patent system and the dynamics of innovation in Europe” in Science and Public Policy (2004) 
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provision permits generic industries to carry out activities of research, during the validity of the 
patent, finalised at creating, manufacturing and selling the drug as soon as the patent expires.    
In addition, the Indian Patents Act of 1970 provides for another type of exception. According to 
Section 47, patented machines or processes “may be used, by any person, for the purpose merely 
of experiment or research including the imparting of instructions to pupils”.222  Notably, the 
wording of this provision is intentionally broad. Thus, the terms “experiment” and “research” 
have been deliberately chosen by the Indian lawmakers so as to include a wide range of scientific 
activities and consequently extend the exception to the patent right. Furthermore, the provision 
expressly includes in the exclusion from liability the “instructions to pupils” imparted by 
universities and schools.223  
2.5.  Compulsory licences 
As previously discussed, abuses of monopoly can be prevented through the use of the compulsory 
licensing mechanism. With the intention of full utilisation of the TRIPS flexibilities and 
implementing the changes recommended by the WTO Decision of 30 August 2003, India amended 
its Patents Act of 1970 by inserting Section 92A, according to which “compulsory licence shall be 
available for manufacture and export of patented pharmaceutical products to any country having 
insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector”.224 The provision explains 
that within the term of “pharmaceutical product” are also included ingredients necessary for 
manufacturing patented goods and processes as well as diagnostic kits for their use.   
In addition, the Indian Patents Act allows for two more types of compulsory licensing, available 
in general cases or in case of emergency.  Under Section 84, general compulsory licences can be 
requested “any time after the expiration of three years from the date of the grant of a patent”, by 
                                                             
222 See Section 47(3) of the Indian Patents Act 1970. 
223 See K. Chakravarthy, N. Pendsey, Research Exemptions in Patent Law, in Journal of Intellectual Property Rights, 
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any interested person, on the basis of three different grounds: a) the reasonable requirements of 
the public with respect to the patented invention have not been satisfied; b) the patented invention 
is not available to the public at a reasonable affordable price; c) the patented invention is not 
worked in India. 225  Moreover, Section 84(7) lists the circumstances according to which the 
“reasonable requirements of the public”, referred to in Section 84(1)(a) “shall be deemed not to 
have been satisfied”. 226  Furthermore, according to Section 92, the Government can grant a 
compulsory licence, upon an official declaration by notification in the official gazette, in cases of 
national emergency, extreme urgency or public non-commercial use, at any time after the grant of 
the patent. 
In March 2012, India granted the first compulsory licence to the generic manufacturer Natco 
Pharma, for the manufacture of Bayer’s anti-cancer drug, Nexavar.227 Natco Pharma claimed that 
the three grounds set by Section 84 of the Indian Patents Act were met. In particular, it was argued 
that Bayer’s patented medicine was not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price, 
that the reasonable requirements of the public were not satisfied and, additionally, that the patented 
drug was not being worked in India. The Controller General of Patents decided to grant the 
compulsory licence, taking into consideration the significant difference of price between Nexavar 
medicine (approximately US$ 5800) and the generic version offered by Natco Pharma 
(US$181).228  
                                                             
225 See Section 84(1) of the Indian Patents Act of 1970.  
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This case reaffirms the position of the Indian State regarding the predominance given to the public 
interest rather than the economic revenues of multinational drug industries. As MSF commented 
referring to Bayer, it needs “to address the reality that their prices are too high and not to appeal 
this decision. It is not the use of a compulsory licence that should be challenged, but the continued 
pursuit of excessively high profits over public health needs”.229 
Yet, this decision also raised certain criticisms from pharmaceutical companies. For instance, 
Bayer’s spokesman pointed out that this judgment “damages the international patent system and 
endangers pharmaceutical research”.230 Of the same opinion, the Deputy Director of the US 
Patent and Trademark Office stated that “although compulsory licensing can be permissible under 
the TRIPS Agreement, we encourage our trading partners to consider ways to address their public 
health challenges while maintaining intellectual property rights systems that promote investment, 
research, and innovation”.231 
As a result, while India is attempting to fully utilise the TRIPS flexibilities, it is becoming tougher 
for its government to resist growing pressures from developed countries to strictly comply with, 
and even reinforce, the international standards of patent protection.232 For instance, in 2015 India 
was again listed on the annual US Priority Watch List.233 
2.6.  Parallel importation  
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Section 107A(b) of the Indian Patents Act, introduced by the amendment of 2005, had facilitated 
parallel importation by removing the condition according to which the importation of patented 
products in India shall be “duly authorised by the patentee”.234 The fact that the exporter needed 
to be authorised by the owner of the patent to sell, distribute and import the product, not only 
caused delays and difficulties, but it was not in accordance with the spirit of Art. 6 of the TRIPS 
Agreement. As mentioned, this provision explicitly recognises the principle of international 
exhaustion of the rights, regardless the authorisation of the patentee.235  
Therefore, the amended provision, stating that the “importation of patented products by any person 
from a person who is duly authorized under the law to produce and sell or distribute the product 
shall not be considered as an infringement of patent rights”,236 undoubtedly introduces a simpler 
mechanism of importation of more affordable medicines.  
Section 107A(b) permits any person in India, to import from a third country a legally manufactured 
product, and sell it into the Indian market. Notably, given the broad scope of the wording of the 
provision, the importation of products, patented in India, is permissible even if the imported 
product is not under patent in the country of origin.237   
2.7.  The Novartis judgment 
The Novartis case 238  is of particular significance in order to understand the importance of 
opposition procedures, as well as the implementation of stricter patentability criteria, in the context 
of accessing medicines. As afore-mentioned, India provides a pre-opposition system which allows 
“any person”, civil society groups included, to file an opposition within three months from the 
filing of the patent application. Furthermore, the amendment of 2005 has included in the Indian 
Patents Act of 1970 Section 3(d), according to which the “mere discovery of a new form of a known 
substance which does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance” is not 
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an invention under the terms of the Indian Patents Act. It is important to bear these two aspects in 
mind for a better comprehension of the Decision of the Indian Supreme Court, the analysis of 
which will be discussed in turn.  
When patent protection became available for pharmaceuticals in India, Novartis filed in 1998 a 
patent application relating to the beta crystalline form of imatinib mesylate to the Indian Patent 
Office.239 The drug, under the names of “Glivec” or “Gleevec”, was used mainly in the treatment 
of chronic myeloid leukaemia. The patent application was rejected in 2005 for lack of novelty and 
non-obviousness, and especially, because the invention was anticipated in the US Zimmermann 
patent240 and it was obvious to the skilled in the art from the disclosure made in the Zimmermann 
patent specification.241 Furthermore, “the patentability of the alleged invention was disallowed by 
section 3(d) of the Act”.242  
This rejection led to seven-years of long battle, which ended, in April 2013, with the landmark 
decision of the Indian Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ruled against Novartis’s patent 
application, holding the non-patentability of the invention regarding the beta crystalline form of 
the mesylate salt of imatinib. The Court upholding its decision attempted to “strike a balance 
between the need to promote research and development in science and technology and to keep 
private monopoly […] at the minimum”.243 It also highlighted the importance of its judgment not 
only for India, but also for several developing and least developed countries, which import life-
saving generic drugs from India.244  
In its decision, the Supreme Court considered whether the appellant’s claimed invention: (i) could 
be qualified as a “new product”, which is an invention possessing features that “involves technical 
advance over the existing knowledge and that makes the invention “not obvious” to a person 
skilled in the art”; (ii) was an “invention” falling under the meaning of clauses (j) and (ja) of 
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Section 2(1) of the amended Indian Patents Act; and (iii) involved an inventive step in terms of 
enhancement of efficacy under Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act.245  
In answering those questions, the Supreme Court dealt with the meaning of “known substance” 
and “efficacy”. Whereas Novartis held that the known substance was the free base form of imatinib 
(not suitable for oral administration), the Court stated that the Zimmermann patent, which covered 
imatinib itself, contained a clarification regarding the conversion of free bases into corresponding 
salts: “Compounds having at least one basic group or at least one basic radical, […] may form 
acid addition salts, for example with inorganic acids, such as hydrochloric acid, sulfuric acid or 
a phosphoric acid, or with suitable organic carboxylic or sulfonic acids. [...] Owing to the close 
relationship between the novel compounds in free form and in the form of their salts, […] 
hereinbefore and hereinafter any reference to the free compounds should be understood as 
including the corresponding salts, where appropriate and expedient”.246 Although there was not a 
direct reference to mesylate salt, this is the salt of a sulfonic acid.247 Therefore, the Supreme Court 
took the view that the salt form of imatinib mesylate was disclosed in the Zimmermann patent and, 
thus, publicly known before the filing of the patent application in India: “we firmly reject the 
appellant’s case that Imatinib Mesylate is a new product and the outcome of an invention beyond 
the Zimmermann patent. We hold and find that Imatinib Mesylate is a known substance from the 
Zimmermann patent itself”.248 
Furthermore, to establish whether the beta crystalline form enhanced efficacy over other 
polymorphs, a comparison with the properties of the free base was irrelevant according to the 
Court, since the free base form of imatinib, as mentioned, was not soluble and therefore not 
marketed.249 Novartis’s analysis shown that “an about 30% improvement in bioavailability was 
observed for the beta crystalline for of Imatinib mesylate compared to the Free Base”.250 Yet, 
according to the Supreme Court, quoting the submission of Mr. Grover, “a demonstration of 
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increase in bioavailability is not a demonstration of enhanced efficacy”.251 Thus, the Court stated, 
“just increased bioavailability alone may not necessarily lead to an enhancement of therapeutic 
efficacy. […] Whether or not an increase in bioavailability leads to an enhancement of therapeutic 
efficacy in any given case must be specifically claimed and established by research data. […] No 
material has been offered to indicate that the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate will 
produce an enhanced or superior efficacy (therapeutic)[…]”.252  
Regarding the meaning of term “efficacy”, the Supreme Court explained that efficacy is the ability 
to achieve an intended result.253 It took the view that in the case of medicines, “the test of efficacy 
can only be “therapeutic efficacy”, concluding, “[…] the test of enhanced efficacy in case of 
chemical substances, especially medicine, should receive a narrow and strict interpretation […]”. 
Furthermore, “the text added to section 3(d) by the 2005 amendment lays down the condition of 
“enhancement of the known efficacy”. Further, the explanation requires the derivative to “differ 
significantly in properties with regard to efficacy””. In light of these considerations, the Supreme 
Court recognised that only the properties directly related to efficacy, which in case of medicines 
are their therapeutic efficacy, need to be considered as relevant. Dissimilarly, in this context, “not 
all advantageous or beneficial properties are relevant”.254 Resultantly, “the mere change of form 
with properties inherent to that form would not qualify as “enhancement of efficacy” of a known 
substance”.255  
Finally, in highlighting the importance of preventing “evergreening”, which is the primary purpose 
of Section 3(d), the Supreme Court held that the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate fails 
the test of section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act: “the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate, 
does not qualify the test of Section 3(d) of the Act but that is not to say that Section 3(d) bars patent 
protection for all incremental inventions of chemical and pharmaceutical substances”.256 
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The present decision shows the firm approach of the Indian Supreme Court to prevent patent ever-
greening, whose importance goes beyond the patentability regime of a drug in India, but bears 
global implications. Most importantly, it highlights the significant role that Indian generic 
producers have in facilitating access to affordable medicines in developing and under-developed 
countries.257 Moreover, the judgment demonstrates that a balance between the promotion of R&D 
and the containment of monopolies could be reached with precise interpretations and clear 
guidelines for defining the scope of the patentability requirements. Conclusively, this decision 
supports the rights of governments to fully adopt the TRIPS flexibilities, with the aim to encourage 
access to affordable life-saving medicines.   
3. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES IN THE BRAZILIAN PATENT 
LAW 
3.1.  Origin and development of the current patent system and its interaction with access to 
medicines  
The end of military dictatorship in 1985 had important consequences on the establishment of a 
new democratic constitution, which strongly proclaimed the defence of and respect for human 
rights principles.258 The importance given to those principles was particularly crucial in order to 
create a public health system based on a universal right to health care, expressed in Article 196 of 
the Brazilian Constitution: “Health is a right of all and a duty of the State and shall be guaranteed 
by means of social and economic policies aimed at reducing the risk of illness and other hazards 
and at the universal and equal access to actions and services for its promotion, protection and 
recovery.” 
In Brazil, public healthcare system is based on three principles, which allow the national health 
system, called Serviços Unificados e Descentralizados de Saúde (currently known as Sistema 
Unico de Saúde “SUS”), to deliver universal therapeutic treatment and access to pharmaceutical 
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products.259 Laws 8.080/90 and 8.142/90 regulate the three principles of universality, equality and 
integrated healthcare, upon which the SUS is based.260 Firstly, everyone, who cannot afford private 
health insurances, should receive full treatment from the SUS coverage; secondly, access to 
medicines and treatments should be equal for all citizens, in other words, no one should be 
prevented from having access to public healthcare services; thirdly, the SUS should provide full 
healthcare coverage, regardless the complexity of the treatment needed.261  
As a result, the right to access to medicines, even though not expressly stated by Article 196 of the 
Constitution, is recognised as a fundamental social right of the country and fully implemented in 
Brazil.262   
In 1991, the Brazilian Ministry of Health began free delivery of AZT to all citizens. However, the 
high demand of the drug and the expensive cost of the AZT, initially purchased from the 
multinational patent owner (now GlaxoSmithKline), led the country to promote the local 
production of these medicines. Therefore, at the beginning of 1990s, the federal government started 
the purchase of ARVs, at a much lower price, directly from domestic pharmaceutical producers.263 
This was initially permitted, given that the previous IP law did not provide patent protection for 
drugs and other pharmaceutical treatments.264  
In addition, in 1996, the Federal Law 9.313/96 was approved. The Law recognised the universal 
access to ARVs as a legislative right, investing the SUS with the obligation to guarantee its free 
access to all Brazilian population.265  
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Also in 1996 a new IP system came into force, the Industrial Property Law 9.279/96 (hereinafter 
the “Industrial Property Law”), which extended patent protection to all pharmaceutical products 
as per Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.266 As previously shown, the TRIPS Agreement 
imposed to all WTO Members the obligation to grant patents in all fields of technology, including 
pharmaceuticals.   
However, unlike India, Brazil did not use the TRIPS flexibilities granted to developing countries, 
which legitimately gave them transitional arrangements in order to delay the application of the 
provisions related to patents in all fields of technology.267 Moreover, Brazil went even further than 
what required by the TRIPS Agreement, by allowing retroactive patent protection.268 According 
to Article 230 and 231 of the Industrial Property Law, patent applications could be filed for 
previously non-patentable subject matter, but only in case the patent was already granted in a 
foreign legislation. This mechanism of retroactive patentability is known as “pipeline” patent 
protection. It had a strong impact in the public health Brazilian system, because it exponentially 
increased, in a very short time, the number of patents granted in the country, provided that a mere 
formal administrative review confirmed the existence of the foreign patent. Additionally, this 
TRIPS-plus mechanism dramatically raised the growth in health expenditure, given to the fact that 
generics, previously available in Brazil, were suddenly banned in the drugs market, forcing the 
Ministry of Health to purchase, at higher price, ARVs from the respective patent owner.269  
Despite the drastic impact that the Industrial Property Law had on the public healthcare system 
provided in Brazil, the country attempted to reach a balance between patents, public health and 
access to medicines through the implementation of some of the flexibilities, granted to developing 
countries, in the TRIPS Agreement. The TRIPS flexibilities available in the Brazilian legislation 
will be analysed in the following.  
                                                             
266 See D. Matthews, (note above) 129. 
267 See Article 65 of the TRIPS Agreement.  
268 See G. C. Chaves, M. Fogaça Vieira & R. Reis (note above) 167. See also D. Matthews, (note above) 130. 
269 See M. S. G. Rosina, D. Wang & T. C. de Campos, (note above) 186. See also D. Matthews, (note above) 130, 
who explains that “following the introduction of pipeline patent protection for pharmaceutical products, while the 
SUS could purchase significant quantities of generic ARVs that were invented before 1996, these drugs were all 
patented in Brazil via the pipeline mechanism that year, dramatically raising the public cost of supplying these drugs 
in Brazil by US$420 million per year.” 
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3.2.  Examination and Opposition Procedures  
In 2001, the Brazilian government introduced an amendment to Article 229-C of the Industrial 
Property Law, empowering the National Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA) to assess, with 
the so-called mechanism of the “prior consent”, pharmaceutical patent applications before a patent 
is granted.270 Specifically, according to Article 229-C “the granting of patents on pharmaceutical 
products or processes shall depend on the prior consent of the National Sanitary Supervision 
Agency (ANVISA)”.  
The “prior consent” mechanism is an unusual example of formal participation of a national health 
authority in the examination of patent claims for pharmaceuticals.271 Through this process, the 
patenting of an already granted drug would be less likely to occur, with obvious benefits in terms 
of public health defense and safeguard.272 Thus, the “prior consent” measure, being also compliant 
with Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement, which allows Members to adopt necessary measures to 
protect public health and promote the public interest in sector of vital importance, contributes to 
prevent the granting of unwarranted pharmaceutical patents.273 
In April 2013, ANVISA issued a new administrative procedure regarding the “prior consent”. 
According to these rules, ANVISA will only analyse patent applications where the subject matter 
is considered to be contrary to public health, namely when the patent claim is related to 
pharmaceutical substances or processes which (i) are a risk for the public health or had been banned 
                                                             
270 Law 9.279/96 was amended by Law 10196/01. In this regards see, R. Gosain, “Brazil’s pharma saga” in Intellectual 
Property Magazine, (2014). Available online at: http://www.intellectualpropertymagazine.com/patent/brazils-
pharma-saga-99144.htm, accessed in March 2015. See also M. Oliveira, G. Chaves, R. Epsztejn, Brazilian intellectual 
property legislation, in A. Jorge, M. Bermudez & O. Auxiliadora, editors, Intellectual property in the context of the 
WTO TRIPS Agreement: challenges for public health, Rio de Janeiro: Escola Nacional de Sau de Publica (2004). 
271 N. Ford, D. Wilson, G. C. Chaves, M. Lotrowska
 
& K. Kijtiwatchakul, Sustaining access to antiretroviral therapy 
in the less-developed world: lessons from Brazil and Thailand, in AIDS (2007) Vol. 21, Suppl. 4, 24.  
272 It should be noted though that some internal pressures arose between the Brazilian Patent Office (known as “INPI”) 
and ANVISA, as to the ANVISA’s competencies. Regarding to this, Brazil’s Attorney General of the Union (AGU) 
issued an official opinion in October 2009, known as “Opinion 210”, in which he stated that ANVISA’s assignments 
were not to determine patentability criteria. He concluded in the final Opinion 337/PGF/EA/2010 released in January 
2011 that ANVISA’ s role was only to consult on technical elements while assisting INPI with its examination and 
that “ANVISA may not refuse the granting of the prior consent of art. 229-C of IP Law based on patentability 
requirements”. In other words, the analysis of criteria such as novelty, inventive step and industrial application are 
competence of the INPI only. 
273 See G. C. Chaves, M. Fogaça Vieira & R. Reis, (note above) 170. 
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in the country, (ii) are listed as strategic products to the SUS or listed for therapeutic use by the 
Ministry of Health.274 
In addition to this, a pre-grant opposition system is available in the country, according to Article 
31 of the Industrial Property Law “after publication of the application and up to the end of the 
examination, interested parties may submit documents and data to assist the examination”. In 
other words, third parties are invited to file comments and opinions against the grant of a patent, 
for instance when the issuance of which could not be justified on public health basis.275  
Furthermore, according to Article 51 of the Industrial Property Law, within a period of 6 month 
after the granting of the patent, “any person having the legitimate interest”, or either the INPI ex 
officio, may file nullification proceeding against the patent.276  
3.3.  Limited exceptions 
Limited exceptions are provided for in Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement, according to which 
the patentee’s exclusive rights can be limited by WTO Members, provided that these exceptions 
do not unreasonably: (i) conflict with the normal exploitation of the patent; (ii) prejudice the 
legitimate interest of the patent owner, having also considered the legitimate interests of third 
parties. 
 “Early working” or “Bolar” exception,277 which permits a generic producer to use a patented 
invention, during the validity of the patent, without the authorization of the right-holder, was 
incorporated in 2001 into Article 43 of the Industrial Property Law.278 This flexibility not only 
allows a faster access of generic products in the pharmaceutical market, but also facilitates the 
                                                             
274 See Resolução-RDC No. 21, 10th of April 2013.  
275 It should be taken into consideration though that the submission of an opposition involves legal and technical 
expertise, which are not always available in developing countries. In this regards, many Brazilian NGOs had been 
highly proactive in filing pre-grant oppositions. See Access Campaign (MSF), Brazilians demand greater access to 
crucial HIV drug, (2011). Available online at: http://www.msfaccess.org/about-us/media-room/press-
releases/brazilians-demand-greater-access-crucial-hiv-drug, accessed in March 2015. 
276 Expired 6 months, a revocation can be submitted any time in the course of an infringement action. 
277 This type of limited exception is explained in details in Chapter II, c) ii) of this paper.  
278 The amendment was introduced by the Law 10.196 of February 14, 2001. See also M. S. G. Rosina, D. Wang & T. 
C. de Campos, (note above) 186. 
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dissemination of relevant information related to drug inventions that can be used for research 
purposes.279  
In this regard, Article 43(II) and (VII) of the Industrial Property Law280 expressly allow researchers 
to carry out activities of reverse engineering of the patented inventions. In fact, Article 43 states 
that the rights conferred to the patentee by Article 42 do not apply: 
 “II. to acts carried out by unauthorized third parties for experimental purposes, in connection 
with scientific or technological studies or researches;” 
“VII. to act performed by non-authorized third parties, regarding patented inventions, which aim 
exclusively the production of information, data and test results directed to procure commerce 
registration, in Brazil or any other country, to allow the exploitation and commercialization of the 
patented product, after the termination of the terms.” 
Therefore, the exception provided by Article 43 of the Industrial Property Law of Brazil is of 
significant importance in the context of access to medicines, since it facilitates generic drugs to 
enter in the market as soon as the patent expires.  
3.4.  Compulsory licences 
Compulsory licensing is a public-health related TRIPS flexibility, aimed at reaching the immediate 
goal of allowing third parties, normally generic producers, to manufacture, use, sell and/or import 
the patented drug, regardless the patentee approval. 
According to Article 68 of the Brazilian Industrial Property Law, a compulsory licence can be 
issued if the titleholder exercises the patent rights “in an abusive manner, or by means thereof 
engages in abuse of economic power […]”. Compulsory licences may also be granted in case of 
non-exploitation of the patent in Brazil “for failure to manufacture or incomplete manufacture of 
the product, or also failure to make full use of the patented process […]”, or when the 
“commercialization that does not satisfy the needs of the market” (the “local working” 
                                                             
279 See G. C. Chaves, M. Fogaça Vieira & R. Reis, (note above) 169. 
280 As amended by the Law 10.196 of February 14, 2001. 
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requirement).281 In addition, Article 70 and Article 71 of the Industrial Property Law set further 
grounds for the grant of a compulsory licence, which are, respectively: “a situation of dependency 
of one patent with regard to another” and “in cases of national emergency or of public interest, 
as declared in an act of the Federal Executive Power”.282 
Despite Brazil having introduced the Industrial Property Law in 1996, without using the 
transitional arrangement flexibility set by Article 65.4 of the TRIPS Agreement and even 
permitting a “pipeline” patent protection, the repeated threats of using compulsory licences helped 
to retrieve a balance between IPRs and access to medicines.283 In fact, by means of these recurrent 
pressures, Brazil could gain several permissions from pharmaceutical industries and, only in 2007, 
the country issued the first compulsory licence for the HIV drug called Efavirenz, since the patent 
owner, Merck & Co, failed to lower the price as requested by the Brazilian Government.284 The 
compulsory licence was subsequently renewed in 2012.285  
Since 2007, the generic version of Efavirenz was imported from India and this allowed the 
Brazilian government to save US$31.5 million. From 2012 the domestic production of Efavirenz 
enabled Brazil to become completely self-sufficient and the Brazilian Ministry of Health was able 
to order 57 million pills from the local manufacturer, Farmanguinhos and Lafepe laboratories, at 
a cost of R$76.9 million.286 
The strategy of threats of compulsory licensing allowed Brazil to negotiate, on several occasions, 
the price of ARV treatments, given that pharmaceutical industries preferred a decrease on the price 
of their drugs, rather than permitting third party producers to manufacture the generic version. For 
instance, in 2005, the Brazilian government issued an official declaration, according to which the 
                                                             
281  See Article 68(1) of the Industrial Property Law.  
282 See Article 70 and 71 of the Industrial Property Law.  
283 See D. Matthews, (note above) 130; see also K. Yu, “Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective Action” 
34 American Journal of Law & Medicine, (2008) 345, 349. 
284 After long negotiations, the patent owner offered to reduce the price, which was US$580 per patient per year, by 
only 2%, while in Thailand the same drug was offered by Merck & Co at half of the price. See G. C. Chaves, M. 
Fogaça Vieira & R. Reis, (note above) 171. 
285 See Brazilian Ministry of Health, Brasil renova licenciamento compulsório do efavirenz, Press Release (May 7, 
2012). Available online at: http://portalsaude.saude.gov.br/index.php/cidadao/principal/agencia-saude/noticias-
anteriores-agencia-saude/1782-, accessed in March 2015. 
286  Portal do Governo Brasileiro, Brazil renews compulsory licence for Efavirenz, (2012). Available online at: 
http://www.aids.gov.br/en/en/noticia/2012/brazil_renews_compulsory_licence_efavirenz, accessed in March 2015. 
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drug Kaletra, a co-formulation of lopinavir and ritonavir necessary for the treatment of HIV, owned 
by the company Abbott, was of public interest for the Brazilian population. In fact, the drug was 
used by about 17,000 people in the country and resultantly Abbott should have lowered its price. 
After a long negotiation, an agreement was reached between the pharmaceutical company and the 
government and a fixed price of US$1,380 per patient per year was settled until 2011. Despite the 
apparent success, this deal was not welcomed by civil society groups (in particular, the Working 
Group on Intellectual Property of the Brazilian Network for the Integration of Peoples 
(GTPI/REBRIP) that considered the condition, which prevented Brazil from issuing compulsory 
licences, too restrictive and not in line with the TRIPS Agreement.287  
Notwithstanding some discontent, these cases show a predominant interest of the Brazilian 
government to sustainably maintain the public policy of free access to HIV/AIDS treatment, as 
well as to monitor drug-pricing trends in view of a public health interest. In fact, from 2001, the 
government successfully obtained considerable price reductions from pharmaceutical companies 
producers of ARVs: Indinavir was reduced by 64.8%, Efavirenz by 59%, Nelfinavir by 40% and 
Lopinavir by 46%.288   
3.5.  Parallel importation  
Unlike India and South Africa, Brazil does not use the flexibility of parallel importation, although 
Article 68 of the Industrial Property Law admits the legal principle of exhaustion, provided for in 
Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement, only in limited cases. In fact, paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 68 
restrict parallel importation solely to cases in which a compulsory licence was granted “on the 
grounds of abuse of economic power”. 
Brazil, by limiting parallel imports, failed to take advantage of a critical policy tool of access to 
medicines, which, as previously explained, by enhancing competition, helps to reduce drug prices 
in the market. Towards this end, a Bill of law no. PL 139/199 was submitted to the National 
                                                             
287 See G. C. Chaves, M. Fogaça Vieira & R. Reis, (note above) 170-171. 
288 See D. Matthews, (note above) 132. 
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Congress, aimed to full use the flexibility of parallel imports in the country. However, the sequel 
of this proposal is fare for an ending.289  
3.6.  The WTO Dispute Settlement case: US v Brazil 
The policy of Brazil, both at international and national level, revealed in the last decades a trend 
of actions, generally, in favor of the right to health and access to medicine, largely supported by 
NGOs and civil society organisations. 
At an international level, the federal government of Brazil demonstrated its capacity to refrain 
pressures against the policy of universal access to medicines. In 2001, the United States started a 
WTO law suit against Brazil and asked for the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to settle the 
complaint against the Industrial Property Law, and in particular, against the provision set forth by 
Article 68, which permits parallel importation and compulsory licensing for promoting “local 
working” of patents. Particularly, the US considered that the “local working” requirement, 
according to which a compulsory licence can be issued for a patent’s subject-matter not worked in 
Brazil, was in violation of Article 27 and 28 of the TRIPS Agreement. These Articles establish the 
principle of non-discrimination “as to the place of invention” and the principle of the enjoyment 
of the exclusive patent rights. However, according to the US, the provision under Article 68 of the 
Brazilian Industrial Property Law discriminated US titleholders of Brazilian patents, since their 
drugs were produced outside Brazil and subsequently imported into the country.290 In light of these 
considerations, the US requested Brazil not to issue compulsory licences for products owned by 
US patentees. Brazil rejected the request and, resultantly, the US called for a WTO dispute 
settlement panel, which was established by the DSB on the 1st of February 2001. Brazil defended 
its compliance with the TRIPS Agreement and, particularly, stated that Article 68 of the Industrial 
Property Law was in line with Article 2.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. This provision imposes to the 
Member States to be compliant “with Articles 1 through 12 […] of the Paris Convention”. Brazil 
stressed the fact that Article 5(A)(4) of the Paris Convention referred to local working and also 
                                                             
289 See G. C. Chaves, M. Fogaça Vieira & R. Reis, (note above) 169. 
290 See WTO, Brazil – Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WTO Document WT/DS199/1, (June 2000). Available 
online at: https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-




that the absence of domestic production, described by Article 68 of the Industrial Property Law, is 
not a condition in itself for granting a compulsory licence, but should be applied together with the 
conditions of abuse of rights or abuse of economic power by the titleholder.291  
However, the risk that the WTO dispute could have destabilised the Brazilian policy of universal 
access to ARVs and the consequent implications in terms of international public opinion, led the 
US, to leave the case in June 2001. In fact, the complaint to the WTO had a negative effect on the 
public perception of the US, which also was influenced by the South African case PMA v 
Government of RSA, where a group of pharmaceutical companies abandoned the lawsuit against 
South African government, due to the international condemnation of the case (see Chapter 3 of 
this study).292 In the Brazilian context, several national NGOs, such as GIV (Group of Incentive 
of Life) and the ABIA (Brazilian Interdisciplinary AIDS Association), as well as international civil 
society activists, such as ActionAid, encouraged the opposition to the US complaint, in particular, 
by emphasizing the importance of human rights principles contained in the Brazilian Constitution 
of 1988.293 
In July 2001, Brazil and the US “notif-[ied]the Dispute Settlement Body that they ha[d] reached 
a mutually satisfactory solution to the matter”, provided that Brazil would hold prior talks with 
the US, when it would have been “necessary to apply Article 68 to grant a compulsory licence on 
patents held by U.S. companies”.294 
This case illustrates that despite the political intimidation from the US government, Brazil 
persistently attempted to maintain a policy in favor of national health public interests, principally 
focused at providing ARVs to all Brazilian living with HIV/AIDS. Moreover, the case 
                                                             
291 See D. Matthews, (note above) 134. See also B. Mercurio & M. Tyagi, “Treaty Interpretation in WTO Dispute 
Settlement: The Outstanding Question of the Legality of Local Working Requirements” in Minnesota Journal of 
International Law, (2010) Vol. 19, No. 2, 284 – 296.  
292 See High Court of South Africa, Case 4183/9 (note above). 
293 See D. Matthews, (note above) 134-137. 
294  See WTO, Brazil - Measures Affecting Patent Protection - Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, WTO 
Document WT/DS199/4, (2001). Available online at: 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=(@Symbol=%20wt/ds199/*)&Language=E
NGLISH&Context=FomerScriptedSearch&languageUIChanged=true#, accessed in March 2015. 
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demonstrates that an implementation of the TRIPS Agreement into national IP laws can be realised 
in a way that is both in line with international agreements and in support of the right to health.295 
4. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES IN THE ARGENTINIAN 
PATENT LAW 
Similarly to India and Brazil, the Argentinian patent legislation changed significantly after the 
coming into force of the TRIPS Agreement. In October 2000, the country started providing patent 
protection for pharmaceutical products with the adoption of the law No. 24.481, entered into force 
the 28th of September 1995.296 
Following the implementation of the new legislation, there was an exponential proliferation of 
pharmaceutical patents generally related to alterations often concerning simple compounds (salts, 
esters, polymorphs etc.), rather than the Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient (API). 297  The 
registration of patents for weak inventions and/or for inventions that unduly extended the 
monopoly over patented drugs led to the final result of precluding the production of generics. In 
this context, a study carried out in 2011 demonstrated that the patentability criteria applied in 
Argentina were extensively low with the evident undesirable outcome of having patents upon small 
modifications produced on existing patented inventions. Between 2001 and 2007, a total of 951 
patents for pharmaceutical products were registered in Argentina, whose subject matter were 
related to: the composition (21%), the API (18%), salts (14%), therapeutic indications (12%) and 
other (36%), which includes polymorphs, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, combinations, 
formulation, dose, esters, ethers, metabolites, pure form, other derivatives and intermediates.298 
Notably, the survey showed that a large proportion of patents, granted amongst 2001 and 2007, 
concerned the so-called “Markush claims”, which are claims “covering a family of a large number 
(sometimes thousands or millions) of possible compounds”.299 Recognising Markush claims in the 
                                                             
295 See D. Matthews, (note above) 138. 
296 Consolidated Text of Law No. 24.481 of March 30, 1995, approved by Decree No. 260/1996, as amended by Law 
No. 24.572/1995 and Law No. 25.859/2003.  
297 See C. Correa et al., “Patentes, Suministro de Medicamentos y Protección de la Salud Pública- Patents, Supply of 
Medicines and Protection of Public Health” in Rev Argent Salud Pública (2011) Vol. 2, No. 7, 20.  
298 See C. Correa et al., (note above) 23.  
299 C. Correa, (note above) 10. The author further explains that “the so-called ‘Markush claims’ refer to a chemical 
structure with multiple functionally equivalent chemical entities allowed in one or more parts of the compound. 
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patent system means admitting patent rights over a great range of compounds, regardless to the 
rigorous verification of the existence of patentability criteria. As a result, pharmaceutical patentees 
often strategically use Markush claims with the aim of extending the patent protection over 
compounds whose proprieties have not yet been demonstrated.300  
In order to prevent the evergreening of patents in the pharmaceutical field arising from the above 
circumstances, the Argentinian Ministries of Industry and Health together with the Argentinian 
National Industrial Property Institute approved and adopted stronger standards of patentability 
requirements in line with the TRIPS Agreement. The “Guidelines for Patentability Examination 
of Patent Applications Directed to Chemical and Pharmaceutical Inventions” (hereinafter 
“Examination Guidelines”) 301  aim at impeding the strategy of patenting obvious patents for 
uninventive drug inventions, such as new uses or new forms of known substances. In particular, 
the new guidelines instruct patent examiners to reject patent claims in cases of polymorphs302 and 
                                                             
Markush claims may include a vast number of possible compounds. They may be used to obtain a wide patent coverage 
including a large number of compounds whose properties have not been tested, but only theoretically inferred from 
the equivalence with other compounds within the claim.”  
300 See C. Correa et al., (note above) 25. 
301 See Resolution of the Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Health and Instituto Nacional de la Propiedad Industrial 
No. 118/2012, No. 546/2012 and No. 107/2012.  
302 A polymorph “is an inherent property of the solid-state of drugs used in the pharmaceutical industry (active 
ingredients and excipients). […] It is not a man-made invention but a property of each substance”. Therefore, “as 
polymorph claims are based on the mere identification and/or characterization of a new crystalline form of a 
substance already known in the art, they are not patentable, even if they have pharmacokinetic or stability differences 
with known solid forms (amorphous and/or crystalline forms) of the same substance”. Moreover, “processes for 
obtaining polymorphs are a routine experimentation in the preparation of drugs. They are not patentable because it 
is obvious to try to obtain the most suitable pharmaceutically polymorph using conventional methods” (Examination 
Guidelines No. 1) (i)). 
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pseudo polymorphs (hydrates and solvates) 303 ; enantiomers 304 ; Markush claims305 ; selection 
patents 306 ; salts, esters and other derivatives (such as amides and complexes) of known 
substances307; active metabolites308; prodrugs309; formulations and compositions310; combinations, 
                                                             
303 Pseudopolymorphs (hydrates and solvates) are “also referred to as “solvates”, and in the specific case in which 
the solvent is water, they are referred to as “hydrates”. […] Although hydrates and solvates have a different chemical 
composition from the known active ingredients, hydrates are formed by exposing a chemical compound to certain 
hydration conditions, and solvates result from application of specific conditions. Consequently, they cannot be 
patented independently from their active ingredient”. Resultantly, “processes to obtain pseudopolymorphs are a 
routine experimentation in the preparation of drugs and they are not patentable” (Examination Guidelines No. 1)(ii)). 
304 Enantiomers are “stereoisomers whose mirror image is not superimposable and that due to the spatial arrangement 
of their atoms on the chiral center rotate the plane of the polarized light in opposite directions. […] When disclosing 
the molecular structure of a racemic compound (having both enantiomers in a 1:1 ratio) the novelty of the 
enantiomeric compounds forming it is also lost, since, being the molecular formula previously known (whether or not 
it is written in a three-dimensional form) the existence of enantiomers and diastereomers is necessarily revealed to a 
person skilled in the art. Therefore, they are not patentable even if the application describes different properties” 
(Examination Guidelines No. 1)(iii)). 
305 Markush-type formula are “generic chemical structures, which can have multiple chemical substituents attached 
to a central core, covering a variety of compounds with properties that, despite not having been tested for all claimed 
compounds, can be inferred for the whole group”. They are often “used for claiming a large number of compounds 
without the need of describing them individually”. Therefore, they “shall be admissible only if unity of invention is 
demonstrated, if they comply with the requirements for patentability (novelty, inventive step and industrial application) 
and if the specification sufficiently describes how to obtain each of the compounds claimed under the Markush formula. 
[…] Thus, the protection of Markush formulas should be limited to the matter supported by the description, that can 
be effectively reproduced by a person skilled in the art and whose industrial application comes up unambiguously 
from the description.” (Examination Guidelines No. 2)(iv)). 
306 Selection patent claims “are those where a single element or small group of elements is selected from a larger 
group, and they are claimed independently, based on a characteristic or characteristics not previously attributed to 
the larger group. […] There is no novelty in the selection of one or more elements already disclosed by the prior art, 
even though they may have different or improved properties, not previously demonstrated. […] Pharmaceutical 
compositions, their methods of preparation and medicaments containing them are not patentable if they are 
specifically related to an element or elements selected from a larger group of elements, since the product or process 
are not considered new.” (Examination Guidelines No. 2)(v)). 
307 Salts, esters and other derivatives of known substances “are deemed to be the same known substance and are not 
patentable.” (Examination Guidelines No. 3)(vi)).  
308 Active metabolites are generated by the metabolism through the ingestion of pharmaceutical compounds in the 
human organism. They are “products derived from the active ingredients used. They cannot be considered to have 
been “created” or “invented”. Thus, they “are not patentable independently from the active ingredient from which 
they derived, even though they may have safety and efficacy profiles differing from those of the parent molecule.” 
(Examination Guidelines No. 3)(vii)). 
309 Prodrugs are “are inactive compounds […], which when hydrolyzed or metabolized in an organism, can give rise 
to a therapeutically active ingredient. […] Patents on prodrugs, if granted, should exclude from the claim the active 
ingredient as such, if the latter has already been disclosed or if it is not patentable” (Examination Guidelines No. 
3)(viii)). 
310 Formulations and Compositions “refer to the use of active ingredients and excipients or carriers pharmaceutically 
suitable such as diluents, binders, disintegrants, lubricants, coloring and flavoring agents. Formulation techniques 
and the components which can be used to develop pharmaceutical products in their various forms are well known 
elements to a person skilled in the art.” Thus, “new forms and compositions as well as the processes for their 
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second medical use and dosage regimes311; manufacturing processes312. The new guidelines also 
require a clear disclosure in the patent applications.  
Similarly to India, the new Argentinian policy as regards patent examination shows the strong 
determination of the country to a more appropriate use of the permitted TRIPS flexibilities. From 
a public health perspective, in fact, a strict application of the patentability criteria, achieved 
through the specific examination guidelines, can be used to address public health concerns related 
to the evergreening phenomenon. Thus, clear examination guidelines, enabling patent officers to 
efficiently evaluate different patent applications for pharmaceutical products, contribute to the 
improvement of the whole patent system, especially in regard to the most crucial field of access to 
medicines.  
South Africa could take inspiration from the Argentinian Examination Guidelines in order to 
restructure its examination system, aiming to apply tougher patentability criteria and to avoid the 
unjustified evergreening of patents.  
5. CONCLUSION  
The goal of this Chapter was to investigate the legal response that India, Brazil and Argentina have 
taken regarding the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. These three countries attempted, in 
different manner and to varying extent, to limit where possible, the drastic implications that the 
                                                             
preparation as a general rule should be considered obvious in view of the prior art.” (Examination Guidelines No. 
4)(ix)). 
311 Combinations refer to “combinations claims of previously known active ingredients” and “in some cases specify 
the specific compounds they include and the amounts they cover, while others only refer to a class of therapeutic 
compounds, such as antacids and anti-viral agents, without specifying which compounds are included. Most 
combinations have already been tested in medical practice by administering the components independently. Claims 
on combinations of previously known active ingredients in practical terms are equivalent to claims on medical 
treatments whose patentability is excluded.” (Examination Guidelines No. 4)(x)); Dosage are not patentable, when 
the patent claims “are directed to inventions consisting of dosages of an existing product, such as once a day pediatric 
dosages or dosage forms.” (Examination Guidelines No. 4)(xi)) Second medical indications are not admissible. 
“Often, applications are limited to describing pharmacological activity trials in order to confirm the discovery of 
further use possibilities. Patent applications for second medical indications (or other medical uses) are equivalent to 
therapeutic treatment methods and have no industrial application. This rule applies even if the claim is drafted under 
a “Swiss formula”, that is, “use of x for the manufacture of a medicament for the treatment of “y” Ã¢Â€Âœ, or its 
variants” (Examination Guidelines No. 4)(xii)).  
312 Manufacturing processes “should be evaluated according to the properties and characteristics of such products or 
processes, considered separately. Synthetic or manufacturing processes which are not new and inventive by 
themselves, should be considered non-patentable as such […].” (Examination Guidelines No. 4)(xiii)).  
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new international patent policy, brought by the TRIPS Agreement, had on pharmaceuticals and 
resultantly on access to medicines. As noted, a more appropriate adoption of the TRIPS Agreement 
standards could affect levels of competition in the market, with particular regard to the competition 
of generic medicines, especially in developing countries where they are more needed.  
The investigation in this Chapter showed that, even though India, Brazil and Argentina are similar 
middle-income economies and share with South Africa similar public health-related issues, they 
have taken better advantage of TRIPS flexibilities. Particularly, India resisted the Western 
pressures, without breaching the international obligations, through (i) delaying, the adoption of 
patent protection for pharmaceuticals, (ii) applying stricter patentability criteria and implementing 
a substantial examination system, with pre- and post- opposition procedures; Brazil attempted to 
safeguard its public health policy of universal access to ARVs with an intense use, or threat to use, 
of the mechanism of compulsory licensing as a negotiating tool; lastly, Argentina only recently 
adopted new examination guidelines for pharmaceutical inventions, with the aim to reduce the 
patent evergreening phenomenon in the pharmaceutical field.   
Although the implementation of the TRIPS flexibilities by India, Brazil and Argentina in their 
respective legislation shows a different legal approach, specifically due to differences in their 
political and historical backgrounds, South Africa could take those strategies as examples for 
tailoring the reform of its patents law system to suit its specific needs.  
Towards this end, the next Chapter V will take into consideration the practical examples given by 
these three developing countries with the aim of providing concrete recommendations for a 







THE DRAFT NATIONAL POLICY ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (IP) OF SOUTH 
AFRICA: COMMENTS AND RECCOMENDATIONS WITH REGARD TO PATENTS 
FOR PHARMACEUTICALS 
1. SCOPE AND OVERVIEW 
The focus of this final Chapter will be the upcoming patent law reform in South Africa expressed 
in the Draft National Policy. The study will focus on the new rules that are recommended by the 
Draft National Policy as essential modifications to the current patent legislation. The analysis will 
also consider the experience of similar middle-income economies such as India, Brazil and 
Argentina (analysed in Chapter IV) that provide examples of strategic actions that could be taken 
in the patent field. Furthermore, particular attention will be paid to the implications that the 
reformed patent system will have upon the right to health and access to medicines. Specifically, 
the Chapter will examine the challenges that a legislative reform of patent law should overcome 
and the practical consequences that, in the long-term, the patent reform would have on both the 
patent and public health systems of South Africa.  
Finally, Chapter V will describe the positive reactions that NGOs and generic drug companies had 
in welcoming the Draft National Policy and the upcoming patent reform. Pharmaceutical industry 
responses will also be considered to demonstrate the existence of competing IP interests. The 
Chapter will show how the presence of relevant conflicting interests in the pharmaceutical market 
urgently calls for a strategy of compromise, aimed to realise and subsequently safeguard the 
balance between IP rights and the right to health and access to medicines.    
 
2. NEW RULES FOR A STRATEGIC REFORM OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PATENTS ACT 
57 OF 1978 
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2.1.  The Draft National Policy on Intellectual Property (IP) of South Africa 
Currently, the South African legislation lacks a coherent IP policy. To this end, in September 2013, 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Dr. Rob Davies released the Draft National Policy with the 
purpose of calling for “written comments on the proposed policy”.313 In this regard, the Draft 
National Policy recognised that reform is necessary in order to harmonise the different existing 
approaches to the IP system. However, such reform should “take into account the fact that South 
Africa is a developing country with the bare minimum of a technological, economic and social 
base”.314 Therefore, a new IP system must be tailored to the economic, social and technological 
background of South Africa. Furthermore, as stated in the Draft National Policy, a well-structured 
IP system could contribute to the abolition of poverty, the boosting of technology development, 
and transfer and the facilitation of access to medicines and education.315 Moreover, a uniformed 
IP system will advantage public departments and private citizens of South Africa, bringing 
economic opportunities as well as empowering stakeholders. The Minister of Trade and Industry 
in the Draft National Policy also highlighted the fact that IP law regards three distinct areas: 
copyright, trade marks and patents; and the Government needs to address the issue with a “one-
policy approach at national and international level” in order to enhance the coordination between 
different, but similarly relevant, interests. In particular, key importance should be given to the 
principal goal of balancing conflicting interests: “the interests of producers, consumers and users 
of IP for the benefit of all stakeholders (TRIPS Agreement), primarily for the benefit of the country 
and its citizens”.316 
Despite the Draft National Policy circulated since September 2013, the Cabinet has not yet 
approved the new IP policy.317 According to TAC’s General Secretary Vuyiseka Dubula this delay 
is unacceptable and it can be due to those international pressures coming from foreign 
pharmaceutical industries. This situation of stalemate, “takes us back to the turn of the century 
                                                             
313 See Department of Trade and Industry, Draft National Policy (note above). Invitation for the public to comment 
on the National Policy on Intellectual Property, 2013, Notice 918 of 2013, Staatskoerant, 4 September 2013 No. 36816, 
3.  
314 See Department of Trade and Industry, Draft National Policy (note above) 8.  
315 See Department of Trade and Industry, Draft National Policy (note above) 8.  
316 See Department of Trade and Industry, Draft National Policy (note above) 9. 
317 See M. Makoni, “South Africa Awaits Patent Reforms with Hope, Concern” in - Intellectual Property Watch (27 
February 2015). Available online at: http://www.ip-watch.org, accessed in April 2015. 
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when 39 pharmaceutical companies took President Nelson Mandela and the South African 
government to court to try to stop legislative reform to improve South Africa’s ability to access 
affordable life-saving medicines”.318 
In fact, the deadline for the Cabinet to approve the Draft National Policy was supposed to be at the 
end of 2014, but the date passed unattended, and no further deadlines have been set.319  
 
2.2.  Patentability criteria: novelty, inventive step and industrial application  
For an invention to be patented it needs to satisfy the three requirements of patentability. The 
invention needs to be new, inventive and have industrial application. Soft patentability criteria 
create the risk that unjustifiable inventions would receive protection without being new, inventive 
and applicable in the industry. Such circumstances unduly increase the phenomena of patents 
proliferation, also called patent evergreening.  
In this regard, the Draft National Policy expressly recognises the crucial importance of patents in 
the critical area of pharmaceuticals and, notably, it admits that “if "weak" patents are granted, its 
stifles the possibility of having access to public health. This means that if a patent is granted, even 
if there is no innovation on the original or dependent patent, access to public health may be 
difficult to attain”.320 Moreover, the Draft National Policy, in referring to the Doha Declaration 
and the WTO Decision (above in Chapter 2), highlights the importance of the use of the TRIPS 
flexibilities “suitable to cure access to public health, in particular by developing countries such 
                                                             
318 See K. Ribet, TAC, SECTION27 and MSF react to PharmaGate, in Fix The Patent Law (2014). Available online 
at: http://www.fixthepatentlaws.org/?p=823, accessed in April 2015. The author reports the statement realised by the 
TAC’S General Secretary, Vuyiseka Dubula, who declared “The Treatment Action Campaign is outraged over what 
appears to be a covert and well-funded plan from the foreign pharmaceutical industry to delay an essential law reform 
process in South Africa. It takes us back to the turn of the century when 39 pharmaceutical companies took President 
Nelson Mandela and the South African government to court to try to stop legislative reform to improve South Africa’s 
ability to access affordable life-saving medicines. Now, just weeks after his death, foreign pharmaceutical companies 
are coordinating another major attack on this right. We call for the urgent finalisation and release of the Department 
of Trade and Industry’s long awaited Intellectual Property Policy. Any further delays are unacceptable and will have 
far reaching impact on the provision of public health. We will not allow foreign industry to derail this national process, 
especially in such a secret and underhanded way. The TAC fought before and we will fight again now to protect the 
Constitutional rights of all people in South Africa.” 
319 See M. Makoni, (note above). 
320 See Department of Trade and Industry, Draft National Policy (note 34 above), Chapter 1, a), ii) “Patent and Access 
to Public Health”, 11-12. 
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as South Africa”.321 Particularly, the Draft National Policy recommends an amendment of the 
South African Patents Act so as to incorporate the flexibilities available in the TRIPS Agreement 
and the WTO Decisions of 2003 and 2005,322 which followed the Doha Declaration: “The Patents 
Act should be amended to be amenable to issues related to access to public health”.323  
Even though these presuppositions are admirable, the Draft National Policy does not seem to have 
expressly addressed the issue of proliferation of patents by means of an amendment to the existing   
patentability criteria. Therefore, as pointed out by S27, MSF and TAC in their Joint Submission 
of 2013, “the Patents Act should be amended to include stricter patentability criteria”.324 To this 
aim, an investigation as to the adoption of the TRIPS flexibilities by other WTO Members could 
efficiently help South Africa in the legislative reform of its Patents Act.  
As previously discussed, some relevant examples can be provided by developing countries, which 
share with South Africa similar public health related issues and similar middle-income economies. 
For instance, in India, stricter patentability criteria have been set during the reform of 2005.325 
Notably, the TRIPS Agreement leaves the Member States free to establish stricter standards of 
patentability, provided that the invention satisfies the three criteria of novelty, inventive step and 
industrial applicability. 326  Therefore, the Indian government, in order to prevent patent 
evergreening and the risk of undue monopolies, inserted special exclusions from patentability, as 
shown in Chapter 4 of this study, which are: 
 
i. The mere discovery of natural substances such as “scientific principle or the 
formulation of or discovery of any living thing or non-living substance 
occurring in nature”;327 
                                                             
321 See Department of Trade and Industry, Draft National Policy (note above), Chapter 1, a), iii) “Doha Declaration 
and Decision 6”, 11-12. 
322 See WTO General Council Decision of 30 August 2003 (note above) and WTO General Council Decision of 
December 2005 (note above). 
323 See Department of Trade and Industry, Draft National Policy (note above), Chapter 1, a), iii) “Recommendations”, 
11-12. 
324 See S27, TAC and MSF in the Joint Submission on the Draft National Intellectual Property Policy, 2013 (note  
above) 3. 
325 In 2005, with the third phase of amendments to the Patents Act of 1970, India extended full patent protection to all 
patentable subject matters.   
326 See Art. 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.  
327 See Section 3(c) of the Indian Patents Act.  
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ii. “new form of a known substance”, not resulting in the enhancement of its 
known efficacy, and “new use for a known substance”;328 
iii. “a substance obtained by a mere admixture resulting only in the aggregation 
of the properties of the components”;329 
iv. “mere arrangement or re-arrangement”;330 
v. methods of treating humans and/or animals.331 
Particularly relevant is the “explanation” of Section 3(d), which states that “salts, esters, ethers, 
polymorphs, metabolites, pure form, particle size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, 
combinations and other derivatives of know substances” are the same substance, “unless they 
differ significantly in properties with regard to efficacy”. 
In particular, as mentioned above, Section 3(d) and the exclusion from patentability of a “new 
form of a known substance” were the centre of a long debate before the Indian Courts in the 
Novartis case.332 The Supreme Court explained the meaning of “an enhancement of efficacy” set 
by Section 3(d) clarifying: “the mere change of form with properties inherent to that form would 
not qualify as ‘enhancement of efficacy’ of a known substance”.333 In taking this view, the Supreme 
Court of India confirmed consequently the legitimacy of Section 3(d).  
As noted, Argentina recently issued new Examination Guidelines for inventions regarding 
pharmaceuticals, 334  aiming at stopping proliferation of patents. Particularly, patent claims for 
uninventive drug inventions, such as new uses or new forms of known substances, are expressly 
rejected. The Examination Guidelines include in the rejection: polymorphs and pseudo 
polymorphs (hydrates and solvates); enantiomers; Markush claims; selection patents; salts, esters 
and other derivatives (such as amides and complexes) of known substances; active metabolites; 
                                                             
328 See Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act. 
329 See Section 3(e) of the Indian Patents Act. 
330 See Section 3(f) of the Indian Patents Act. 
331 See Section 3(i) of the Indian Patents Act. 
332 For a detailed analysis of the Novartis AG v Union of India & Others case see Chapter IV, 2) g) of this study.  
333 See Novartis AG v Union of India & Others, (note above) 181. 
334 See Resolution of the Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Health and Instituto Nacional de la Propiedad Industrial 
No. 118/2012, No. 546/2012 and No. 107/2012, (note above).  
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prodrugs; formulations and compositions; combinations, second medical use and dosage regimes; 
manufacturing processes.335  
2.2.1.  Recommendation 
The analysis carried out on the legislations currently adopted by other WTO Member States, in 
particular in the cases of India and Argentina, demonstrates that implementation in the South 
African patents system of the TRIPS flexibilities in terms of narrower patentability criteria is 
allowed and endorsed by the international agreements, the TRIPS Agreement and the WTO 
Decisions of 2003 and 2005.  
Therefore, reform of the South African patents system, which intends to create a more appropriate 
use of the allowed TRIPS flexibilities so as to address the public health concerns, should be 
initiated with the application of tougher patentability criteria.  This goal could be better achieved 
through the use of practical indications, such as special guidelines (following the example of 
Argentina) or legal explanations (such as in the case of India), which would specifically prohibit 
from patentability those new forms and/or uses of known substances. Furthermore, a list of these 
known substances, drafted by highly skilled experts in the pharmaceutical field, could be expressly 
included in the new Patents Act of South Africa (similarly to the “explanation” of Section 3(d) of 
the Indian Patents Act) or instead added in separated detailed instructions (likewise the Argentinian 
Examination Guidelines). 
2.3.  Examination and Opposition Procedures  
As shown in Chapter III of this study, South Africa does not provide for a substantive examination 
system, although the benefits of such a procedure are demonstrated by the experience of numerous 
WTO Members. In this regard, all developed industrialised states, and some emerging economies, 
in particular India and Brazil, as indicated in Chapter IV, have positively adopted the 
administrative system of patent examination and opposition. According to Section 34 of the 
Patents Act of South Africa, a patent is granted when the application simply “complies with the 
requirements of this Act”. Moreover, a procedure for pre- and post-grant opposition to the content 
                                                             
335 See Chapter IV, para 4) “The implementation of the TRIPS flexibilities in the Argentinian patent law” of this study.  
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of the patent is not available; as a result, a patent can potentially be granted without ensuring that 
the criteria of patentability are satisfied.336 
A non-examining system can lead the country to issue patent protection towards weak inventions, 
since a strict inspection as to the existence of the patents criteria is evaded. The importance of 
opposing weaker patents is expressly acknowledged by the Draft National Policy, which states 
that: 
 “A country like India resorted to pre- and post-grant opposition to facilitate a possibility of 
opposing weaker patents […]. The South Africa Patents does not prescribe for such. This 
procedure has been a success to challenge "weaker" patents […].  
The Patents Act should be amended to have both pre- and post-grant opposition to effectively 
foster the spirit of granting stronger patents.”337 
Moreover, the Draft National Policy recognises that the use by similar economies, such as in the 
case of India, of pre- and post- opposition procedures helps to reduce the issuance of undue patents, 
which can “frustrate access to public health”.338  
In India, as illustrated above, in addition to stricter requirements of patentability, which already 
contribute to the diminution of unwarranted patents339, the right to oppose a patent, before and 
after its granting, is recognised in the country as one of the most important tools for preventing 
unjustified inventions receiving patent protection. According to Section 25 of the Indian Patents 
Act, before the grant of the patent, “any person” may start a pre-grant opposition proceeding 
against an application. Furthermore, Section 25(1) lists the grounds for filing an opposition which 
occur if the invention: (i) was wrongfully obtained by the applicant; (ii) was published before the 
priority date; (iii) was already claimed in another application; (iv) did not fulfil the statutory 
standards; (v) was not sufficiently disclosed in the specification; and, (vi) was anticipated by 
                                                             
336 A. Pouris & A. Pouris, (note above) 5.  
337 See Department of Trade and Industry, Draft National Policy (note above), Chapter 1, a), v) “Pre- and Post-
Opposition of Patents” and “Recommendations”, 12-13. 
338 See Department of Trade and Industry, Draft National Policy (note above), Chapter 1, a), viii) “Substantive Search 
and Examination of Patents”, 13-14. 
339 See Section 3 of the Indian Patents Act, in particular  para 3(c), (d), (e), (f), (i).  
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traditional knowledge.340 Additionally, India recognises the right to oppose patents, within one 
year from the granting. However, as previously noted, this right is available only to the “person 
interested”.341  
Brazil took a different approach to the substantive examination system compared with India, 
although similar implications in terms of public health protection can be appreciated. As described 
in Chapter IV, Article 229-C of the Industrial Property Law342 empowers ANVISA343 to give its 
“prior consent” regarding pharmaceutical patent claims before a patent is granted.344 The “prior 
consent” method aims at reducing patent evergreening for pharmaceuticals, since, by means of this 
previous inspection, the patenting of an already granted drug would be less likely to occur. 
Furthermore, with the new process of “prior consent”, issued in April 2013, 345 ANVISA will 
examine only those pharmaceutical patent applications, which subject matter is related to 
pharmaceutical substances or processes which (i) are a risk for the public health or had been banned 
in the country, (ii) are listed as strategic products to the SUS or listed for therapeutic use by the 
Ministry of Health.  
As regards the pre- and post-grant opposition mechanisms, Article 31 of the Industrial Property 
Law allows “interested parties” to file a pre-opposition claim “after publication of the application 
and up to the end of the examination”. In this regard, several Brazilian NGOs had been highly 
proactive in filing comments and opinions against the grant of a patent when the issuance of which 
could be unjustified on a public health basis.346 Moreover, according to Article 51 of the Industrial 
Property Law, “any person having the legitimate interest”, or the INPI ex officio, may file 
                                                             
340 See Section 25(1) a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k of the Indian Patents Act.  
341 See Section 25(2) of the Indian Patents Act. It should be noted that Section 2(1)(t) of the Indian Patents Act specifies 
that the “person interested” is “a person engaged in, or in promoting, research in the same field as that to which the 
invention relates”. 
342 Law 9.279/96, which was amended by Law 10196/01. 
343 ANVISA is the National Health Surveillance Agency, described in Chapter IV.  
344 See, R. Gosain, (note above) and M. Oliveira, G. Chaves, R. Epsztejn, (note above). 
345 See Resolução-RDC No. 21, 10th of April 2013. 
346 See Access Campaign (MSF), Brazilians demand greater access to crucial HIV drug, (2011). Available online at: 
http://www.msfaccess.org/about-us/media-room/press-releases/brazilians-demand-greater-access-crucial-hiv-drug, 
accessed in May 2015. 
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nullification proceeding against the patent, within a period of 6 months after the date of the 
granting.347  
As a result, India and Brazil are good examples, which show how emerging economies can 
positively use the TRIPS flexibilities with the adoption of a substantive examination system. 
Towards this aim, the Draft National Policy endorses legislative reform, which would introduce in 
the country the “Search and Examination of Patents” complemented by “systems such as pre- 
and post-opposition processes and capacity-building for an efficient system”.348  
 However, for the reform to be entirely accomplished, a cost-efficient structure of highly qualified 
examiners should also be put in place. Those experts should have the necessary skills to assess the 
patent claim in relation to the prior art, whether local or foreign.349 Moreover, this should be 
facilitated, in part, by the adoption of a national on-line searchable database and also, though the 
access to global databases.350 In this view, the Resolution 61.21 of the World Health Assembly 
(2008) pointed out that Member States should adopt “user-friendly global databases […] in order 
to strengthen national capacities for analysis of the information contained in those databases, and 
improve the quality of patents” (World Health Assembly, 2008). 
2.3. 1.  Recommendation 
The reform of the patent examination system, such as the one anticipated by the Draft National 
Policy, which would also recognise the right of “any person” to file a pre-grant opposition and the 
right of “the interested person” to file a post- opposition, can be a challenge for South Africa, 
especially in terms of initial costs required. Nonetheless, it should be bear in mind what considered 
in the previous Chapter III, as regards the registration fees for patents, which in South Africa are 
                                                             
347 Expired 6 months, a revocation can be submitted any time in the course of an infringement action. 
348  See Department of Trade and Industry, Draft National Policy (note 34 above), Chapter 1, a), viii) 
“Recommendations”, 13-14. 
349 See Dr. T. Schonwette and Prof. Y. A. Vawda, Comments at the Draft National Policy on Intellectual Property 
(IP) of South Africa, 2013, (17 October 2013), 16-17. 
350 See Dr. T. Schonwette and Prof. Y. A. Vawda, Comments at the Draft National Policy on Intellectual Property 
(IP) of South Africa, 2013, (note above), who highlighted this point: “Just as important as accessing other databases, 
all should be able to access the South African patent database. It should therefore be freely available and fully 
searchable on-line by anyone”. 
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some of the cheapest in the world.351 For instance, both the EPO and the USPTO limits the number 
of claims permitted for each application, setting different registration fees for those that exceed a 
certain number of claims. Research conducted at the University of Pretoria in 2009, 352 showed 
that “South Africa is 20 to 30 times cheaper than the other patent regimes”. 353  Therefore, 
increasing the patent registration fees and putting a limit to the number of claims allowed per patent 
could help reaching two different goals: i) on one hand, it would reduce and/or avoid the 
proliferation of patents; ii) on the other hand, it would subsidise the reorganisation of the existing 
system so as to implement a substantive examination procedure, which would include pre- and 
post- opposition proceedings.  
In this regard, the same view was taken by a group of experts during the EPO Economic and 
Scientific Advisory Board Workshop of September 2012.354 Hence, in their opinion, “setting a 
higher price may reduce strategic behaviour”. 355  Fees should be considered as a means of 
supporting patent offices as well as guiding applicant behaviours, increasing the quality standards 
and diminishing the number of patents granted to applicants.356 Furthermore, “renewal fees” could 
also be increased so as to verify “whether a patent is truly valuable. Such a system would allow 
more patents to expire, potentially reducing competing claims and reducing complexity”.357  
However, the rise of prices for patents examination, registration and renewal can also lead to some 
concerns regarding the potential disadvantage that may be faced by local applicants, universities 
as well as small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Such difficulties could be overcome by setting 
rewards and monetary subsidies to encourage small innovators.  
                                                             
351 A. Pouris & A. Pouris, (note above) 6. 
352 L. Lubango, Industry specific know-how, inventiveness, and research performance of universities’ entrepreneurs: 
A cross-national patent portfolio analysis, PhD thesis, Pretoria, University of Pretoria (2009). 
353 A. Pouris & A. Pouris, (note above) 6. The author pointed out that a system, such as the one implemented in South 
Africa, “[…] opens the system to frivolous and useless patents, which increases uncertainty, increases search and 
monitoring costs by interested patentees and makes more difficult the dissemination of prior art by useful or real 
inventions.” 
354 European Patent Office, Report EPO Economic and Scientific Advisory Board Workshop on Patent Thickets,  
(Leuven) (26 September 2012). Available online at: 
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponot.nsf/0/B58781F239B083CEC1257B190038E433/$FILE/workshop
_patent_thickets_en.pdf, accessed in April 2015. 
355 Ibid 12. 
356 Ibid 11.  
357 Ibid 12. 
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For instance, in 2013 Ecuador358 drastically raised the fees for patents examination, registration 
and maintenance, excluding only applications coming from particular types of applicants, such as 
SMEs and universities.359 
Moreover, granting a reward in terms of reduction of renewal fees for high-quality patents could 
compensate the higher application fees initially paid. Simultaneously, this return would motivate 
applicants to submit better applications.360  
It should be also considered that pre-and post- opposition procedures are cost efficient in the long-
term, although the creation of a substantive patent system will require, as said, an initial investment 
from the State in adopting an efficient structure of highly qualified and trained examiners. In fact, 
the legal and judicial costs of a full court proceeding are saved. Furthermore, administrative 
procedures, such as the one described, greatly speed up the process of obtaining a decision, since 
they permit the settling of disputes in shorter timeframes than through judicial proceedings.361 
In light of the above considerations, a practical step towards improving the system could include 
a substantial rise in patent registration fees. The generated income could finance the creation of a 
patent office staffed by an adequately, and appropriately, qualified force of patent examiners. As 
highlighted, a substantive examination patent system as such would help reducing the issuance of 
secondary patents as regards pharmaceutical inventions and would simultaneously enable generic 
industries to enter into the market at an earlier stage. Concurrently, increased competition in the 
market will have the effect of reducing prices of drugs and simultaneously increasing access to 
medicines.362  
                                                             
358  See Resolución No. 001-2013 CD-IEPI, Available online at: http://www.propiedadintelectual.gob.ec/wp- 
content/uploads/2013/08/reformas_tasas_2013.pdf, accessed in May 2015. 
359 See C. Correa, Tackling the Proliferation of Patents: How to Avoid Undue Limitations To Competition and the 
Public Domain in Research Paper 52, (2014) South Centre, 38.  
360 European Patent Office, Report EPO Economic and Scientific Advisory Board Workshop on Patent Thickets (note 
above) 16. 
361 See W. M. Cohen, S. A. Merrill & others, (note above) 132.  
362 See C. Correa, Pharmaceutical Innovation, Pharmaceutical Patenting and Compulsory Licensing, South Centre 
Research Paper 41 (2011), available online at 
http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1601%3Apharmaceutical-
innovation-incremental-patenting-and-compulsory-licensing&catid=41%3Ainnovation-technology-and-patent-
policy&Itemid=67&lang=en, accessed in May 2015. 
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2.4.  Exclusion from patentability 
As noted in the second Chapter of this study, the South African Patents Act is mainly in line with 
the TRIPS Agreement provisions regarding the exclusion from patentability.363 Articles 25(4) and 
25(11) of the South African Patents Act state that patents should not be granted for inventions, (i) 
which would “encourage offensive or immoral behaviour”; (ii) for animal and plant varieties; (iii) 
for methods of treatment of the human and animal body “by surgery or therapy or diagnosis 
practiced on the human or animal body” to be “used or applied in trade or industry or 
agriculture”. 
However, Section 25(12) introduces an exception to the exclusion from patentability, which 
exceeds the minimum rule set forth by the TRIPS Agreement. In this regard, Section 25(12) 
specifies that Article 25(11) should be interpreted as preventing “a product consisting of a 
substance or composition being deemed capable of being used or applied in trade or industry or 
agriculture merely because it is invented for use in any such method”.  
As a result, this subsection (12) produces an additional exception to the principle of non-
patentability of methods of treatment of humans or animals, which extends the scope of industrial 
applicability beyond its required limit set by Articles 27.2 and 27.3 of the TRIPS Agreement.364  
2.4. 1.  Recommendation 
In the revision of the South African Patents Act, the abrogation of Section 25(12) of the same Act 
is highly recommended, since it would narrow the scope of industrial applicability so as to exclude 
all method of treatment claims, as per the TRIPS Agreement standards. 
 
2.5.  Limited exceptions 
                                                             
363 See Articles 27.2 and 27.3 of the TRIPS Agreement.  
364 C. Park, A. Prabhala & J. Berger (note above) 35 – 38.  The authors explain that “[…] section 25(12) creates an 
exception to the general rule that method of treatment claims are not capable of industrial application, and states that 
a method of treatment claim may be valid if a substance or composition is used for such treatment. However, there is 
nothing in the language of TRIPS Article 27.3 that requires such an exception.” 
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In 2002, South Africa amended Section 69A (1) of its Patents Act, introducing the exception 
according to which “to make, use, exercise, offer to dispose of, dispose of or import” a patented 
invention, without the permission of its owner, is not an act of infringement if it is done “for the 
purposes reasonably related to the obtaining, development and submission of information required 
under any law that regulates the manufacture, production, distribution, use or sale of any 
product”. 365 
Limited exceptions as such are authorised by the TRIPS Agreement as part of the TRIPS 
flexibilities. In this regard, Art. 30 of the TRIPS Agreement permits WTO Members to provide for 
“limited exceptions to the exclusive rights” of the patent holder, when they “do not unreasonably 
conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the patent owner”.  
As illustrated in Chapter II and III, the provision contained in Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement 
is broad and gives to WTO States a wide range of autonomy to provide for different types of 
exceptions to the patentee’ exclusive rights. Subsequently, many developed and developing states 
have taken full advantage of this flexibility so as to include also research and experimentation, 
prior use, early working exceptions.  
Similarly to South Africa, India, amended the Indian Patents Act of 1970 with the Patents 
Amendment Act of 2005, which also introduced Section 107A(a). According to this provision, 
making and using patented inventions solely for developing information necessary to obtain 
marketing approval are “not to be considered as infringement”. However, in addition to this, 
Section 47(3) of the Indian Patents Act of 1970 authorises the research and experimentation 
exception. In fact, according to this provision, patented machines or processes “may be used, by 
any person, for the purpose merely of experiment or research including the imparting of 
instructions to pupils”. Notably, the terms “experiment” and “research” have been intentionally 
chosen in order to include a broad variety of scientific activities and consequently extend the scope 
                                                             
365 The South African Patents Act was amended by the Patents Amendment Act No. 58 of 2002, and published in 
Government Gazette on 15 January 2003.  
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of the exception, which is also emphasised by the inclusion of “instructions to pupils” imparted 
by universities and schools.366  
Analogously, in Brazil, Law 10.196 of February 14, 2001 amended Article 43 of the Industrial 
Property Law. 367  In particular, the new Article 43(II) and (VII) states that the patent rights 
conferred by Article 42 do not apply “to acts carried out by unauthorized third parties for 
experimental purposes, in connection with scientific or technological studies or researches” and 
“to act performed by non-authorized third parties, regarding patented inventions, which aim 
exclusively the production of information, data and test results directed to procure commerce 
registration, in Brazil or any other country, to allow the exploitation and commercialization of the 
patented product, after the termination of the terms”.  
As previously shown, Section 69(A) of the South African Patents Act permits only exceptions for 
regulatory purposes (so-called Bolar exception). Regrettably, the Draft National Policy did not 
propose an amendment to the South African Patents Act so as to extend the scope of the exception 
to include research and experimentation purposes, as allowed in the TRIPS Agreement and already 
provided by several industrialised and emerging economies. 
2.5.1.  Recommendation 
An extensive interpretation of the limited exceptions to the patentee rights, which includes research, 
experimental and educational purposes, is not in conflict with the TRIPS Agreement and is 
currently operated by several WTO Members. 368  Research and experimental exceptions are 
fundamental policy mechanisms required for the development of the pharmaceutical sector. 
Furthermore, they are necessary for ongoing monitoring of the uses and side-effects of drugs.369 
Thus, it is recommended that the legislative reform of the South African Patents Act would amend 
                                                             
366 See K. Chakravarthy, N. Pendsey, (note above) 332-341. See also S. Chaudhuri (note above) 17. 
367 See M. S. G. Rosina, D. Wang & T. C. de Campos, (note 257 above) 186. 
368 C. Park, A. Prabhala & J. Berger (note above) 56 - 57. 
369 World Health Organization, Intellectual property and access to medicines: papers and perspectives (2010) (note 
above) 16-17.  
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Section 69(A) so as to expand the existing exception and include those activities of research, 
experimentation and education.370  
2.6.  Compulsory licensing   
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement permits WTO Members to issue compulsory licences, which 
allow third parties to manufacture and/or use patented inventions, under certain conditions, without 
the express authorisation of the patent holder, during the validity of the patent.  
As shown, according to Section 56 of the South African Patents Act, applications must be filed 
with the commissioner of patents and the proceeding will be conducted according to “the law 
governing procedure in civil cases in the Transvaal Provincial Division of the High Court of South 
Africa”.371  The process of issuance of a compulsory licence can, therefore, take years to be 
finalised.372 
Moreover, as discussed in the previous Chapter III of this study, the grounds upon which 
compulsory licences may be granted are solely limited to four circumstances and only “in case of 
abuse of patent rights”373, which occur for: 
e) failure to work the invention in South Africa during an adequate time;374 
f) the demand for the patented item is “not being met to an adequate extent and on 
reasonable terms”;375 
g) refusal coming from the patent holder to grant the licence “upon reasonable terms” causes 
prejudice to the “trade, industry or agriculture, the trade of persons, or the establishment 
                                                             
370 See S27, TAC and MSF in the Joint Submission on the Draft National Intellectual Property Policy, 2013 (note 
above) 55. The authors firmly pointed out that “in addition to adopting a broad research exception, South Africa 
should also adopt a broad educational use exception to patent rights. Academics and researchers must be able to 
train the next generation of inventors and scientists on research and product development methods. Tertiary 
institutions, and even secondary institutions, should be permitted to use patented products or processes for the purpose 
of instruction. Again, Article 30 of TRIPS allows such an exception and there is precedent in Brazil, India, and 
Argentina.” 
371 Section 19(1) of the South African Patents Act.  
372 C. Park, A. Prabhala & J. Berger (note above) 61- 62. 
373 Section 56 of the South African Patents Act.  
374 Section 56(2)(a) of the South African Patents Act.   
375 Section 56(2)(b) of the South African Patents Act.   
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of any new trade or industry […] and it is in the public interest that a licence or licences 
should be granted”;376 
h) the demand for the patent item is met by importation and “the price charged is excessive 
compared to the price in the country” of origin.377  
Furthermore, according to Section 4 of the South African Patents Act (so-called “government use” 
licence, as issued directly by the state and not through the judicial proceeding), a Minister of State 
must agree with the patent holder to the terms and conditions upon which the patented invention 
can be used, before using an invention for public purposes. This provision establishes an additional 
requirement (as underlined) to the issuance of a government-use licence. In fact, the TRIPS 
Agreement in Article 31(b) expressly declares that no prior consultations need to be started “in 
case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in case of public non 
commercial use” (emphasis added). 
As previously noted, the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration allow Member States to 
grant compulsory licences in case of national emergency or extreme urgency.378 In particular, the 
Doha Declaration recognises for the WTO Member “the right to determine what constitutes a 
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency”, having understood that “public 
health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, 
can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency”.379 
However, South Africa does not grant compulsory licences in case of national emergency or 
extreme urgency. Dissimilar to South Africa, the Indian Patents Act speeds the process of issuing 
compulsory licences in such situations.  
In 2005, India inserted Section 92A, which states that compulsory licence are available in the 
country for manufacturing and exporting “patented pharmaceutical products to any country 
                                                             
376 Section 56(2)(d) of the South African Patents Act.   
377 Section 56(2)(e) of the South African Patents Act.   
378 See para 5(c) of Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 20 November 2001, Doha WTO 
Ministerial Declaration 2001 (note above) and Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
379 See para 5(c) of the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 20 November 2001, Doha WTO 
Ministerial Declaration 2001 (note above). 
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having insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector”.380 In addition to 
this, Section 84 permits any interested person to request general compulsory licences “any time 
after the expiration of three years from the date of the grant of a patent”, upon three grounds: a) 
“the reasonable requirements of the public” with respect to the patented invention have not been 
satisfied;381 b) the patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonable affordable price; 
c) the patented invention is not worked in India.382 Furthermore, according to Section 92, the 
Government can grant a compulsory licence (the “government use” licence), at any time after the 
grant of the patent, in cases of national emergency, extreme urgency or public non-commercial use. 
In Brazil, the Industrial Property Law authorises the issuance of compulsory licences, when the 
patentee exercises its rights “in an abusive manner, or by means thereof engages in abuse of 
economic power […]”.383 Compulsory licences are also granted in case of non-exploitation of the 
patent in Brazil or when the commercialization “does not satisfy the needs of the market” (the 
“local working” requirement).384 Moreover, additional grounds for the issuance of a compulsory 
licence are set by Article 70 and Article 71 of the Industrial Property Law and they are, respectively: 
“a situation of dependency of one patent with regard to another” and “in cases of national 
emergency or of public interest, as declared in an act of the Federal Executive Power”.385 
In South Africa, the Draft National Policy recognises that the mechanism of compulsory licences 
would facilitate “access medicines at lower prices”, for instance “when the Government considers 
the price of medicines to be astronomically high […]” or it can be used “as a bargaining tool in 
                                                             
380 See Section 92A of the Indian Patents Act of 1970 (as amended by the Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005).  
381 Under the Indian Patents law, Section 84(7), the reasonable requirements of the public “shall be deemed not to 
have been satisfied” when: (A) considering the refusal of the patentee to grant the licence, the Indian trade, industry 
or its developments are prejudiced, (ii) the demand of the patented item is inadequate, (iii) the market for export the 
patented item is not supplied or developed, (iv) commercial activities in India are prejudiced; (B) considering the 
conditions imposed by the patentee for the grant of the licence, the use of unpatented materials or Indian trade and 
industry are prejudiced; (C) the patent holder imposes a condition for the grant of the licence to provide exclusive 
grant back, prevention to challenges to the validity of patent or coercive package licensing; (D) the patented invention 
is not being commercially worked in India to an adequate extent; or (E) the commercial working of the patented 
invention in India is prevented or hindered by the importation of the patented article by (i) the patentee, (ii) persons 
purchasing from him; or (iii) persons against whom the patentee is not taking proceedings for infringement. 
382 See Section 84(1) of the Indian Patents Act of 1970.  
383 See Article 68 of the Industrial Property Law. 
384  See Article 68(1) of the Industrial Property Law.  
385 See Article 70 and 71 of the Industrial Property Law.  
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price negotiations with producers of patented medicines […]”.386 The Draft National Policy also 
focuses upon the “balance between trade and health issues in relation to patents and IP 
protection”, which is a goal that can be reached with the use of compulsory licensing.387 Therefore, 
the Draft National Policy recommends: “compulsory licensing should be introduced in South 
Africa in line with international treaties, such as the Doha Decision 6 of the WTO negotiations on 
Trade and Public Health”. However, it fails in addressing the issue in a detailed and exhaustive 
manner, since it only takes into consideration the policy tool “available pursuant to the Paragraph 
6 Decision of the TRIPS General Council of 30 August 2003”.388 As previously seen with the 
experience of India and Brazil, there are additional types of compulsory licencing, either issued by 
the Court or directly by the State in emergency cases, which are not considered by the Draft 
National Policy but should be included in a strategic reform of the South African patent system.  
2.6.1.  Recommendation 
As highlighted, compulsory licensing can help reducing the negative implications that strong 
patent rights may have upon “public welfare”, since it can significantly reduce the cost of 
medicines “through generic manufacture and by posing a credible threat in negotiations with drug 
manufacturers”.389 Thus, the use of such a policy mechanism could be of special importance for a 
developing country like South Africa, because boosting the generic pharmaceutical industry would 
promote competition.   
In light of these considerations, combined with a review of the experience of other emerging 
economies, such as India and Brazil, it is recommended that South Africa amend, aligning with 
the TRIPS Agreement, Section 4 and Section 56 of the South African Patents Act to allow a greater 
use of the compulsory licensing tool. 
First of all, Section 56 should be modified in order to speed up the process of issuance of 
compulsory licences. As seen, Article 1 of the TRIPS Agreement leaves Member States “free to 
determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their 
                                                             
386 See Department of Trade and Industry, Draft National Policy (note above) 23.  
387 See Department of Trade and Industry, Draft National Policy (note above) 23. 
388 See Dr. T. Schonwette and Prof. Y. A. Vawda, Comments at the Draft National Policy on Intellectual Property 
(IP) of South Africa, 2013, (note above) 12. 
389 See Lisa Forman, (note above) 191.  
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own legal system and practice”. This means that the complex procedure, such as the one set by 
the South African Patents Act, can be replaced by a simpler system. Streamlined processes would 
encourage a greater use of compulsory licences, which resultantly can intensify competition in the 
pharmaceutical sector. 
Secondly, Section 56, as currently worded, limits the grounds upon which a compulsory licence 
may be issued to only four circumstances and only “in case of abuse of patent rights”390. In this 
regard, South Africa could amend Section 56 of its Patents Act by deleting the reference to the 
sole “case of abuse of patent rights” and embracing a broader variety of public health related 
grounds. These grounds could include, in addition to the existing ones, but should not be limited 
to, cases when: (i) the medicine is not available at a reasonably affordable price; (ii) the patent is 
not worked in the country; (iii) there is the need to avoid shortages or stock-outs; (iv) the non-
exploitation of the patent in South Africa or the commercialisation does not satisfy the needs of 
the market; (v) the medicine is an “essential facility”.391   
Regarding Section 4 of the South African Patents Act, it is recommended that South Africa would 
remove the obligation of prior negotiations with the patent holder. In fact, by imposing such a t 
requirement, South Africa does not maximise the flexibility granted by Article 31(b) of the TRIPS 
Agreement to all WTO members, according to which the requirement of obtaining a prior 
authorisation from the patentee “may be waived by a Member in the case of a national emergency 
or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use.”  
2.7.  Parallel importation  
As discussed in the previous Chapters, the principle of international exhaustion of rights, 
recognised in Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement, can be applied in the context of public health to 
ensure better access to medicines.  In this regard, parallel importation permits the importation of a 
patented invention from another country, without the authorisation of its patent holder, provided 
that the product has been already sold, with the authorisation of its title-holder, into the market of 
                                                             
390 Section 56 of the South African Patents Act.  
391 See S27, TAC and MSF in the Joint Submission on the Draft National Intellectual Property Policy, 2013 (note 




To this end, in 2002, South Africa amended its Patents Act of 1978 with the insertion of Section 
45(2), according to which “the disposal of a patented article by or on behalf of a patentee or his 
licencee shall, subject to other patent rights, give the purchaser the right to use, offer to dispose 
of and dispose of that article”.392  
Furthermore, Section 15C of the Medicines Act, introduced in 1997, with the aim of addressing 
the health crisis and ensuring the supply of more affordable medicines, particularly due the 
epidemiological explosion of HIV/AIDS in the country, empowers the Minister to “prescribe the 
conditions for the supply of more affordable medicines in certain circumstances so as to protect 
the health of the public”. This provision, however, should be considered together with Regulation 
7 of the General Regulations to the Medicines Act 2003, which gives effect to Section 15C, but up 
to now has never been used in South Africa for the importation of medicines, probably due to the 
complexity of the systems.393 In fact, certain provisions of the Regulation 7 seems to unduly 
aggravate the mechanism of importation with unnecessary requirements, going beyond the TRIPS 
provisions. Specifically, Regulation 7 establishes that the person desiring to import a medicine 
should submit to the Minister of Health (i) a large number of documents and certificates, 
notwithstanding the lack of an administrative organization, which would appropriately receive 
those papers;394 (ii) documentary proof regarding the price at which the medicine will be sold in 
South Africa, although the price will be eventually set at a second stage of the process, and not 
when the application for patent importation is submitted.395 In addition, the validity of the permit, 
once the Minister of Health approved the application, is limited to a period of two years,396 leading 
to a situation of uncertainty at the end of these two years. Finally, the successful applicant who 
received the permit of parallel importing a medicine in South Africa must apply for the registration 
of the imported medicine, notwithstanding the medicine is only subject to a two years of validity.397  
                                                             
392 See Patents Amendment Act No. 58 of 2002. 
393 See S27, TAC and MSF in the Joint Submission on the Draft National Intellectual Property Policy, 2013 (note 
above) 48.  
394 See Regulation 7(2) of the General Regulations to the Medicines Act 2003.  
395 See Regulation 7(2) e) of the General Regulations to the Medicines Act 2003. 
396 See Regulation 7(3) of the General Regulations to the Medicines Act 2003. 
397 See Regulation 7(5) of the General Regulations to the Medicines Act 2003. 
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Interestingly, in Kenya a progressive approach as to parallel importation can be noted. Section 58.2 
of the Industrial Property Act 2001 of Kenya permits the parallel importation of pharmaceutical 
products, which are branded, generic and produced under a compulsory licence:  “The rights under 
the patent shall not extend to acts in respect of articles which have been put on the market in Kenya 
or in any other country or imported into Kenya”.398 
2.7.1.  Recommendation 
It is recommended that a Patent reform in South Africa would amend Regulation 7 so as to 
facilitate the system of parallel importation and eliminate those provisions, in particular Regulation 
7(2), 7(2) e) iv), 7(3) and 7(5), which unduly complicate the mechanism, exceeding the 
requirements of the TRIPS Agreement. Additionally, South Africa could take Kenyan IP law 
(particularly, Section 58.2 of the Industrial Property Act 2001) as a suitable example of appropriate 
use of the flexibility of parallel importation. 
3. IMPLICATIONS FOR ACCESS TO MEDICINES OF THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN 
PATENTS POLICY 
The goal of obtaining a greater access to medicines in South Africa is challenging and demands a 
wide variety of actions to be put into practice, involving a legislative intervention as well as strict 
jurisprudential interpretations.  
The experience of foreign developing economies, which had fully or partly implemented the 
TRIPS flexibilities, can offer a concrete appraisal of the short and long-term implications that an 
appropriate use of the TRIPS flexibilities could have upon public health in South Africa, and 
especially access to medicines.  
In Thailand, the mortality rate caused by malaria dropped from 10.9 per 100,000 persons in 1977 
to 0.1 per 100,000 persons in 2009, after the policy in favor of the public health sector was 
                                                             
398 For further discussion about Kenyan parallel importation policy, see P. Munyi, R. Lewis-Lettington, Willingness 
and Ability to Use TRIPs Flexibilities: Kenya case study (2004) in DFID Health Systems Research Centre, Issue Paper 
– Access to Medicines accessible online at 
http://www.who.int/hiv/amds/countries/ken_UseTRIPsFlexibilitiesDFID.pdf, accessed in June 2015. 
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implemented by the Thai government.399  Particularly, in 2007, the first compulsory licence for 
non-communicable diseases (NCD) was issued for the drug Plavix, which treats cardiovascular 
diseases. It helped reduce the price of Plavix from US$ 2.75 per tablet to US$ 0.03 per tablet.400 
Subsequently, other four compulsory licences were issued on drugs to treat cancer. This led the 
United States Trade Representative to include Thailand on the “Special 301” Watch List, since, 
according to the US, Thailand’s actions lacked transparency in the granting of compulsory 
licences.401   
As critically discussed, India is one of the largest producers of generic medicines in the world, 
whose generic pharmaceutical industry satisfies 95% of the national health needs.402 Since the 
TRIPS Agreement came into force, India attempted to maximize the use of its flexibilities, in 
particular its patentability standards and the issuance of compulsory licences for pharmaceuticals. 
Recently, a compulsory licence for the anti-cancer drug, Nexavar, was granted in March 2012,403 
allowing the generic drug manufacturer, Natco, to put sorafenib tosylate into the market at US$ 162 
per patient per month instead of the original price of US$ 5162.51.404  
In 2003, Malaysia issued a government-use licence, during a period of two years, for importing 
generic ARVs from the Indian company, Cipla. This induced the patent owners, Bristol-Myers 
Squibb and GlaxoSmithKline, to drastically reduce the prices for the stavudine + didanosine + 
nevirapine from US$ 261.44 to US$197.10 (per patient per month) and the combination of 
zidovudine and lamivudine + efavirenz from US$ 362.63 to US$ 136.34 (per patient per month). 
Furthermore, after the import of generic ARVs under a government-use licence, the percentage of 
cost reduction in 2004 was of 83% for stavudine + didanosine + nevirapine (per patient per month) 
                                                             
399 See S. Wibulpolprasert, “Thailand Health Profile 2008-2010”, Printing Press, The War Veteran Organization of 
Thailand (2010). 
400 See S. Danawala & Z. Zhang, “Implications of TRIPS Flexibilities for Access to Non-communicable Disease 
Medicines in Lower and Middle Income Countries” in International Journal of Nursing and Health Care, (2013) 
Volume 1 Number 1, 6.  
401 J. Wetzler, M. Mankad & A. Burrowbridge, Timeline for US- Thailand Compulsory Licence Dispute, Version 3. 
Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property. (2009) Available online at: http://infojustice.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/11/pijip-thailand-timeline.pdf, accessed in June 2015.  
402 See S. Danawala and Z. Zhang, (note above) 7. 
403 See Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks, Compulsory Licence Application No.1 of 2011. 
Available online at: www.ipindia.nic.in/iponew/compulsory_licence_12032012.pdf, accessed in June 2015. 
404 See S. Danawala and Z. Zhang, (note above) 7. 
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and of 68% for the combination of zidovudine and lamivudine + efavirenz.405  
As already seen, in July 2005, after long negotiations between the pharmaceutical company Abbott 
and the Government of Brazil regarding the granting of a compulsory licence for the drug 
Kaletra,406 Abbott agreed to decrease the price of the drug from US$ 1.17 to US$ 0.63 (unit price 
per Kaletra capsule).407    
The above are only a few examples of the results achieved by low-income countries, which have 
successfully reduced drug prices, as a result of a better use of the flexibilities granted by the TRIPS 
Agreement. Therefore, in applying a patent policy, which is more favorable to public health, South 
Africa can also obtain the same positive outcomes resulting in greater price reductions for 
medicines, which will lead to increased access to medicines. 
Importantly, the positive effects experienced by some of these mentioned emerging economies can 
be fully experienced if a revision of the national policies which introduced TRIPS-plus provisions 
is also carried out. As discussed,408 TRIPS-plus are provisions whose scope goes beyond the 
original intention of the TRIPS Agreement’s standards.409 These provisions are often implemented 
through FTAs and they aim at increasing IP protection, but they can concurrently obstruct the full 
use of the flexibilities available in the TRIPS Agreement.410 In particular, a special report of the 
UN High Commission for Human Rights stressed the negative impacts that FTAs can have upon 
access to medicines, stating that: “these agreements are usually negotiated with little transparency 
or participation from the public, and often establish TRIPS-plus provisions. These provisions 
undermine the safeguards and flexibilities that developing countries sought to preserve under 
                                                             
405 See M. Khor, “Patents, compulsory licences and access to medicines: some recent experiences” in World Health 
Organization, Intellectual Property and access to medicines, (2010) 93.  
406 For further details, see Chapter IV, 3) d) of this study.  
407 See M. Khor (note above) 99. 
408 See Chapter II, 3) c) iii) of this study for further discussion. 
409 S. Musungu & G. Dutfield, Multilateral Agreements and a TRIPS-Plus World: The World Intellectual Property 
Organisation, TRIPS Issues Papers No. 3, (2003) QUNO, Geneva, and Quaker International Affairs Programme, 
Ottawa, Canada. In particular, the authors highlighted that: “ […] the adoption of multilateral, plurilateral, regional 
and/or national intellectual property rules and practices which have the effect of reducing the ability of developing 
countries to protect the public interest aims to increase the level of protection for right holders beyond that which is 
given in the TRIPS Agreement [...]”.   
410 See S. Danawala and Z. Zhang, (note above) 4.  
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TRIPS”.411 As a result, there is a “need to revisit trade-related agreements in light of their impact 
on the right to health and in particular on access to medicines” 412, but particularly, “developing 
countries and LDCs should not introduce TRIPS-plus standards in their national laws. Developed 
countries should not encourage developing countries and LDCs to enter into TRIPS-plus FTAs 
and should be mindful of actions which may infringe upon the right to health”. 413 
Consequently, the positive implications resulting from implementation of the TRIPS flexibilities, 
as experienced by the discussed emerging economies, can succeed through an effective strategy of 
complete use of the flexibilities available in the TRIPS, and especially refraining from entering 
into new TRIPS-plus FTAs.414 
4. COMPETING INTERESTS: THE HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH VERSUS 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS – IMPLICATIONS FOR ACCESS TO 
MEDICINES 
Far from being unanimously welcomed, the legislative reform of the South African Patents 
systems as introduced by the Draft National Policy gave rise to conflicting opinions, with national 
and international NGOs and generic drug companies supporting the upcoming IP reform, and 
resistance coming from pharmaceutical companies condemning what they considered a weakening 
of patent protection.  
Since the debate is far from over, these opposing views will be investigated below in turn. 
                                                             
411 United Nation, General Assembly, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Including The Right to Development, A/HRC/11/12 31 March 2009, para. 69. Available 
online at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/11session/A.HRC.11.12_en.pdf, accessed in June 
2015. 
412 Ibid 5.  
413 Ibid para. 108.  
414 The Draft National Policy also refers to data exclusivity provisions, which concern “the protection of undisclosed 
data submitted in the course of seeking regulatory approval of new chemical entities” (see Department of Trade and 
Industry, Draft National Policy (note above), Chapter 1, i), 21). In particular, the Draft National Policy recognises the 
importance of Article 39.9 of the TRIPS, which requires Member States to protect “undisclosed test or other data” 
for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical entities. However, the Draft National Policy also firmly recommends the 
restriction on the protection of this confidential information to what is required by Article 39.3 of the TRIPS 
Agreement. For these reasons, new forms of data protection, which exceed the protection required by Article 39.3 of 
the TRIPS Agreement, should be seen as TRIPS-plus provisions and therefore resolutely rejected. 
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4.1.  Pro-reform: The NGOs, Generic Drugs companies’ and scholars’ perspective 
Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), SECTION27 (S27), Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), whose 
campaign “Fix the Patent Laws”415 was especially involved in the debate regarding IPRs and 
access to medicines, positively welcomed the Draft National Policy, through their Joint 
Submission On The Draft National Intellectual Property Policy, 2013.416 
These three NGOs, particularly, highlighted the necessity to review the South African IP law in 
light of the “constitutional obligations arising from the Bill of Rights” 417  together with the 
“opportunities provided by the international trade framework” (the TRIPS Agreement and the 
Doha Declaration), “which recognises that protecting public health must be a priority for all 
member states”.418  
MSF, S27 and TAC particularly appreciated “the tenor of the draft policy”, focused towards 
Section 27 of the Constitution and “the right to have access to health care services”. Moreover, 
they valued the Draft National Policy for recognising (i) the existence of a strong connection 
between the patent regime and the excessive cost of medicines and medical treatments in South 
Africa; and (ii) “the country’s health and developmental needs”; (iii) the efforts of India and Brazil 
to reach a balance between IP and public health.419 
The submission provides “key recommendations” as to critical aspects of the IP systems in South 
Africa. In particular, regarding patents and access to medicines, MSF, S27 and TAC emphasises 
in their Submission that a new South African Patents Act should include stricter patentability 
                                                             
415 “Fix the Patent Laws” is a campaign initiated by the non-profit organisation (NGO) TAC in order to “ensure that 
every person living with HIV has access to quality, comprehensive prevention and treatment services to live a healthy 
life.” The blog, which is available at: http://www.fixthepatentlaws.org, stresses the attention towards the importance 
of a legal reform of the South Africa’s Patents Act 57 of 1978, which will decrease the price of drugs, and therefore 
will improve the health of millions of South Africans. 
416 The Joint Submission was handed to the Department of Trade and Industry in Pretoria on the 17th October 2013 
and it is available at: http://www.tac.org.za/news/tac-msf-s27-joint-submission-dtis-draft-national-policy-ip, accessed 
in August 2014. 
417 See Section 7 of the South African Constitution of 1996, which binds the State to “respect, protect, promote and 
fulfill the rights in the Bill of Rights”, (note above). 
418 See S27, TAC and MSF in the Joint Submission on the Draft National Intellectual Property Policy, 2013 (note 
above) para. 2.  
419 See S27, TAC and MSF in the Joint Submission on the Draft National Intellectual Property Policy, 2013 (note 
above) para. 4. 
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requirements, and it should expressly preclude “new uses and methods of treatment” from 
patentability, as well as “new forms of known substances” when “they fail to demonstrate the 
required degree of inventive step”.420  
Furthermore, attention was given to the online patent search database, which needs to be 
“improved to facilitate access to accurate information on patents for ordinary users of the system”. 
421 Stakeholders and civil society could also benefit from an online database, by taking direct 
actions “to limit the granting of abusive medicines patents”.422 As regards the examination and 
opposition proceedings, the Submission highlighted the importance of having “meaningful pre- 
and post- grant opposition mechanisms”.423 It also calls for a simplified process of issuance of 
compulsory licensing and for the inclusion of “default positions regarding licence conditions 
(including but not limited to royalty rates) and negotiation timelines” in Sections 4 and 56 of the 
South African Patents Act.424 Finally, Paragraph 6.7 of the Submission stresses attention upon the 
importance of scientific research and educational use exceptions.  
A similar view was taken by a group of academics representing the University of Cape Town and 
the University of KwaZulu-Natal in the Joint Submission On Draft National Policy On Intellectual 
Property (IP) Of South Africa, 2013.425 
These scholars expressed their favour towards the amendment of the South African Patents Act in 
the manner stated by the Draft National Policy, since the intention of the same “is grounded in a 
developmental approach appropriate to our country, and seeks to eliminate the many perverse 
outcomes of IP protection which are detrimental to the broader society”.426 In particular, they 
praised the fact that the Draft National Policy’s main goal is “to strike a fair balance between 
                                                             
420 Ibid para. 6.1. 
421 Ibid para. 6.2. 
422 Ibid para. 6.2. 
423 Ibid para. 6.3. 
424 Ibid para. 6.5. 
425 See Dr. T. Schonwette and Prof. Y. A. Vawda, Comments at the Draft National Policy on Intellectual Property 
(IP) of South Africa, 2013, (note above). 
426 Ibid 4.  
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competing private and public interests in the field – taking into consideration South Africa’s 
specific needs and circumstances”.427  
The discussion as to the upcoming patent reform is centred on the crucial need of addressing “lax 
patentability standards” and renovating the patent examination system, with “search and 
examination” procedure for the granting of patents”, which would bring it “in line with virtually 
all developed industrialised countries and, more importantly, emerging economies such as 
India”.428 
However, the authors pointed out that “the document is, among other things confused by repetition, 
inconsistencies, contradictions and omissions”429 and that legislative reform in itself is not enough. 
In fact, a proficient examining body would require “qualified individuals capable of not only 
performing searches of prior art but who also have the knowledge and experience to evaluate the 
patent application in light of the prior art”.430 To this aim, policy priorities should be (i) to fund 
“training of examiners”, (ii) to enable lawyers “to study further to obtain the necessary expertise” 
and (iii) to “provide technical assistance and skill development of judges”. 431  Opposition 
procedures should be available to a great variety of actors, including competitors and NGOs.432 
Furthermore, the upcoming patent reform should provide a South African patent database “freely 
available and fully searchable on-line by anyone”.433   
Generic pharmaceutical manufacturers have also welcomed the legislative reform proclaimed by 
the Draft National Policy. In this regard, Pharma Dynamics, highlighted the importance of the 
Draft National Policy in boosting access to medicines and healthcare in South Africa. In particular, 
its CEO, Paul Anley declared: “after years of urging authorities to address the stranglehold of 
originator drug companies on the market, it appears that the general public will finally start 
reaping the fruits of a market free of patent manipulation. […] We believe that the proposals will 
                                                             
427 See Dr. T. Schonwette and Prof. Y. A. Vawda, Comments at the Draft National Policy on Intellectual Property 
(IP) of South Africa, 2013, (note above), 4. 
428 Ibid 16.  
429 Ibid 4. 
430 Ibid 16. 
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bring new products to market faster and therefore increase competition and reduce the cost of 
medicine”.434 
4.2.  Contra-reform: The pharmaceutical companies’ opinions and other influential views  
Relevant to this investigation is the understanding of the opposite side of the debate, mainly 
represented by Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) and Innovative 
Pharmaceutical Association of South Africa (IPASA).435  
IPASA, in particular, in submitting its Comments on the Draft National Policy on IP in October 
2013,436 partly expressed its favor to the Draft National Policy, believing that it can be an important 
step towards reaching the goals of encouraging “medicines innovation, investment and economic 
development”.437  However, IPASA also conveyed several concerns as to the upcoming reform 
regarding the South African patent systems, since the Draft National Policy could also “overly 
restrict patentable subject matter and may not offer adequate data protection to pharmaceutical 
innovators”.438 In fact, according to IPASA, a use by the Draft National Policy of the TRIPS 
flexibilities in an arbitrary manner could lead to a weakening of the patent system and the reduction 
or elimination of patents for pharmaceuticals.439 This potential occurrence is seen as a severe threat 
for all industrial sectors and ultimately for the whole South Africa economy, since, in IPASA’s 
opinion, it “would discourage R&D and innovation projects”.440  
In particular, as regards the “substantive search and examination system”, in IPASA’s opinion, 
the current system does not contribute to weaken patents and the implementation of the new system 
                                                             
434 L. Daniels, “New Draft South African IP Policy Receives Initial Positive Reactions” in Intellectual Property Watch, 
(2013). Article available online at: Http://Www.Ip-Watch.Org/2013/09/09/New-South-African-Ip-Policy-Receives-
Initial-Positive-Reactions/, accessed in May 2015. 
435 The Innovative Pharmaceutical Association of South Africa (IPASA) is a trade association representing in South 
Africa the following research- based biopharmaceutical companies operating: Abbot Laboratories, AbbVie, Alcon 
Laboratories, Allergan Pharmaceuticals, Amgen, AstraZeneca, Baxter Healthcare, Bayer Healthcare, Boehringer 
Ingelheim, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Covidien, Galderma, GE Healthcare, Janssen Pharmaceutical, Lilly, Merck, MSD, 
Norgine, Novartis, Novo Nordisk, Takeda, Pfizer, Roche, Sanofi , Servier Laboratories. 
436  See IPASA, Comments on the Draft National Policy on IP – October 2013, available online at: 
http://ipasa.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Copy-of-IPASA-submission-on-the-draft-national-policy-on-IP-final-
131016.pdf, accessed in April 2015. 
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described by the Draft National Policy will be neither practical not feasible.441 In fact, “such a 
system will demand high costs and substantial human resource capacity”.442 Furthermore, IPASA 
added that the fact that only pharmaceutical patents will be examined, whereas other applications 
will only be registered, would result in obvious discrimination against inventions for drugs, in 
contravention of Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.443 
As to the pre-grant opposition system, IPASA considered that such a mechanism might lead to 
“unnecessary delays and undermine development of a robust intellectual property system […]. 
Such proceedings may be used inappropriately and often frivolously to delay the granting and 
enjoyment of valid patent rights”.444 Regarding the post-grant opposition system, according to 
IPASA, there is no need to introduce a new mechanism of post- opposition, since Section 61 of 
the South African Patents Act already provide for a procedure of post-grant revocation.445  
The Draft National Policy’s proposal of restricting the scope of patentability criteria has also been 
challenged by IPASA, which expressed its opinion against the amendment of the South African 
Patents Act regarding the ban of patenting new uses/new forms of already known substances.446 
In its comments, IPASA stated: “through continued research and development, important new 
uses for known medicines are discovered”.447 Thus, IPASA recommended the South African 
government to recognise the crucial importance of incremental innovations and new uses for 
existing drugs.  Resultantly, IPASA stated that “failure to provide patents for ‘new uses of known 
products’ may reduce investments in research, resulting in fewer treatments for unmet medical 
needs”.448 
With regard to parallel importations and compulsory licensing, IPASA pointed out that the 
reference to the Doha Declaration of 2001, made in the Draft National Policy, although correct, 
needs to be reviewed in the context of the time when the Doha Declaration was issued: “the 2001 
                                                             
441 See IPASA, Comments on the Draft National Policy on IP (note above) 9, recommendation 1.1. 
442 Ibid 9, recommendation 1.1. 
443 Ibid 9, recommendation 1.2. 
444 Ibid 9, recommendation 1.3. 
445 Ibid 9, recommendation 1.3. 
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Doha Declaration must be viewed within the context of critical issues that were addressed at that 
time, ie the gravity of the pandemic diseases that were afflicting developing and least-developed 
countries at that time”.449 As a result, as stated by IPASA, legislative reforms in line with the Doha 
Declaration were necessary to address the health crises occurring in that period of time, however, 
the “reliance on the 2001 Doha Declaration cannot be justified in order to motivate legislative 
amendments to facilitate parallel imports and compulsory licences in respect of pharmaceutical 
products in general”.450 As to parallel importation, a particular concern of IPASA is the risk that 
the increase of parallel imports would facilitate the market of uncontrolled and counterfeit drugs, 
with obvious negative implications in terms of public health.451 Regarding compulsory licensing, 
IPASA took the view that Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, should be applied solely “on case-
by-case basis” and in case South Africa has been declared to have “insufficient manufacturing 
capacity for the specific product that it seeks to import”.452 Thus, according to IPASA, South 
Africa’s lack or insufficient manufacturing capacity should be factually determined in order to 
invoke Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration.453  
Another point raised by IPASA regards the Bolar, early working exception. IPASA stressed the 
attention to the fact that the South African Patents Act already provide for early working exception, 
therefore there is no need for any amendment of this provision.454  
IPASA’s standpoint is partially supported in the response submitted by the Anton Mostert Chair 
of Intellectual Property Law at the University of Stellenbosch (“CIP”),455 whose opinion was 
summarised in the Comments On The Draft National Policy On Intellectual Property, 2013.456 
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The CIP started stressing the attention to the incoherence of the Draft National Policy, highlighting 
the fact “[…] that it is often difficult to comprehend what the author is saying”.457  It also 
challenged the feasibility of the search and examination systems in South Africa. In fact, if on one 
hand the search and examination regime is seen as a good idea by CIP, since “such a system will 
result in patents that are most likely valid and more difficult to challenge”;458 on the other hand, 
it pointed out that because examination and opposition proceedings require patent officers with 
skills and specific knowledge, “the shortage of skills and the duration required to train people 
[…], good as they are, may not be feasible for South Africa”.459 
Despite the expected attempt of the pro-pharmaceutical industry lobby to restrain the wave of 
reformation in South Africa, some explanations could address their concerns.  
Regarding the assumption made by IPASA that the use of the TRIPS flexibilities would negatively 
impact R&D, it should be pointed out that coherent utilisation of the TRIPS flexibilities, as 
recommended by the Draft National Policy, would not necessarily do so. As previously stated, 
patents are not exclusively issued for substantial efficacy enhancement of existing drugs. Actually, 
the majority of R&D carried out by pharmaceutical manufacturers relates to the enhancement and 
amelioration of existing technology.460 Resultantly, patent holders often receive rewards for R&D 
costs for inventions other than “genuine innovations”.461 Furthermore, although IP protection and 
R&D have been shown to be linked regarding diseases affecting the developed world, this is not 
the case regarding diseases that predominately affect the developing world. Furthermore 90% of 
global investment in R&D is focused on diseases affecting the developed world with only 10% 
                                                             
IPASA’s interests, PAE considered that even though “a comprehensive IP policy is needed”, South Africa should not 
rush into the policy offered by the Draft National Policy because “it will be doing great damage to the country and 
helping competitors such as Nigeria” (pag. 4). In PAE’s view, “[…] patents do not impede access to medicines; 
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457 See Anton Mostert Chair of Intellectual Property Law at the University of Stellenbosch, (note above) 1-2, para 4.  
458 Ibid 3-5, para 17. 
459 Ibid 3-6, para 21. 
460  See C. Correa, “Patentability standards: When is an invention patentable?” in World Health Organization, 
Intellectual property and access to medicines: papers and perspectives (2010), 44. 
461 See R. Lopert & D. Gleeson, “The High Price of “Free” Trade: U.S. Trade Agreements and Access to Medicines” 
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directed towards diseases affecting the less developed world. 462  Considering these points it 
becomes apparent that the assertions relating to negative impacts on R&D lack credible support 
from the literature.  
Regarding the argument that a substantive search and examination system would not be feasible, 
nor practical, it should be noted that South Africa’s patent office is one of the cheapest in the 
world. 463  Therefore, the resources necessary for investing in a new system of search and 
examination can be obtained through a policy of increasing patent registration and renewal fees. 
In fact, raising the fees would (i) support patent offices; (ii) increase the quality standards and 
finally, (iii) reduce the number of patents granted to the same applicant.464  
To answer the concern that a pre-grant opposition system can “delay the granting and enjoyment 
of valid patent rights”,465 this paper has above demonstrated that pre-grant opposition mechanism 
is an essential tool necessary for establishing a consistent patent system, which is coherent with 
the applicable patent criteria in view of addressing public health concerns. As shown, pre and post-
grant oppositions ensure that the quality and validity of patents are entirely satisfied, reducing the 
risk of patent ever-greening and precluding monopolies over non-patentable inventions. Also, pre 
and post-grant opposition systems will reduce, or even prevent, the need for civil proceedings of 
revocation if the quality of a patent is subsequently challenged. In this regard, the argument 
sustained by IPASA466 that South Africa already provides for a procedure of post-grant revocation 
and resultantly does not need an appropriate post- grant revocation system is not supported.  
R&D in medicine is certainly of crucial importance and the discovery of new drugs and effective 
therapies is essential for the progress of humanity and global public health. Patents are granted as 
financial rewards for the investment supported by an individual or a company and for the benefit 
to be spread to the society at large. However, under international and national patent laws, the 
existence of a patent monopoly is limited in the time and therefore any kind of patent ever-greening 
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should be rejected and deemed as detrimental to the benefit of the general public. Resultantly, 
patenting new uses/new forms of already known substances should be banned when they do not 
bear any incremental innovation. 
Furthermore, the reason given by IPASA concerning the superfluity of a legislative reform with 
regard to compulsory licensing should be also rejected. IPASA stated that the need for compulsory 
licensing should be viewed in the context of the health crisis affecting South Africa and other 
developing countries during the time when the Doha Declaration was issued. Conversely, the 
importance of using compulsory licences is, as seen previously, statutorily declared under Article 
31 of the TRIPS Agreement and repeatedly highlighted in the Doha Declaration and subsequent 
WTO Decisions. Recently, the importance for developing countries, in general, and South Africa, 
in particular, has been further reaffirmed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
in Using Law To Accelerate Treatment Access in South Africa,467 according to which compulsory 
licensing is the essential remedy to “anticompetitive practices and the power to regulate specific 
types of abuse of rights that would constitute anti-competitive behaviour”. In light of these 
considerations, compulsory licensing is an existing public health related policy tool, which cannot 
be artificially restricted to a certain time in history.  
Finally, there is no apparent evidence that the use of parallel importation would increase the 
amount of uncontrolled and counterfeit drugs entering the country. The WTO clarifies that parallel 
imports are “not imports of counterfeit products or illegal copies. These are products marketed by 
the patent owner […] or with the patent owner’s permission in one country and imported into 
another country without the approval of the patent owner” (emphasis added).468  The risk that 
unwanted illicit medicines would enter illegally in the parallel trade market can be avoided by 
properly monitoring the trade of medicines. In this regard, the Draft also recommends: 
“counterfeited medicines should be properly monitored and the deflection of medicines to 
unintended destinations should be avoided”.469 
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The examination carried out in this final Chapter has explored the proposed amendments that the 
upcoming patent law reform, namely the Draft National Policy on IP, is likely to introduce in the 
South African Patents Act. Particularly, the analysis has focused on the TRIPS flexibilities that, in 
the Draft National Policy’s view, should be implemented in South Africa. As seen, the Draft 
National Policy provides a series of recommendations for a legislative patent reform in the country, 
starting from the recognition of the importance of the TRIPS flexibilities, as highlighted in the 
Doha Declaration and the WTO Decisions of 2005 and 2006. However, this study has recognised 
the existence in the Draft National Policy of certain inaccuracies and deficiencies, whose 
adjustment is here highly recommended. To this aim, this work has suggested a series of 
amendments that, in line with the TRIPS Agreement, will enhance the use of the available TRIPS 
flexibilities. Also, the investigation has explored the practical experiences of countries such as 
India, Brazil and Argentina in their approach to those internationally recognised policy tools 
directed to maximise access to essential medicines in emerging economies. The examination of 
those jurisdictions has shown the feasibility of the implementation of TRIPS flexibilities in South 
Africa, which would involve:  
1) the use of narrower patentability criteria; 
2) a substantive examination procedure with proceedings of pre- and post- oppositions; 
3) limited exceptions to the patentee rights, including research, experimental and educational 
purposes; 
4) a more appropriate use of the mechanism of compulsory licensing, aligning Section 4 and 
56 of the South African Patents Act to the TRIPS Agreement;  
5) the amendment of Regulation 7 of the General Regulations to the Medicines Act 2003 for 
an effective use of parallel imports. 
Furthermore, this study has briefly explored the long-term effect that an appropriate use of the 
TRIPS flexibilities has had upon public health and access to medicines in developing countries 
similar to South Africa. The analysis showed a noticeable improvement in terms of public health 
related issues in low-income countries such Thailand, India, Malaysia and Brazil, resulting in the 
successful decrease of medicine prices for life-saving drugs. As a result, in applying a more 
favorable public health policy, South Africa could obtain similar outcomes that can improve access 
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to medicine. However, as earlier discussed, the positive effects experienced by these emerging 
economies should be complemented with the review of the national policies, which apply the so-
called TRIPS-plus provisions, creating barriers to the full use of the flexibilities available in the 
TRIPS Agreement.  
At the end of the Chapter a summary of the reactions of NGOs, academics, generic drug 
manufacturers and pharmaceutical companies has been reported. In fact, far from being universally 
welcomed, the forthcoming legislative reform of the South African Patents systems, as introduced 
by the Draft National Policy, gave rise to conflicting opinions: on one hand, national and 
international NGOs and generic drug companies expressed their support to the upcoming IP reform; 
whereas, on the other hand, the resistance of the pharmaceutical companies severely criticized 
what they considered a weakening of their patent rights. Finally, this paper has shown how 
concerns expressed by pharmaceutical industries can be overcome through the correct use of the 
permitted TRIPS flexibilities.  
The presence in the pharmaceutical market of these significant opposing interests further 
demonstrates the need for a strategy of balance. This means an appropriate and comprehensive use 
of the public health related flexibilities available in the TRIPS Agreement, whose primary goal is 
nothing more than to create the perfect balance between IP rights protection and the human right 








Accessibility of essential medicines to address present and future health crisis in South Africa 
cannot significantly improve unless substantial legislative and political actions are implemented. 
Accordingly, the goal of this study was: (i) firstly, to critically analyse the current patents systems 
of South Africa, set forth by the South African Patents Act, which, as argued, does not entirely 
facilitate access to affordable medicine, in part because it greatly expands patentability beyond the 
minimum required by the TRIPS Agreement; (ii) secondly, to define and explain the 
internationally recognised public-health methods, in particular the TRIPS flexibilities, necessary 
for South Africa in order to reach the policy objective of facilitating access to essential medicines 
in the country; (iii) thirdly, to critically examine, in relation to patents and access to medicines 
only, the new South African Intellectual Property (IP) Policy, as currently worded in the Draft 
National IP Policy470; (iv) fourthly, assess, with the help of a comparative analysis as to the 
implementation of the TRIPS flexibilities in similar emerging economies (in particular, India, 
Brazil and Argentina), the positive impact that the new rules of the upcoming patent legislative 
reform could potentially have upon IPRs and access to medicines; (v) finally, formulate practical 
recommendations for the reform of the South African patents system in order to positively enhance 
access to medicines.  
This work, focusing on the universal recognition of the human right to health expressed in 
international treaties and national constitutions, used as its point of departure, an analysis of 
Section 27 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996, which enshrines the human 
rights principle of having access to health care. As discussed, the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa in Minister of Health & Others v. Treatment Action Campaign & Others471 highlighted the 
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importance of Section 27, stating that this provision explicitly imposes on the State the obligation 
to accomplish the right to access to health. In addition, the Constitutional Court clarified in 
Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others472, that the 
“Constitution obliges the state to act positively to ameliorate” the situation of those who live “in 
deplorable conditions throughout the country. […] The obligation is to provide access to housing, 
health-care, sufficient food and water, and social security to those unable to support themselves 
and their dependants”.473  
The above decisions conclusively establish that the right to health and access to life-saving 
medicines in South Africa is a national obligation that the State must undeniably put into place.  
Regrettably, as shown, the South African Patents Act applies a more extensive patents legislation 
than is required by the TRIPS Agreement, which results in an inadequate use of the TRIPS 
flexibilities allowed in the international patents context.  
Since the crucial debate as to whether IPRs, particularly patents, should have priority over the right 
to health and access to medicines or vice-versa is far from over, a balanced solution should be 
considered. In fact, on one hand, IPRs and more specifically patents, contribute to the progress of 
society by rewarding the title-holder with a monopoly on the invention, and by allowing 
pharmaceutical industries to adequately invest on R&D; on the other hand, pandemics and health 
emergencies, such as the HIV/AIDS and TB crisis affecting South Africa, ask for some degree of 
limitation of the monopoly owned by pharmaceutical companies in order to increase the 
competition from generic companies to provide cheaper medicines. As a result, a solution that 
balances those opposing but interfaced rights must be reached. This could be obtained, as 
highlighted in this work, by taking full advantage of the flexibilities granted by the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
Hence, this study has verified that South Africa, in order to reach the obligation of positively 
addressing public health related issues, must enact the international policy mechanisms contained 
in the TRIPS flexibilities. Notably, the crucial importance of the TRIPS flexibilities has been 
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emphasised by the Doha Declaration of 2001, which has underlined the need for developing 
countries and LDCs to take full advantage of the TRIPS flexibilities so as to guarantee access to 
medicine in their territories. Especially, paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration of 2001 affirms that 
the TRIPS Agreement “can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive 
of WTO Members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines 
for all”.474     
As previously shown, South Africa has often broadly interpreted the novelty principle, holding 
that little differences between the prior art and the claimed invention are able to satisfy the novelty 
requirement.475 In addition, Section 25(9) of the South African Patents Act brings into the system 
the problem of “patent ever-greening”, by expressly recognising the patenting of new uses of 
already-known substances, which is an exception that goes beyond the patentability requirements 
set by the TRIPS Agreement.  
Moreover, while a substantial examination system (which includes pre- and post-grant 
mechanisms of opposing patent applications) is internationally recognised, by a number of 
developing countries, the South Africa Patents Act provides that a patent application shall be 
granted if the application complies with the required formalities.476 As demonstrated earlier, patent 
applications can be granted without ensuring that the criteria of patentability have been satisfied. 
In this regard, this study revealed the legal response to the implementation of the TRIPS 
Agreement of countries such as India, Brazil and Argentina. India, for instance, set stricter 
patentability criteria, unambiguously aimed at limiting the practice of patent ever-greening.477 
Brazil subjects the granting of a pharmaceutical patent to the mechanism of the “prior consent” 
from ANVISA; meanwhile, the Argentinian Ministries of Industry and Health together with the 
Argentinian National Industrial Property Institute approved and adopted stronger standards of 
                                                             
474  See Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 20 November 2001, Doha WTO Ministerial 
Declaration 2001, (note above). 
475 See Schlumberger Logelco Inc. v. Coflexip SA, (note above). 
476 See Section 34 of the South African Patents Act that empowers the registrar of applications to grant the patent if it 
complies with the requirements of the Act. 
477 See Chapter IV, 2) b of this work in which shows as India in order to prevent unwarranted patent monopolies, 
directly excludes in Section 3 of the its Patents Act certain inventions from patent protection.    
 
 124 
patentability requirements, which are contained in “Examination Guidelines”478, for instructing 
patent examiners in the registration phase.  
In addition, this study has shown that the South African legal approach to the use of other 
flexibilities available in the international context, such as compulsory licensing, parallel 
importation and limited exceptions, lags behind those of similar emerging economies. As 
previously disclosed, Section 56 of the South African Patents Act requires a lengthy and costly 
judicial process mechanism when granting a compulsory licence. Currently, applications must be 
filed with the Commissioner of Patents and the proceeding will be conducted according to the laws 
governing civil cases, like any other full judicial proceeding.479 This delay excessively complicates 
the issuance and implementation of compulsory licences, which can take up to three or more years 
to be fully completed with unacceptable effects in case of national emergencies.  
As seen for parallel importation, Regulation 7 of the General Regulations 2003, which gives effect 
to Section 15C(b) of the Medicines Act related to parallel importation has not yet been put into 
practice480. Finally, although in 2002 South Africa introduced the “early working” or “Bolar” 
exception, amending Section 69A(1) of its Patents Act, it does not seem to extensively utilise the 
exceptions considered by Art. 30 of the TRIPS Agreement. For instance, research, experimental 
and educational exceptions, which would not be in conflict with the TRIPS Agreement, are not 
considered.  
Although the implementation of the TRIPS flexibilities by India, Brazil and Argentina in their 
legislation shows a different legal approach, specifically due to differences in their political and 
historical backgrounds, South Africa can take those strategies as examples for tailoring the reform 
of patents law system to its specific needs. 
These three countries attempted, in fact, to limit, where possible, the drastic implications that the 
new international patent policy, brought by the TRIPS Agreement, had on pharmaceuticals and 
resultantly on access to medicines.  As noted, a strict adoption of the TRIPS Agreement 
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patentability standards could benefit the level of competition in the market, with particular regard 
to the competition of generic medicines, especially in developing countries where they are most 
needed. For instance, India resisted the Western pressures, through (i) delaying, the adoption of 
patent protection for pharmaceuticals, and (ii) applying stricter patentability criteria and 
implementing a substantial examination system, with pre- and post- opposition procedures. In 
addition, the India Government, without breaching its international obligations, prioritised the 
public interest rather than the economic revenues of multinational drug industries by granting, in 
March 2012, the first compulsory licence to the generic manufacturer Natco Pharma, for the 
manufacture of Bayer’s anti-cancer drug, Nexavar.481 The Controller General of Patents issued the 
compulsory licence especially in view of the substantial price difference between Nexavar 
medicine (approximately US$ 5800) and the generic version offered by Natco Pharma 
(US$181).482 With regard to Brazil, this study has shown how the Brazilian government repeatedly 
attempted to safeguard its public health policy of universal access to ARVs with the use or threat 
to use of the mechanism of compulsory licensing as a negotiating tool.   
Taking these international examples into consideration, the discussion, finally, has explored the 
proposed amendments that the Draft National Policy is likely to introduce in the South African 
Patents Act. Particularly, the Draft National Policy, recognising the importance of the TRIPS 
flexibilities, as highlighted in the Doha Declaration and the WTO Decisions of 2005 and 2006, 
sets a series of recommendations for a legislative patent reform in the country. However, this study 
noticed the existence of some inaccuracies and deficiencies in the Draft National Policy, which 
should be addressed by the South African government.  
As seen, this work has recommended a series of amendments that are able to enhance the use of 
the available TRIPS flexibilities, which can be summarised as follows:483  
1) the use of stricter patentability criteria; 
2) a substantial examination procedure with proceedings of pre- and post- oppositions; 
3) limited exceptions to the patentee rights, including research, experimental and educational 
purposes; 
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4) a more extensive use of the mechanism of compulsory licensing, aligning Section 4 and 56 
of the South African Patents Act to the TRIPS Agreement;  
5) the amendment of Regulation 7 of the General Regulations to the Medicines Act 2003 in 
order to completely use the mechanism of parallel imports. 
Regarding the long-term effects that an appropriate use of the TRIPS flexibilities could have on 
public health and access to medicines, this analysis has concisely shown the impact that TRIPS 
flexibilities had in other emerging economies. Thus, a visible improvement in terms of public 
health related issues is observed in low-income countries such as Thailand, India, Malaysia and 
Brazil, which results in the successful decrease of medicine prices for life-saving drugs.484 In light 
of this, it has been shown that South Africa could obtain similar outcomes by applying a more 
favorable public health policy. Nevertheless, this intervention, in order to fully achieve the positive 
effects faced by the above emerging economies, should be accompanied by the amendment, and 
the refusal, of national policies containing TRIPS-plus provisions, which create explicit barriers 
to the full use of the flexibilities available in the TRIPS Agreement.  
Whereas there are still some deficiencies in the South African patent systems, the process of 
improving access to medicines in the country has positively started. In addition, the support of 
national and international NGOs and public organisations as well as generic drug companies, to 
the proposed legislative reform of the South African Patents systems, introduced by the Draft 
National Policy, have significantly increased the awareness of the public opinion on the need to 
safeguard the human right to health, in particular the right to have access to medicines. That being 
said, the process of improving public health in South Africa is ongoing, and optimistically in the 
years ahead it will be possible to see a radical change in the availability, affordability and 
accessibility of essential medicines. 
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